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This thesis is the first full-length study to investigate memory discourse in Katherine 
Mansfield’s short stories. It presents multiple close readings of the ways in which memory is 
inscribed in Mansfield’s stories, taking an approach to memory drawn from the philosophy 
of the French philosopher Henri Bergson. What Mansfield and Bergson share in common is 
an idea of the insistence of memory – its survival, determination, assertion and resistance – 
during a period of multiple social and historical change when memory was variously seen to 
be in crisis. Bergson’s distinctive theory of memory which opposes temporalism (or ‘time in 
the mind’) with measured (or ‘spatialised’) time provides a rich interpretive tool for 
analysing memory in Mansfield’s fiction. 
Following phases of Bergson’s developing thinking, each of the four chapters 
introduces a different dimension of memory – the generative, the topological, the 
degenerative and the cosmic – through which I analyse The Aloe and Prelude, ‘At the Bay’, 
‘The Garden Party’, ‘The Daughters of the Late Colonel’, ‘Bliss’ and ‘The Canary’ as well 
as other less well-known examples of Mansfield’s fictional and personal writings. What 
emerges from this process is a new Mansfield acutely sensitive to the insistent power of 
memory and the attenuation of time past into the present, concurrent with some of her 
modernist contemporaries, yet especially attuned to the signal and significant thought of 
Bergson. 
Lay Summary 
This thesis explores the way in which memory is represented by the modernist short 
story writer Katherine Mansfield both in her personal writings and in a selection of her short 
stories against a backdrop of historical and cultural change in the early twentieth century. It 
approaches the idea of memory using the philosophical ideas of the late nineteenth-century 
French philosopher Henri Bergson and develops some of his concepts into an apparatus for 
close readings of both well-known stories by Mansfield, such as Prelude, ‘The Garden Party’ 
and ‘Bliss’, as well as less well-known and sometimes unfinished stories. I claim that 
memory is a strong, dynamic force both for Bergson and for Mansfield even when there 
were historical reasons to think that memory might be under pressure. 
Mansfield’s experimental literary techniques are developed, alongside her contemporaries, 
partly as a means of representing the fecundity as well as the occasional failures of 
individual memory in her characters. These techniques, which find analogies with Bergson’s 
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thought, render in fiction the power of the past and of dream; the movement of time; the 
complexities of forgetting; and epiphany. For the first time, in critical discussions of 
Katherine Mansfield’s work, the notion of subjective or interior memory is brought together 
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In quotations, points indicating an ellipsis have been enclosed in square brackets; points that 
occur in the original text have been retained. 
I have italicised the stories Prelude and Je ne parle pas français on the grounds that both 
stories were published first as individual books. This practice also defers to the two-volume 
edition of Katherine Mansfield’s fiction published by Edinburgh University Press. 
From issue 5, Katherine Mansfield Studies has been published as a book rather than a 
journal. 
For referencing, I have used MHRA Style Guide: A Handbook for Authors and Editors, 3rd 






 In May 1907 Katherine Mansfield took notes on her reading, apparently, of Edmund 
Parish’s Hallucinations and Illusions: A Study of the Fallacies of Perception.
1
 At the age of 
nineteen she exhibits an interest in the mind and its habits, of having cognisance of an object, 
of passing from image to language. Juxtaposed with these reading notes is a vivid, 
metaphorical description of her perceptions of her surroundings, of the brooding twilight 
shining through the window onto her personal possessions, her books, her pictures, her 
’cello, which are all enlivened by the light. Mansfield feels the weight of the past on the 
present; she recalls her life until it seems not merely one life, but a ‘thousand millions lives’, 
comprising present, past and an ‘uneasy consciousness of future strivings’ (p. 42). In 1909 
she records that her writing is only interesting if she can ‘make it psychological’ (p. 113). In 
1918 she is striving to ‘get into touch’ with her mind (p. 247); and in 1919 she is reliving the 
past in all its vibrant and sensory particularity (p. 290). By 1922 she is making notes about 
escaping from ‘the prison of the flesh – of matter’ (p. 396) and putting the question: ‘What is 
the universal mind?’ (p. 396). Such comments highlight Mansfield’s preoccupation with her 
own mind and its workings as well as her curiosity about a world consciousness; they point 
to the interplay of accumulated personal memories and the ‘making’ of fictional texts attuned 
to states of mind and memories. They indicate her engagement, as a reader and as a writer, 
with wider concerns about the mind and memory in the first decades of the twentieth century 
and set the framework for my investigation into Katherine Mansfield and memory through 
the philosophy of mind of Bergson and the formative intellectual and cultural contexts of the 
period which were also reformulated by the contributions of each. 
In this Introduction I first historicise memory, delineating the ways in which rapid 
and specific changes in early twentieth-century Britain led to a sense of crisis in historical 
and personal memory which impacted on Mansfield’s generation. If change brought with it a 
sense of temporal discontinuity as well as spatial disorientation, I argue that for the two 
principal figures in this study, Henri Bergson and Katherine Mansfield, the opposite was 
true: change inheres in temporal continuity and memory endures. I examine Bergson’s 
theory of memory and establish similarities with Mansfield’s approach to memory. I then 
                                                 
1
 See The Edinburgh Edition of the Collected Works of Katherine Mansfield, 4: The Diaries of 
Katherine Mansfield Including Miscellaneous Works, ed. by Gerri Kimber and Claire Davison 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016), p. 42. Subsequent references to this edition are 
abbreviated to CWKM4 followed by the page number. Subsequent references in this paragraph are 
given in brackets in the text. 
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look at the ways in which memory is significant for the development of the modern short 
story and whether its potential for depicting memory was a reason Mansfield was drawn to 
the form. Finally, I outline what I term Mansfield’s ‘Bergsonian aesthetic’ and I set out my 
critical strategy which is to draw on some of Bergson’s philosophical concepts as a 
methodological tool for analysing four different dimensions of memory – the generative, the 
topological, the degenerative and the cosmic – in a selection of Mansfield’s short stories. 
A Generation’s Memory 
The turn of the twentieth century seemed to separate the generations and introduce a 
sense of discontinuity, a fact noted by Rupert Brooke who in 1910 observed a marked 
difference between his world and that of his septuagenarian Victorian uncle: ‘The whole 
machinery of life, and the minds of every class and kind of men, change beyond recognition 
every generation. I don’t know that “Progress” is certain. All I know is that change is.’
2
 
Change, and the speed of that change, registered with all kinds of people, even royalty. A 
year later, in 1911, Queen Mary concurred with her aunt ‘about the ideas of the two centuries 
being so totally different, and […] come so rapidly too’.
3
 But when Virginia Woolf 
published her now famous assertion in her essay on ‘Character in Fiction’, that ‘on or about 
December 1910 human character changed’, it was a reflection on the past from the vantage 
point of 1924.
4
 Looking back after more than a dozen years and remembering, Woolf also 
suggests that change ‘was not sudden and definite […]. But a change there was’.
5
 Change 
also returns Woolf to an even earlier period of the past in the essay to Samuel Butler’s The 
Way of All Flesh, written between 1873 and 1884 and published posthumously in 1903, 
indicating both that the past may still have much to contribute to the present, and that change 
is accumulative and may not be drastic or catastrophic. Thus, Woolf’s choice of the word 
‘about’ may be deliberately imprecise allowing for gradual continuity-in-change, and 
looking back in historical time points to the persistence of the past and of memory. 
                                                 
2
 Donald Read, ‘History: Political and Diplomatic’, in The Twentieth-Century Mind: History, Ideas, 
and Literature in Britain, ed. by C. B. Cox and A. E. Dyson, 1: 1900-1918 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1972), pp. 1-50. Quoted by Read, p. 1. 
3
 Ibid., p. 1. 
4
 Virginia Woolf, ‘Character in Fiction’, in The Essays of Virginia Woolf, 3: 1919-1924, ed. by 
Andrew McNeillie (London: The Hogarth Press, 1988), pp. 420-38 (p. 421). As Andrew McNeillie’s 
accompanying editorial note makes clear, the essay was first published in the Criterion in July 1924 
and was based on a paper read to the Cambridge Heretics on 18 May 1924, which itself had its roots 
in the earlier essay ‘Mr Bennett and Mrs Brown’ from November 1923. These iterations of Woolf’s 
ideas are themselves a product, therefore, of revision and change. 
5
 Ibid., p. 422. 
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These remarks set Woolf’s suggestion of gradual but definite change against the idea 
of a decisive break with the past. While Woolf settled on 1910 for her example, the year in 
which the reigning monarch Edward VII died and George V came to the throne, as well as 
the year in which the iconoclastic First Post-Impressionist Exhibition was mounted at the 
Grafton Galleries, she might have picked any number of other years as being representative 
of distinct changes occurring in the modern world. For my purposes, it is significant that 
1910 was also the year in which Henri Bergson’s work first began to be translated into 
English having had a considerable impact on an earlier generation in France, further 
indicating that intellectual ideas may take a generation in which to percolate into other 
cultures. Examples of cultural transition as well as technological innovation in 1910 included 
Igor Stravinsky’s score for The Firebird ballet with Mikhail Fokine’s startling choreography 
which was performed in Paris by the Ballets Russes, and Edison’s demonstration of talking 
motion pictures. Katherine Mansfield was still a fledgling writer publishing her Chekhov-
inspired story ‘The Child-Who-Was-Tired’ and satirical short stories in the New Age and as a 
‘modern’ was at an early stage of literary experimentalism. 
Given advances especially in the arts and in technology, why might there have been 
a turn to the past and a preoccupation with memory? Was this a reaction to the specific types 
of innovation underway, or to the rapidity and diversity of change? The answer lies partly in 
the fact that Mansfield’s generation was subject to myriad and far-reaching changes in the 
sciences, in technology and philosophy as well as in literature and the arts which were felt to 
have undermined social stability and community identity, disturbed temporality, and 
challenged cultural memory and meaning. The continuing pace and extent particularly of 
technological change in the early years of the twentieth century had such an impact that the 
structures of the mind were seen to have altered: the process of modernisation at this time 
transformed the very ‘dimensions of […] thought’, as Stephen Kern has observed.
6
 In a 
period which has been described by Kern as a ‘crisis of abundance’, of multiplying consumer 
goods and choices, a more retrospective mood may have helped maintain a much-needed 
sense of continuity with the past.
7
 
Technological change was however not all rejected or feared. In the sphere of 
cultural modernism the Italian Futurists notably embraced the power and potential of new 
technology as an artistic means to celebrate speed and change, an attitude, in turn, repudiated 
initially by Wyndham Lewis’s Vorticism, thereby indicating an oscillating dynamic in 
                                                 
6
 Stephen Kern, The Culture of Time and Space 1880-1918 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1983), p. 2. 
7
 Ibid., p. 9. 
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cultural innovation between action and reaction, avant-gardism and retreat. Developments in 
technology also enabled the past to be preserved. For example, Edison’s invention of the 
phonograph in 1877 had altered the way people experienced their personal and historical 
past. Like the photograph which fixed an image, the phonograph could faithfully record and 
memorialise voices.
8
 Other ‘transformative technologies’ which contained the mechanical 
means to record memories, as Alex Goody observes, were the commercial typewriter (1873) 
and the cinematograph (1895).
9
 With the advent of the typewriter, all kinds of writing were 
technologised, enabling writers to mechanically register thoughts and memory impressions 
as well as to simultaneously carbon ‘copy’ and reproduce them.
10
 The cinematograph both 
contributed to the reproducibility of memories and provided, for some, an analogy for the 
movement of the mind.
11
 As Laura Marcus has observed, the cinematograph was 
fundamental to the theorisation of mind and reality of Henri Bergson, even though Bergson 




Simultaneously, new disciplinary developments in psychology, psychiatry and 
philosophy opened up the field of memory-study reflecting a desire to understand why and 
how we remember – and forget. The late nineteenth century was a period of formal 
experiment and measurement as scientists and psychologists sought both to locate and 
understand the functioning of the mind and memory, often with very different methods and 
results. Herman Ebbinghaus inaugurated the experimental study of memory, publishing his 
path-breaking book Über das Gedächtnis in 1885 (translated into English as Memory: A 
Contribution to Experimental Psychology in 1913), while William James earned the 
appellation the ‘father’ of American psychology for his philosophical psychology, 
metaphysical pluralism and pragmatic epistemology. In the first volume of The Principles of 
Psychology in 1890, James famously promoted the idea of consciousness as moving and 
flowing rather than as ‘chopped up’: ‘let us call it the stream of thought, of consciousness, or 
                                                 
8
 Ibid., p. 38. 
9
 See Alex Goody, Technology, Literature and Change (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011), p. 2. 
10
 Goody makes an interesting observation about Heidegger’s description of technology as ‘techne’, 
both as ‘bringing-forth’ and as related to the ‘poietic’ including the ‘arts of the mind’ (p. 31). See 
Martin Heidegger [1955], The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, trans. by 
William Lovitt (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), p. 13. Picking up on Heidegger, we might 
therefore regard writing itself as a technology which both reproduces memory and operates as a 
mode of ‘revelation’. 
11
 For a full discussion of the impact on cultural modernity of the cinematograph see Laura Marcus, 
The Tenth Muse: Writing about Cinema in the Modernist Period (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007) and Dreams of Modernity: Psychoanalysis, Literature, Cinema (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014). 
12
 Marcus, Dreams of Modernity, pp. 179-80. 
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of subjective life’, he declared.
13
 What James called the ‘wonderful stream of consciousness’ 
inaugurated a term which would of course become attached to an influential narrative 
technique associated with modernist fiction.
14
 
Among the contributions to the new psychology of mind was Sigmund Freud’s 
theory of childhood memory, ‘Screen Memories’, of 1899. Although his ideas were not fully 
established in Britain until after the First World War, an influential feature of Freud’s theory 
was memory distortion. Freud’s suggestion that traumatic memories are repressed, and that a 
process of psychotherapeutically led remembering is needed to recover potentially damaging 
experiences, added to the period’s sense of general memory ‘crisis’. Freud also saw memory 
in terms of an ‘imprint’, as on a wax tablet, and in terms of retention: as ‘psychical’ 
memories lodged in the brain. Freud’s ‘Mystic Writing-Pad’ provided a binary model of 
memory between perceptual consciousness and the unconscious which retained a permanent 
memory trace.
15
 If for Freud memory was often connoted in negative terms, as being 
submerged, repressed or contained, for Henri Bergson memory was a more insistently 
positive and generative force as I will go on to show. Although Bergson discussed ‘false 
recognition’ or déjà vu, as well as other pathological ‘failures’ of memory (see Chapter 
Three) such as amnesia, he tended to provide redeeming interpretations of such phenomena, 
and eschewed the idea that memory might be unreliable or falsified. 
While the public may have found some of the psychological investigations into the 
mind perturbing, for Virginia Woolf they characterised what it was to be ‘modern’. In her 
essay ‘Modern Novels’ of 1919 Woolf observed that the ‘tendency of the moderns and part 
of their perplexity is no doubt that they find their interest more and more in [the] dark region 
of psychology’.
16
 Woolf may have been echoing the views of others before her, including T. 
S. Eliot in his poem ‘Rhapsody on a Windy Night’, in which the moon with its feeble 
                                                 
13
 William James [1890], The Principles of Psychology, 2 vols (New York: Dover Publications, 1950), 
1, p. 239. James’s account was first published in article form in the British journal Mind in 1884 as 
‘On Some Omissions of Introspective Psychology’, Mind, 9 (1884), 1-26. Rick Rylance has, 
however, traced the origins of the term to G. H. Lewes and to his book of 1859, The Physiology of 
Common Life, in which Lewes distinguished between ‘the general stream of Consciousness’, which 
referred to the movement of our minds between conscious and unconscious states, and ‘the general 
stream of Sensation’, which referred to the individual’s ‘feeling of existence – the consciousness of 
himself as a sensitive being’. See Rick Rylance, Victorian Psychology and British Culture 1850-
1880 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 9. 
14
 James, The Principles of Psychology, p. 243. 
15
 See Sigmund Freud [1925], ‘A Note upon the “Mystic Writing-Pad”’, in On Metapsychology: The 
Theory of Psychoanalysis, The Penguin Freud Library, 11, trans. by James Strachey, ed. by Angela 
Richards (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1991), pp. 429-34. 
16
 Virginia Woolf, ‘Modern Novels’, published in the Times Literary Supplement, 10 April 1919 and 




reminiscences is confronted by the sputtering artificial light of modern lamp-lit streets, and 
memory produces ‘A crowd of twisted things’.
17
 Intriguingly, this was the poem which 
Katherine Mansfield reportedly read in 1917 to a gathering at Garsington Manor (home of 
the society hostess Lady Ottoline Morrell) shortly after Eliot’s collection Prufrock and Other 
Observations was published, indicating that Mansfield was herself engaged with a ‘modern’ 
social set interested in the new discourses of the mind.
18
 Woolf’s essay more forcefully than 
Eliot’s poem contrasts the shadowy places of the inner regions of the mind with the artificial 
brightness of the external world. To be ‘modern’, however, was also to be ‘psychological’ 
and the ‘dark region’ of the mind was a source of potent memories of the past, if also an 
opaqueness regarding the future. 
The First World War clearly played a significant part in complicating memory for 
Mansfield’s generation. Shell-shock was emerging as a legitimate diagnosis of war neurosis 
and memory dysfunction, as critics such as Lyndsey Stonebridge have noted, and some 
psychoanalytically trained medical practitioners were beginning to address the possibility 
that mentally ravaged soldiers were suffering from ‘unbearable memories’.
19
 The war 
undoubtedly prompted both a cataclysmic rupture with the past as well as feelings of 
anguished nostalgia: a clash between fearing to remember the war, yet longing to remember 
a pre-war past. Lorna Martens has suggested that after the First World War ‘nostalgia for the 
past intensified’.
20
 However, the idea of a pre-war idyll is itself not straightforward, as 
Graham Hough, among others, has observed: 
The concept of pre-1914 England as a long summer afternoon is quite false; it was 
filled with conflict, political, social, and ideological. But it is true that the fabric of 
                                                 
17
 T. S. Eliot, ‘Rhapsody on a Windy Night’, in [1954], Let Us Go Then, You and I: Selected Poems 
(London: Faber, 2002), p. 16. 
18
 This was an account given by Clive Bell according to Antony Alpers. See Antony Alpers, The Life 
of Katherine Mansfield (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1982), p. 239; and note 4, p. 441; 
hereinafter referred to as the Life. Quoting a diary entry of 1917, Alpers shows that Mansfield 
admired the poem and that its cadences registered with her (footnote, p. 239). For its insight into 
Mansfield’s view of literary genre, in a letter to Virginia Woolf [c.12
 
May 1919], Katherine 
Mansfield said she didn’t think of Eliot as a poet because ‘Prufrock is, after all a short story’. See 
The Collected Letters of Katherine Mansfield, 2, 1918-1919, ed. by Vincent O’Sullivan with 
Margaret Scott (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 318. Hereinafter abbreviated to CLKM, 
with the volume and page number(s) provided. 
19
 Lyndsey Stonebridge, ‘Psychoanalysis and Literature’, in The Cambridge History of Twentieth-
Century English Literature, ed. by Laura Marcus and Peter Nicholls (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), pp. 269-85 (p. 272). 
20
 Lorna Martens, The Promise of Memory: Childhood Recollection and its Objects in Literary 
Modernism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), p. 49. 
20 
 
high bourgeois culture was as yet unbroken, and it managed to hold all together in a 
precarious fusion until the war blew it away for ever.
21
 
At best, post-war remembering could be displaced onto idealised memories of a time before 
the war allowing the remembering subject to place himself or herself in a time and place 
which did not contain the later memory of war-time suffering. By artificially returning to an 
earlier past, war-traumatised individuals could temporarily erase the horrors of the most 
recent past. 
The inverse of the psychological need to forget, however, was the danger of not 
remembering, and of losing a sense of past time, history and memory. To deny the past runs 
the risk of becoming ‘forgetful in the present’.
22
 This may be where modern writers of the 
period, as one principal group of literary ‘guardians’ of memory, played their part in 
textually mediating the processes of remembering by attending to stylistic innovation as a 
new mode of memorialising. A narrative technique such as Free Indirect Discourse lent itself 
to bringing together past recollection with present thought. In particular, as Randall 
Stevenson has observed, Great War Fiction found new ‘registers’ for conveying the effects 
of war on memory and the disturbances of the mind. In his tetralogy Parade’s End, Ford 
Madox Ford explores to striking effect Christopher Tietjens’s troubled recall of his trench 
experiences, capturing in ‘fractured phrases’, as well as textual pauses and ellipses, the 
‘flickering uncertainty’ of his thoughts and memories.
23
 Paradoxically, therefore, literary 
fiction could serve as a means of articulating disjointed memory and of proffering a form of 
tentative fictional memorialisation of the recent traumatic past. 
While literary modernism has long been associated with a preoccupation with the 
present and with time passing (or the transitory moment), modernists such as T. S. Eliot and 
Ezra Pound indicated an equal concern with commemorating the past, whether construed as 
cultural tradition, cultural memory, or literary history. Yet the kind of past that Bergson was 
interested in, and which is crucial to placing him at the centre of a philosophical 
rapprochement between the past and the present, was one which did not exclude the present, 
at least when it came to individual memory. In fact, as I will detail in Chapter One, for 
Bergson the past must merge with the present as part of its sustaining power in the mind as 
                                                 
21
 Graham Hough, ‘English Criticism’, in The Twentieth-Century Mind: History, Ideas, and Literature 
in Britain, 1: 1900-1918, ed. by C. B. Cox and A. E. Dyson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1972), pp. 475-84 (p. 476). See also Anne Fernihough, Freewomen and Supermen: Edwardian 
Radicals and Literary Modernism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
22
 See Mark S. Muldoon, Tricks of Time: Bergson, Merleau-Ponty and Ricoeur in Search of Time, Self 
and Meaning (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2006), p. 254. 
23
 Randall Stevenson, Literature and the Great War 1914-1918 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2013), p. 113. 
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well as its necessary opening onto the future. Furthermore, in Bergson’s schema, the 
individual’s past always contains complete representations of the past (‘memory, laden with 
the whole of the past, responds to the appeal of the present state’).
24
 I contend that Mansfield 
shares this assumption in representing, even seeming to empathise more closely with, 
characters whose memories assist in living in the present and in representing as alienated 
those who turn back to the past, thereby contributing to a modernist literary practice 
decidedly based on folding the past into the present. 
A focus on the past, whether as past or as fused with the present, was closely bound 
up with ideas about time. The most widespread outcome of economic and technological 
developments as well as the expansion of communication was the ‘standardisation’ of time 
which brought with it also a sense of spatial ‘zones’: time segmented for the purposes of 
furthering industrial capitalism and colonialism. The changing concepts, measurement and 
experience of time also impinged on memory during the period. Mansfield’s generation was 
subjected not only to the temporal rupture of war but to multiple new definitions of time 
which seemed to oscillate between two sides of a dichotomy: between ‘primitive’ and 
‘modern’ time, Messianic and geological time, seasonal time and manufacturing time, 
agrarian time and railway time, rural and metropolitan time, public time and private time, 
and measured time on the clock and the free flow of unfettered time in the mind. An 
oscillation between – and a challenge to – such binaries may even mark the modern 
condition in as much as writers, philosophers, artists and other cultural producers variously 
reinforced, reversed and attempted to harmonise some of these temporal dichotomies. As I 
go on to demonstrate in Chapter Two, Bergson challenged the hegemony of measured time 
by acknowledging the ‘lived’ time of the individual, theorising the expansion and contraction 
of time, and seeing in the flux of time different temporal rhythms. Simultaneously, writers 
such as T. S. Eliot, Woolf, Joyce, Mansfield, Proust, Dorothy Richardson and Gertrude 
Stein, artists such as Van Gogh and Cézanne, musicians such as Stravinsky, Berg and Bartók 
and philosophers such as Nietzsche and Husserl sought new and different conceptual and 
cultural modes to express a sense both of changing times and changes to the measurement of 
time. 
Finally, some of Mansfield’s literary generation sought solace in personal memory 
as a means of rejecting the overarching grand narratives of the historical past. According to 
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Stephen Kern the establishment of the general laws of history was regarded as overly 
deterministic by ‘avant-garde’ thinkers such as Nietzsche and Bergson, dramatists such as 
Ibsen and writers such as Gide, Proust and Joyce.
25
 While such figures of course did not 
originate the idea of a personal past, they extended its application by turning inwards to the 
psyche and memory in a search for meaning, also finding there a troubled persistence in 
‘dreams and neuroses, retentions and involuntary memories, guilt and ghosts’.
26
 For Kern, 
this focus on the personal past over that of the historical past lines up with the general shift 
of focus from public time to private time. However, within the ‘private’ time of the mind, the 
case may be more complex. Bergson, for one, pointed to multiple axes of personal memory 
which took the form of different dimensions or ‘planes’, as I will discuss in Chapter Two. 
That Bergson was responding to multiple cultural and intellectual sources is picked up by 
Ben-Ami Scharfstein who suggests that Bergson’s thought ‘mirrors the culture that was its 
source, as the clear river mirrors the land in which it rises and through which it flows’, an 
image which introduces a key component of this study’s understanding of memory as 
change, fluid movement and flow.
27
 And as I turn to Bergson’s and Mansfield’s attitudes to 
memory, it is in the multiple contexts of their times. 
Bergson, Mansfield and Memory 
‘Memory’ is typically held to be the faculty by which things are remembered; it is a 
function of retaining or storing a mental impression, recalling information or recollecting an 
event or person, carried out by a part of the brain. A memory, by contrast, is generally 
regarded as that which is remembered, denoting a particular recollection of something which 
is returned to us from the past. Bergson uses the terms ‘mémoire’ to refer to memory and 
‘souvenirs’ to refer to recollections but his theory puts pressure on conventional ideas about 
memory. Bergson’s unique contribution to the theory of memory is in my view threefold: 1. 
His scepticism that the brain ‘stores’ memories and his assertion that memories are retained 
intact and are always potentially available; 2. His presentation of two types of memory 
(which I discuss in more detail in Chapter One), on the one hand ‘habit’ memory (the 
memory necessary for action / l’action) and on the other hand ‘pure’ memory which is 
unconscious and virtual (the totality of our memories); and 3. His belief that memory has 
different rhythms which contract and expand according to the requirements of action in the 
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 These aspects of Bergson’s theory of memory point to what I am calling memory’s 
‘insistence’; that is, its potency and its protean adaptability to the inner or psychological life, 
which is summed up in the following description from Bergson in 1901: 
Our memories, at a given moment, form one solidary whole, a pyramid whose point 
coincides with our present, – with a present moving ceaselessly and plunging into 
the future. But, behind the memories which crowd in upon our present occupation 
and are revealed by means of it, there are others, thousands on thousands of others, 
below and beneath the scene illuminated by consciousness … [A]ll we have 
perceived […], persists indefinitely.
29
 
In Bergson’s theory of memory, memories are latent until they are required for action in the 
present, with the unknowable future unfolding out of the present. Bergson does not dwell on 
the past as past or articulate memory in terms of a longing to return to the past; he does not 
offer a theory of nostalgia. The very idea of nostalgia, it might be said, is eliminated in 
Bergson’s schema, for the past is only what interests us in the passing present. 
The role of the past in memory was a distinctive feature of memory as it was 
understood during the period. To memory was attributed a temporal aspect as well as the 
feeling of recalling something which has already occurred. In The Principles of Psychology 
William James distinguished between the ‘directly intuited’ or ‘just’ past
30
 and a past in 
which one was felt to be reliving or back in the past: ‘[I]t is the knowledge of an event, or 
fact, of which meantime we have not been thinking, with the additional consciousness that 
we have thought or experienced it before.’
31
 This affirming sense that memory carries with it 
a sense of having come from the past and into the present is also outlined by Bergson who 
suggests that carrying the ‘mark’ of the past is ‘constitutive’ of memory’s ‘essence’.
32
 For 
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Bergson, however, memory and present perception are generated together, as part of the 
continuous ‘unrolling of psychical life’ (p. 129). Bergson theorised an ‘actual’ perception of 
an object occurring simultaneously with a ‘virtual’ memory image; in effect, a mirror image 
(pp. 134-5). He could then assert that while the memory of a perception is not the same as 
the actual perception, memory nonetheless does not alter the past in its virtuality (p. 133). 
What is new and distinctive about Bergson’s theory of memory, according to Jean 
Hyppolite, is his ‘cogito’: ‘I endure therefore I am’, a principle which points to the synthesis 
of the past and the present with a view to the future.
 33
 One of Bergson’s metaphors for 
memory with which he tries to capture this sense of the survival of the past is of a ‘continual 
winding, like that of thread into a ball’; in this way, ‘our past follows us, becoming larger 
and larger with the present it picks up on its way’.
34
 Contemporary critic, Leonard Lawlor, 
describes this process as being ‘the whole of the past plus one more moment’.
35
 That is, 
memory for Bergson grows by natural additions but is continually being renewed in its 
entirety; ‘memory as a whole has a constantly new organization’, suggests Lawlor, which 
‘includes the whole of the past’.
36
 
An aspect of Bergson’s originality lies in introducing memory as the term which 
would reorganise the dominant philosophical dualism of ‘mind’ and ‘matter’. Ian W. 
Alexander goes as far as to say that Bergson’s thought transcends philosophical dualism by 
explaining the world in terms of acts or events.
37
 This view, with its emphasis on action and, 
with it, movement, comes close to recognising Bergson as a process philosopher with links 
to vitalism and the idea that the processes of life are self-determining. Contemporary critics 
have more overtly aligned Bergson’s thinking with varieties of vitalist thought, such as 
Darwin’s adaptive evolution, the moral philosophy of Nietzsche, the sociology of Simmel 
and the philosophy of A. N. Whitehead.
38
 Bergson certainly seems to express views which 
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are similar to the vitalist ideas of life as flow, of valuing becoming over that of being, of 
movement over stasis and of action over structure.
39
 If vitalism is fundamentally concerned 
with the animation of the universe, the question arises as to whether that animation is 
spiritual in nature or derived from physical energies. I am interested in Bergson as a spiritual 
vitalist and in Chapter Four I explore some of the positive implications of this more spiritual 
side to Bergson, including his view that all that exists is engendered by the élan vital or vital 
impetus. In the views of his detractors at the time, however, vitalist philosophy was 
associated with ‘irrationalism’ and with excessive subjectivity or an over-emphasis on 
individual consciousness and experience.
40
 
In analysing the theory of memory of a philosopher of change, it must also be noted 
that Bergson’s thinking itself changed over time. Lawlor argues that whereas Bergson’s first 
major work, Time and Free Will, constructed a dualism between time and space, and 
between spirit and matter, where the difference between spirit and matter was one of a 
difference in nature, in his second work, Matter and Memory, Bergson gave credence to the 
reality of matter as well as of spirit representing a distinct development in his thinking.
41
 
Victor Delbos in a review of 1897 explained that Matter and Memory ‘surmount[ed] the 
dualism with which the Essay [i.e. Time and Free Will] had been content’.
42
 Pilkington, by 
contrast, identifies a departure in Bergson’s work between the third major text, Creative 
Evolution, and the fourth, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, which, he suggests, 
pivots on ‘the more transcendental theses of 1932’, pointing to the later phase of Bergson’s 
philosophical thinking.
43
 Pilkington, I think rightly, alludes to the ‘more cosmic and verbal 
plane on which the theory of the élan vital develops’ in Creative Evolution.
44
 In Chapter 
Four I pick up on this development in Bergson’s thought and argue for a more mystical 
aspect to his later works which sees a broadening out from the individual mind to a cosmic 
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consciousness. Alexander describes Two Sources as ‘the terminal point of a spiritual 
dialectic, of which each of Bergson’s works represents a stage, whereby the mind becomes 
progressively aware of the transcendent nature of the activity immanent within its 
operations.’
45
 Like Pilkington, Alexander maintains that this development is ‘divinely 
inspired’ in Two Sources.
46
 I take the view that Bergson’s philosophy is continually being 
creatively remade with memory the connecting conceptual thread that runs throughout his 
work. The concept of freedom, for example, is elaborated by Bergson from the early idea of 
individual human freedom and culminates in ‘its final glorification of Christian mysticism’.
47
 
Mansfield’s view of memory, like that of Bergson, hinges on an active process of 
remembering which she referred to as the ‘memory game’.
48
 This process includes vivid 
recollections of childhood, of place and of her native country, New Zealand.
49
 Centred on the 
reiterated question, ‘Do you remember?’, Mansfield engages in the game with friends and 
family. A letter from Mansfield to her sister Jeanne (Renshaw Beauchamp), for example, 
captures both the intensity of this process and highlights the insistence of memory for 
Mansfield: 
Ah, Jeanne, anyone who says to me ‘do you remember’ simply has my heart … I 
remember everything, and perhaps the great joy of Life to me is in playing just that 
game, going back with someone into the past – going back to the dining room at 75 
to the proud and rather angry looking selzogene on the sideboard, with the little 
bucket under the spout. Do you remember that hiss it gave & sometimes a kind of 




What stands out here is Mansfield’s own ‘strong’ memory, in which she returns to the past, 
not in order to reside in the past, but in order to bring memories into the present. 
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Late in her life, and in a sometimes strained psychological state, Mansfield recorded 
in her notebooks her ability to select powerful and highly specific memories of her family 
past: 
I lie on my right side & put my left hand up to my forehead as though I were 
praying. This seems to induce the state. Then for instance its 10.30 p.m. on a big 
liner in mid ocean … 
[…] 
People are beginning to leave the Ladies Cabin. Father puts his head in & asks if one 
of you would care for a walk before you turn in. It’s glorious up on deck. That 
begins it. I am there.
51
 
What is worth noting about this passage is the way in which Mansfield actively invokes 
memories by placing herself in the past (‘I am there’), a view which Bergson articulates in 




Examples of Mansfield’s purposeful and sensory memory process occur frequently 
in her letters.
53
 Remembering might be seen, then, to stand for Mansfield as a form of 
Bergsonian ‘action’, necessary in order to write about the past in the present. By contrast, 
Proust’s In Search of Lost Time explores forms of ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’ recall which 
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have been variously construed and contested by critics as Bergsonian.
54
 Yet ‘involuntary’ 
memory is not conducive to Bergson’s theory. It is true that he wrote in Time and Free Will: 
‘I smell a rose and immediately confused recollections of childhood come back to my 
memory’, which suggests that present sensory stimuli could stir a strong sense of the 
personal past in the present. But Bergson’s observation may have been taken out of context, 
because he goes on to say that ‘[i]n truth, these recollections have not been called up by the 
perfume of the rose: I breathe them in with the very scent; it means all that to me’, 
suggesting that it is the memory itself which is insistent.
55
 
In terms of her aesthetic principles, Mansfield was clear that the discerning writer 
ought to be selective in choosing which memories to use; those, if looked at through a 
Bergsonian lens, that have a particular ‘interest’ in the present for her characters. Mansfield 
argued that her contemporary Dorothy Richardson had failed in ascribing specific memories 
to her character’s actions and interests in the present by including too many recollections in 
her narrative. In her review of The Tunnel, the fourth ‘chapter’ of Richardson’s novel 
sequence Pilgrimage, Mansfield expressed her suspicion of Richardson’s ‘passion for 
registering every single thing that happens in the clear, shadowless country of her mind’.
56
 
Like Bergson, Mansfield believed the mind continues to preserve all of its memories, while 
memory has an active and presiding role to play in choosing what it needs: 
Memory mounts his throne and judges all that is in our minds – appointing each his 
separate place, high or low, rejecting this, selecting that – putting this one to shine in 
the light and throwing that one into the darkness.
57
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Virginia Woolf also recorded strong personal memories which she referred to as ‘shocks’ 
and which required words to tame them. In her memoir, ‘Sketch of the Past’, Woolf 
describes the way in which ‘exceptional moments’ from her remembered past are made 
‘whole’ by being made concrete in words. It is her ‘shock-receiving capacity’ that has made 
her a writer.
58
 If for Woolf, writing consolidated the ‘sledge-hammer’ blows from the past in 
the pleasure of writing in the present, for Mansfield, it was writing, and in particular writing 
short stories, which provided a means of representing memory states – not her own – but 
those of her characters. I turn now to look at the development of the experimental modern 
short story as a form, adopted and adapted by Mansfield and her contemporaries, capable of 
rendering consciousness, inner processes and the compelling nature of memory in the 
modern age. 
Mansfield, the Modern Short Story and Memory 
When Katherine Mansfield was writing her major stories, short story ‘theory’ was in 
its infancy. In the criticism of Edgar Allan Poe and Brander Mathews, in the mid- and late 
nineteenth century respectively, short stories were broadly seen in terms of the ‘unity of 
impression’.
59
 Critics of the short story in the early twentieth century were preoccupied with 
whether a story could convey something unique of an event or character in its use of 
language, imagery, symbol and ‘impression’.
60
 They also debated who could be said to have 
inaugurated the ‘modern’ short story in Britain: Walter Scott or R. L. Stevenson 
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(overlooking the major mid-Victorian writers like Thackeray, Dickens, Gaskell, George Eliot 
and Henry James who wrote short stories which contain ‘modern’ elements); although 
Chekhov was generally regarded by Mansfield’s generation as the principal instigator of a 
new type of story.
61
 Discussion also focused on defining the short story in terms of 
measurement: how long, or how short, a short story should be in order to make it 
distinguishable from the anecdote, tale or novel. 
This drive to identify the modern short story’s specificity focused on whether or not 
the form might be particularly suited to representing the mind over that of the novel, an idea 
outlined by Alfred Ward in 1924: ‘The brief prose form […] affords a more suitable medium 
than the novel for excursions into the dim territory of the subconscious; it allows 
experimental glimpses into “the other-world”.’
62
 This apparent propensity of the short story 
was taken up by contemporary critic Mary Rohrberger who brings Bergson into her 
discussion about the different properties of the short story and the novel in her claim that the 
two aspects of Bergson’s philosophy of time can be mapped directly on to the novel and the 
short story respectively: 
[T]the essential characteristics of durée as outlined by Bergson are remarkably 
similar to essential characteristics of the short story. Bergson’s characterization of 
mechanical time seems to define the novel’s temporal base. […] Durée, on the other 
hand, seems perfectly fitted to the short story.
63
 
But this assertion shows how dangerous it is to try to reduce the short story to one formal 
characteristic; Rohrberger’s distinction cannot be pressed very far because Woolf’s and 
Proust’s novels have also been considered in terms of Bergsonian duration.
64
 
A preoccupation with the individual memory states and perceptions of her characters 
relates to Mansfield’s search for new formal ways of representing multiple viewpoints as 
though from within the mind. This endeavour required the concomitant abandoning of the 
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omniscient narrator for an ‘invisible’ narrator; that is, a narrator stealthily occupying the 
separate ‘consciousnesses’ of the characters and the characters’ pasts and present. That 
memory was central to such a strategy has been noted by modernist critics, including Randall 
Stevenson: 
For modernist narrative, seeking to place ‘everything in the mind’, memory offers 
the ideal means of including the past alongside present experience. As fiction in the 
early years of the twentieth century moves further within the consciousness of 




As modernist literary authors adjusted chronology and used flashbacks as a means of altering 
the temporal order in which events are recalled by characters, memory had a unifying role to 
play. Mansfield’s stories, from the ‘The Tiredness of Rosabel’ through ‘The Daughters of the 
Late Colonel’ to ‘The Canary’, depict characters’ memories as having significance for their 
present situations, aligning her practice with an aspect of literary modernism and Bergsonian 
philosophy focused on a modern mind that ‘makes it new’ by incorporating past memories. 
Mansfield’s short stories are also examples of the story-as-revelation and use 
epiphany with specific Bergsonian overtones as a literary device, as I will discuss in more 
detail in Chapter Four. Just one example indicates that such literary and philosophical ideas 
were intertwined and culturally prevalent at the time. A writing competition running in 
American Life magazine in 1915 required the submitted stories to ‘reveal in the briefest 
possible manner – as it were, like a flash – a situation which carries the reader beyond it’; 
and to offer ‘a picture out of real life’ which must yet ‘convey an idea much larger than itself 
[…] in such a way as to produce in the reader a sense of revelation’.
66
 The requirements for 
revelation and a sense of transcendence align with Bergson’s philosophical preoccupations, 
as I will go on to discuss.
67
 A review entitled ‘A Model Story’ of 1920 shows that, for 
Mansfield, ‘being modern’ is to do with imparting a sense of mystery, vision and revelation 
to the reader: 
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Has it quickened our perception, or increased our mysterious response to Life? Do 
we feel that we have partaken of the author’s vision – that something has been 
revealed that we are the richer for having seen?
68
 
While the literary critical insights here are caught up with a wider discourse of the times, 
including a perturbed fascination with the mind or soul, Mansfield is especially interested in 
whether or not the writer’s prose has transcended the ordinary and enriched the reader’s 




Mansfield’s Bergsonian Aesthetic 
Mansfield’s ‘modern’ short story technique involves merging her narrator with (in 
Gerard Genette’s terms) her ‘focal character’, the latter an example of what is now referred 
to as Free Indirect Discourse, and in historical terms is also closely aligned with Bergson’s 
notion of intuition. Mansfield’s use of Free Indirect Discourse involved first actively and 
imaginatively identifying (‘coinciding’ in Bergson’s terms) with an object or thing, in order 
to generate a sense of its aliveness. In October 1917 she outlined her practice in a significant 
statement to her friend the painter Dorothy Brett, claiming that artists, rather than merely 
‘perceiving’ an object, must ‘become’ the object itself: 
It seems to me so extraordinarily right that you should be painting Still Lives just 
now. What can one do, faced with this wonderful tumble of round bright fruits, but 
gather them and play with them – and become them, as it were. […] For although 
that is as far as most people can get, it is really only the ‘prelude’. There follows the 
moment when you are more duck, more apple or more Natasha than any of these 
objects could ever possibly be, and so you create them anew. […] But that is why I 
believe in technique, too […]. I do, just because I don’t see how art is going to make 
that divine spring into the bounding outlines of things if it hasn’t passed through the 
process of trying to become these things before recreating them.
70
 
This creative process has clear affinities with Bergson’s philosophical method of intuition as 
outlined in An Introduction to Metaphysics (1903; first translated into English in 1912). 
Bergson’s method is to imaginatively sympathise with the interiority of the objects he 
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perceives: ‘I insert myself in them by an effort of imagination.’
71
 Bergson then slips from 
philosophy to literature in applying his intuitive method to reading a novel in a rare 
inference to textual reception. The conventional use of ‘point of view’, he argues, places the 
reader of literature outside the character and does not give access to the character’s 
‘essence’.
72
 Intuition, by contrast, is the active process by which we ‘enter into’ a thing or 
object and fully identify ourselves with it, which includes identifying with a character in a 
story: ‘By intuition is meant the kind of intellectual sympathy by which one places oneself 
within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it and consequently 
inexpressible.’
73
 Here, the philosopher’s literary example seems interchangeable with the 
short story writer’s philosophically inflected literary practice. However, a significant caveat 
is that the intuitive method is bound up with the ‘inexpressible’ for Bergson, which is 
problematic when it comes to literature. Noting the limitation, Bergson concedes that even 
though a true metaphysics should operate without ‘symbols’, writers and artists require an, 
albeit imperfect, language, a means of symbolisation, with which to operate creatively.
74
 
Despite the imperfect tools, Bergson is clear that the artist who is equipped with 
unique perceptual powers should conform to his idea of rhythm in deploying language and 
symbols. In his work of 1901, Rire (translated into English in 1911 as Laughter), Bergson 
had already suggested that while most individuals function in a ‘utilitarian’ way in order to 
carry out the actions associated with living, the souls of artists are naturally endowed with 
the ability to see things in their ‘native purity’.
75
 It is by using words rhythmically arranged 
and which exceed conventional language and modes of expression, that artists may get in 
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touch with ‘certain rhythms of life’ which bring them closer to a more ‘direct vision of 
reality’.
76
 In the 1910s, then, as Laughter was circulating, Mansfield was expressing a 
similar sentiment, praising Brett for adopting a Bergsonian style of empathic intuition in her 
painting technique and seeking to enact this form of artistry herself by immersing herself in 
her characters, and describing them from the inside. 
When it comes to artistic creation, Bergson’s thinking about the past in Matter and 
Memory is closely bound up with the free play of imagination. Although the past is 
‘powerless’ in the sense that it cannot reoccur, Bergson sees a role for imagining the past. If 
‘mind’ is equated with memory and is temporal, and ‘matter’ is equated with action and is 
spatial, the past must be ‘acted by matter’ and ‘imagined by mind’.
77
 It is the proclivities of a 
mind capable of invoking the past which gives credence to Mansfield’s imaginative 
rendering of the memories of her fictional characters couched in terms of sympathetic and 
self-effacing ‘immersion’. This ‘impersonality’ of the author also materially altered the role 
of the reader of modern fiction.
78
 According to Edith Rickert, writing in 1923, the intuitive 
method encouraged the reader to participate in the writer’s immersive process. Rickert 
heralded Mansfield as a successful exemplar of a new mode of short story writing which 
demanded the reader’s ‘willingness to be identified with the person from whose point of 
view the story is told’.
79
 By losing her own self-consciousness in order to describe the 
consciousness of a character, Mansfield ‘herself made the identification that it is necessary 
for the reader to make in order to understand her technique’.
80
 Framed historically, 
Mansfield’s Bergsonian practice of authorial depersonalisation would now be called her 
technique of character focalisation. 
At least one contemporary critic, however, has attributed to Bergson a fundamental 
role in the emergence of modernist literary experimentation. Paul Douglass maintains that 
although Bergson admits in Time and Free Will that we cannot directly represent the 
temporal flux of duration, artists can render the ‘“emotional equivalent”’ of it by continually 
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 What Bergson means by ‘form’, however, is the way in which 
the poet develops emotions into images through the use of rhythm ‘by which our soul is 
lulled into self-forgetfulness, and, as in a dream, thinks and sees with the poet’.
82
 Alongside 
rhythm, Bergson identifies harmony brought about by ‘the free play of sympathy’ as 
contributing to the development of ‘aesthetic emotion’.
83
 Aesthetic feeling, according to 
Bergson must, however, be ‘suggested’ which brings into play Mansfield’s own view that 
the writer ought to imply rather than ‘tell anybody bang out’ about the effects of the world 
on the senses.
84
 While Douglass goes as far as to say that ‘The modernist idea of 
“experimental literature” derives from a Bergsonian paradigm’ which, if true, brings 
modernist writers into close contiguity with Bergson’s philosophical aesthetics, this 





One might ask, why draw on Bergson in the context of reading Mansfield? I have 
already begun to suggest some reasons. Bergson’s pre-eminence in public life in Britain in 
the second decade of the twentieth century at a time when Mansfield was beginning to 
establish herself as a writer provides the conditions for influence if not discipleship. Bergson 
gave lectures on his work in London, Oxford and Birmingham in 1911, while his theories 
were being explained in prominent newspapers, particularly The Times, as well as in little 
magazines such as the New Age, in which T. E. Hulme, an early supporter and translator of 
Bergson’s work, published his ‘Notes on Bergson’ between November 1911 and February 
1912.
86
 Bergson’s ideas were regarded as challenging received orthodoxies which may have 
appealed to a ‘self-exiled’ writer from the colonies looking to move in progressive, and 
transgressive, circles. Here was a philosopher who, as early as 1909, had been described as 
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Bergson’s influence seemed far-reaching. For example, despite being an outspoken 
sceptic of Bergson’s metaphysics, Wyndham Lewis acknowledged that in founding ‘time-
philosophy’ Bergson was ‘more than any other single figure […] responsible for the main 
intellectual characteristics of the world we live in’.
88
 And the leading philosopher of the day, 
William James, warmly anointed Bergson, affirming the novelty and profundity of his ideas: 
[O]pen Bergson, and new horizons loom on every page you read. It is like the breath 
of the morning and the song of birds. It tells of reality itself, instead of merely 
reiterating what dusty-minded professors have written about what other previous 
professors have thought. Nothing in Bergson is shop-worn or at second hand.
89
 
Bergson also valued the spiritual at a time when opposing ideas about material progress held 
sway. In 1913, in admittedly rather excessive terms, Edwin Björkman heralded Bergson as a 
messiah whose ideas could be seen as ‘spreading, like flames across a sun-scorched prairie’ 
finding an eager and varied audience: ‘everywhere laymen and learned alike feel compelled 
to define their intellectual, moral and artistic attitudes by reference to his ideas.’
90
 Björkman 
also placed Bergson’s work squarely within the then influential philosophical movement of 
New Mysticism, ‘the thought-structure most expressive of our own day and its tendencies’.
91
 
While Bergson denied he was a mystic, if the term implied being anti-scientific, he embraced 
the idea that the mystical was commensurate with an ‘inner’ and ‘profound’ life.
92
 That 
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Bergson was seen to be part of a mystical movement as well as an innovator, sage and guide 
only underscores the fact that he was both an exemplary spokesperson for his time as well as 
at the forefront of thinking in his time. 
Bergson also had his detractors who accused him of anti-intellectualism. They 
included Bertrand Russell, whose philosophy, like that of George Moore, was associated 
with English empiricism and rationalism.
93
 Russell was deeply resistant to Bergson’s focus 
on intuition, while George Santayana denigrated Bergson’s thinking as a form of ‘romantic 
anarchy’.
94
 Santayana castigated Bergson for suggesting that humans lived in a ‘Babylon of 
abstractions’ and were outcasts from reality compared to the mystic who is perfectly happy 
‘in the droning consciousness of his own heart-beats and those of the universe’.
95
 Bergson’s 
‘originality’ has also been questioned by Ben-Ami Scharfstein who identifies many aspects 
of Bergson’s thought in the work of a wide range of French philosophical precursors.
96
 
However, such a distinguished philosophical lineage does not detract from Bergson’s 
particular and timely philosophical articulations in my view. Bergson’s significance to the 
intellectual culture of the period is that he brought both established ideas and novel 
departures demonstrably into conjunction in the face of emerging discourses: psychophysics 
in Time and Free Will, physiological psychology in Matter and Memory, biology and 
evolutionary theory in Creative Evolution, and sociology and religion in Two Sources.
97
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One problem this thesis acknowledges is whether in his metaphysics Bergson was 
codifying emergent aspects of a new literary practice which sought to represent the mind, or 
whether writers at the time, such as Henry James (in his later work), Joyce, Richardson, 
Mansfield and Woolf, were incorporating salient ideas about the inner processes of the mind 
into their narrative modes for rendering characters’ minds in their fiction. While I cannot 
resolve this conundrum in terms of causality, I can point to a productive contiguity. There 
may also be an interest which philosophy and literature share in this period: reading as a new 
interpretative strategy for understanding the modern condition. On the back of a new mode 
of modern writing and thinking comes, suggests Edith Rickert, a new art of reading: ‘We 
must learn to read in the new way.’
98
 Reading in a new way is what I aim to do in this thesis 
and my method is to deploy aspects of Bergson’s philosophy as a strategy for re-reading 
Mansfield’s short stories. That is, I do not look to determine the ‘origins’ of Mansfield’s 
writing in Bergson but rather seek to illuminate an implicit dialogue one with the other, 
acknowledging at the same time that Bergson’s ideas were disseminated throughout the age, 
that Mansfield was a pioneer of the modern/ist short story, and that both Mansfield and 
Bergson contributed and responded to ideas circulating among their contemporaries. 
While this thesis is the first to think about Mansfield, Bergson and memory in a 
sustained way, it both builds on and departs from interpretations put forward by previous 
critics who have invoked Bergson’s thinking in relation to Mansfield, including Mary 
Rohrberger, Sydney Janet Kaplan, Angela Smith and more recently Eiko Nakano and Louise 
Edensor. Early reviewers of Mansfield’s stories in newspapers and periodicals picked up on 
her acute perception as an artist and her way of representing a character’s consciousness, 
although none did so in explicitly Bergsonian terms except for Martin Armstrong in his 
obituary of Mansfield.
99
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February 1923, 211, Martin Armstrong observes that in one type of 
Mansfield story ‘we are shown a personality reacting more or less acutely to a moment of 
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concepts tended to focus on three aspects of his thinking: his theory of philosophical 
intuition; his concept of duration and, with it, of continuity and heterogeneity; and, in 
passing, his theory of memory. 
One of the earliest direct critical references to Bergsonian intuition in relation to 
Mansfield was in 1970 when Christiane Mortelier suggested a connection to the 1930s 
French view of her: 
‘Woman’, ‘Tuberculosis’, ‘English’, ‘Poet’, ‘Mystic’ – these were highly charged 
words for the French mind of the thirties, for their overtones were related to 
intuition, an aspect of the cognitive process to which Bergson had drawn attention.
100
 
However, Mortelier is sceptical of the ‘self-revealing’, intuitive Mansfield stemming from 
the hagiography of her instigated by John Middleton Murry after Mansfield’s death, and 
instead champions Mansfield’s ‘sharpened realism’.
101
 Regarding intuition in a more 
favourable light, Clare Hanson and Andrew Gurr in their 1981 study of Mansfield outlined 
the impact of Bergson’s intuition on the little magazine Rhythm, on Post-Impressionism and 
on Fauvism.
102
 They also associated Mansfield’s stories with Bergson’s ideas of time, 
suggesting that in her story ‘At the Bay’, Mansfield’s women ‘live by “real time”’. But in a 
curious note they also maintain that: ‘K.M. had read her Bergson years before Virginia 
Woolf, and the opposition in his philosophy of “clock time” and “real time” is equally strong 
in her work.’
103
 Yet there is no tangible evidence that Mansfield actually read Bergson, just 
as there is debate about whether Woolf did so. What does seem highly likely is that 
Mansfield would have ‘read’ the signs of culture, its preoccupation with ideas about time, 
memory, perception and consciousness, and would have been aware of Bergson’s impact on 
English society in the 1910s. Whether or not Bergson directly influenced Mansfield, he 
established a terminological framework which is useful for thinking about Mansfield’s own 
inventiveness. 
Although there is no mention at all of Bergson in Antony Alpers’s 1953 biography 
of Mansfield, in the much expanded and revised edition of 1982 in the chapter on Rhythm, 
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Alpers discusses the ‘profound’ influence of Bergson’s ‘new philosophy of the intuition’ on 
Middleton Murry’s Rhythm, a journal Mansfield would go on to co-edit.
104
 Murry, with 
whom Mansfield began a relationship in 1912, had read Bergson in French while in Paris. He 
had already written an editorial for Rhythm’s first issue in the summer of 1911 which was 
inflected with avowedly Bergsonian terms.
105
 Murry and Mansfield then co-wrote an article 
on ‘The Meaning of Rhythm’ for a subsequent issue the following summer in which they 
retrieved for art Bergson’s term ‘intuition’, described as ‘the power of divining individuality 
in other persons and other things’.
106
 In the article they claimed that the ‘free’ artist is one 
who rejects ‘machine-made realism’ and uses intuition to directly apprehend reality.
107
 A 
further joint editorial in the following issue of Rhythm on ‘Seriousness in Art’ is also 
suffused with Bergsonian imagery.
108
 
In her 1991 study of Mansfield, Sydney Janet Kaplan observed that arguments about 
Bergson’s ideas had already taken place earlier in the New Age, under the editorship of A. R. 
Orage, an observation also made by Wallace Martin in his in-depth study of the periodical.
109
 
A review in the New Age in the summer of 1911 by T. E. Hulme calls for attention in being 
juxtaposed with Mansfield’s story ‘The Journey to Bruges’ and provides tangible evidence 
that Mansfield’s early fiction was published alongside accounts of Bergson; it seems 
inconceivable that she would not have glanced at the issues in which her work was placed.
110
 
From my perspective, ‘A Journey to Bruges’ is significant for the way it seemingly plays 
with a felt sense of interior time, in this case with its apparent oscillation and suspension, 
when an individual is held in spatial confinement: 
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In the shortest sea voyage there is no sense of time. You have been down in the 
cabin for hours or days or years. […] You do not believe in dry land any more – you 
are caught in the pendulum itself, and left there, idly swinging.
111
 
There is also a clear sense of moving in public time in the story: of journeying and voyaging 
and promenading. There seem to be affinities, then, in the theme of Mansfield’s quite early 
story and Bergson’s philosophical preoccupations. 
In her biography of Mansfield, Angela Smith was one of the first critics not only to 
suggest a possible connection between Bergson’s duration and Mansfield’s ‘late’ work, but 
to use explicitly Bergsonian conceptual language in describing the link: 
Mansfield constantly expresses in her late fiction and in her personal writing ideas 
that could stem from Bergson’s emphasis on deep structures and his analysis of time 
and duration, that duration is an experience of heterogeneity, the merging and 
becoming process of psychic states, not of homogeneous identifiable emotions.
112
 
Smith also links Bergson’s thinking to Fauvist techniques (p. 128) and explores the 
Bergsonian ideas of heterogeneity and multiple experience (p. 135) and the idea of self or 
‘becoming’ as ‘demonic’ in opposition to Bergson’s ‘creative heterogeneity’ (p. 147). In a 
subsequent article of 2003, Smith states that Mansfield was in Paris during Christmas 1912 
where she associated with a group of painters, writers and critics who were ‘inventing 
Bergson’, a phrase coined by Mark Antliff to refer to Bergson’s organicist ideas about 
creative freedom as ‘continual invention’ and ‘self-generation’, as well as to the caution that 
Bergson’s ideas do not precede cultural conventions but are rather ‘socially authorized’ (that 
is, ‘invented’).
113
 Smith maintains that ‘the dominant intellectual influence’ on this artistic 
group at the time was Bergson.
114
 
Smith’s work is a defining moment in Bergsonian-inflected criticism of Mansfield. 
She was also one of the first critics to provide close textual analysis of several of Mansfield’s 
stories from a Bergsonian perspective, including ‘The Daughters of the Late Colonel’ (in 
terms of duration) and ‘At the Bay’ (in terms of Bergson’s approach to consciousness and 
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memory). Further close readings were provided by Eiko Nakano in her 2005 thesis in which 
she offered a detailed study of Bergson’s influence on Mansfield’s fiction.
115
 In particular, 
Nakano analyses ‘Maata’ through the concept of duration, continuity and heterogeneity as 
outlined in Time and Free Will; links the narrator’s body with her memory in ‘The Woman 
at the Store’ by deriving ideas from Matter and Memory; and reads ‘How Pearl Button was 
Kidnapped’ through the child’s intuitive perception, distinguishing between instinctive, 
intelligent and intuitive tendencies put forward in Bergson’s Creative Evolution. The main 
thrust of Nakano’s argument is that, overall, Bergson balanced the ‘one’ and the ‘many’ or 
the singular and the multiple, and was not, as some critics have argued, fervently on the side 
of intuition over intellect, or of spirit over matter, a view with which I concur. Nakano also 
published an article in 2011 in which she claimed that Bergson’s philosophy particularly 
influenced Mansfield’s early stories ‘The Woman at the Store’ and ‘How Pearl Button was 
Kidnapped’ (published in Rhythm and The Blue Review in 1912 and 1913 respectively). 
Nakano focuses on the ‘inseparability of intuition and intellect’ in the way the stories depict 
the characters’ ‘continuously changing consciousness’.
116
 She also argues that the 
‘inseparable relation between spatial and temporal aspects’ is central to Mansfield’s early 
work.
117
 My own approach broadens this terrain by suggesting that Mansfield’s earliest 
through to her last stories can be read through a range of Bergson’s philosophical terms 
specifically with respect to memory. 
There has been very little written directly on Mansfield and memory. While Clare 
Hanson raised the topic in her introduction to her anthology of Mansfield’s critical writings 
in 1987, she did not do so with Bergson in view. Rather, she suggested that memory is an 
important aspect of Mansfield’s ‘personal’ aesthetic which Mansfield ‘places at the centre of 
the artistic process.’
118
 However, in her Katherine Mansfield birthday lecture, Hanson begins 
to draw together in suggestive ways aspects of Bergson’s thinking in relation to Mansfield, 
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 Hanson discusses Bergson’s account of the self, as well as of the 
past, memory, intuition, virtual and actual futures, and freedom briefly in relation to various 
Mansfield stories. Whereas I focus on Bergson’s metaphysics and specifically on memory, 
Hanson places greater emphasis on Bergson’s vitalist psychology and on emotion and affect. 
In her dissertation, Louise Edensor brought memory into her consideration of Mansfield’s 
stories by drawing on Bergson and Arthur Symons to focus on the ways in which Mansfield 
critiques women’s oppression.
120
 Edensor provides readings of ‘The Tiredness of Rosabel’, 
some of The German Pension stories, and ‘The Swing of the Pendulum’ in terms of 
Symbolist representations of Bergson’s concepts of perception, memory images and 
duration. And in her persuasive reading of ‘A Dill Pickle’ she illuminates the ways in which 
the evocation of memory is achieved using symbols which point up the discrepant memories 
of the two characters. My approach concentrates on multiple aspects of memory in a more 
philosophically inflected reading and selects entirely different stories for my textual 
analyses. 
While delineating my engagement with recent Mansfield criticism on aspects of 
Bergson’s philosophy, I also want to place my work in relation to studies of modernism and 
memory and to studies of Bergson and memory more generally. The key contemporary study 
on European modernism and specifically autobiographical memory has recently been 
provided by Lorna Martens in The Promise of Memory, in reading the childhood memories 
of Proust, Rilke and Benjamin, while the unsurpassed cultural history of modernism in 
describing intellectual, technological and scientific developments, including those of time 
and space, is the work of Stephen Kern. Of the critical work on Bergson and modernism, 
important precursors are The Crisis in Modernism, which redefines Bergson’s thought in 
relation to the vexed question of vitalism, and Bergson and British Modernism by Mary Ann 
Gillies, who established the intellectual contexts in Britain for Bergson’s reception and 
outlined a Bergsonian modernist aesthetics in relation to T. S. Eliot, Virginia Woolf, James 
Joyce, Dorothy Richardson and Joseph Conrad but who in this work excluded Mansfield. 
While doing valuable ground work, Gillies engages with three themes: the nature of origins 
in the early twentieth-century materialist world; problems of identity; and representation in 
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art, rather than with memory. Mark Antliff’s 1993 magisterial study of Bergson exclusively 
focuses on his impact on cultural politics, and particularly on the artistic practice of the 
Cubists and Futurists in pre-war France. More recently, the collection Understanding 
Bergson, Understanding Modernism has reframed Bergson for a twenty-first-century 
readership especially in the light of the Deleuzian ‘turn’ to Bergson. In this vein, the recent 
essay collection on Bergson and the Art of Immanence brings this contemporary Bergson to 
bear on art’s philosophy in approaching painting, photography and film.
121
 
In contradistinction to a political Bergson, a new vitalist Bergson, a post-Deleuzian 
Bergson and an aesthetic Bergson I return to a more historicised Bergson in order to extend 
incipient readings of Mansfield via Bergson’s theory of intuition and duration. My study 
provides Bergsonian readings of Mansfield’s fictional rendering of the subjective processes 
of memory. It does so in relation to Bergson’s ideas of action and dream, of movement in 
relation to time, of the persistence of memory (or unforgetting) and on the possibilities of 
personal memory subsumed within a wider cosmic consciousness. It is less to do with the 
reconstruction of the past, whether seemingly mimetic or textually memorialised through the 
stories we tell about it, because Bergson and Mansfield evidently eschewed a theory of 
mediated memory and the past in favour of direct apprehension, even while they each, of 
course, used language and a particularly metaphorical style at that in order to represent their 
ideas. 
In the four chapters which follow, I examine four types of memory: generative, 
topological, degenerative (that is, memory loss or forgetting) and cosmic memory. What 
Bergson and Mansfield share in common, I argue, is the idea that memory not only persists, 
but is insistent: it is a vital, life-giving, agglomerative and creative force. I use a model of 
memory which is not preoccupied with psychic repression, nostalgia, involuntary 
recollection, cognitive impairment or visual images, all valid approaches to remembering in 
the period covered by this thesis. Rather, I attend to memory’s resilience and its protean and 
potent qualities and the ways in which it is actively involved in bringing the past into the 
present; is time-filled and in motion; and is not only a creative force at work within 
individual minds, but exhibits cosmic or worldly properties. 
I derive the four memory types from Bergson’s thinking as it developed from Time 
and Free Will through to The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, a period stretching 
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from 1889 to 1932, for publication in French, and from 1910 to1946 in English translation. 
While I should have liked to map Bergson’s own four major books onto four of Mansfield’s 
most important stories across my four chapters in sequence, I deal with Matter and Memory 
principally in Chapters One and Three, Time and Free Will in Chapter Two and Creative 
Evolution and Two Sources in Chapter Four as I develop my argument about the way in 
which memory expands from the inner world of the individual subject outwards towards the 
cosmos. By placing Mansfield in dialogue with Bergson I aim to contribute to a process of 
re-reading Bergson and Mansfield as a continuous and reciprocal, rather than conclusive, re-
creative act. If I find Bergsonian philosophical ideas in Mansfield’s writing, I also suggest 
that Mansfield takes Bergson in new and intriguing literary directions. 
In the first chapter, I discuss Bergson’s theory of memory in Matter and Memory in 
terms of what I call ‘generative’ memory, which is memory that expands and accumulates 
over the lifetime of an individual. I contend that generative memory is a means of bringing 
together Bergson’s dual concepts of pure and habit memory which are in turn related to the 
two planes of memory he outlines in Matter and Memory: that of action and of dream. I use 
the idea of generative memory to think about the ways in which memory is attributed by 
Mansfield to her characters in The Aloe and Prelude according to whether they are action-led 
or dream-led and whether they are orientated towards the past, present or future. I align the 
character of Stanley Burnell with action-led memory, Linda Burnell with passive, past-
orientated dream memory, which inhibits her ability to act in the present, and the character of 
Mrs Fairfield, the grandmother, with the harmonious resolution of action and dream 
memory. Through the character of Beryl I suggest Mansfield blends Bergson’s practical 
memory with his dream memory but as a form of anticipation of the future in the forming of 
adult sexual orientation and gendered identity. I read the character of the child Kezia in 
terms of the creative dimension of memory, or memory-making, suggesting that the 
significant events which will produce some of Kezia’s formative childhood memories and 
which will later ‘dominate’ her memory are in the process of being made during the course 
of the narrative. I also look at Mansfield’s own views of memory and examine whether or 
not the texts of The Aloe and Prelude are creatively generated re-inscriptions of Mansfield’s 
own personal memories. 
In the second chapter I outline what I refer to as topological memory which I regard 
as a ‘mobile geometry’ of space and time developing out of the philosophical dualism 
Bergson outlined in Time and Free Will between homogeneous, quantitative and spatialised 
time and the heterogeneous, qualitative and living time of ‘duration’. I deploy the trope of 
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topological memory to read Mansfield’s story ‘At the Bay’, a story which also happens to 
expand out of Prelude and generates intertextual memories between the two narratives. This 
topological reading follows the ‘curve’ of time in the story, which I argue is one of the 
narrative means by which Mansfield brings the Bergsonian duality of space and time into 
something like harmony by re-shaping time through movement in space in what I call ‘time-
space’. In this way I give what I consider to be a necessary and proper weighting to the 
importance of time and space in Bergson’s philosophical thinking by way of Mansfield’s 
fictional writing. A brief chapter interlude looks at two less well-known stories in relation to 
Mansfield’s apparent mockery of spatialised time and duration. 
My third chapter focuses on degenerative memory, or forgetting. I argue that while 
memory, for both Bergson and Mansfield, is rarely thought of or represented as being 
catastrophically degenerative (that is, permanently erased or lost), it is nonetheless intimately 
bound up with forgetting.
122
 Forgetting, in Bergsonian terms, I suggest, relates to memory in 
abeyance, latent in the virtuality of ‘pure’ memory or in the ‘habit’ memory of the body. If 
memory, as Mary Warnock has claimed, ‘consist[s] in thinking of things in their absence’, 
absence is another way of thinking about forgetting.
123
 I argue that Bergson and Mansfield 
articulate in different ways the idea of the temporary absence of memory. Drawing on 
Bergson’s clinical and philosophical investigation of the conditions of amnesia and aphasia 
principally in Matter and Memory, I establish temporary forgetting as the necessary corollary 
of remembering in a close reading of Mansfield’s story ‘The Garden Party’. In this 
Bergsonian reading, I suggest that Laura’s temporary forgetting is represented both by her 
distraction from remembering (amnesia) as multiple events impinge on her during the 
fraught excitements of the party, and in the linguistic disarray of her stammering (aphasia) as 
she makes the difficult transition from adolescence to young adulthood. 
In my final chapter I turn to the more expansive concept of cosmic memory. I do so 
by bringing individual and cosmic memory together via the concept of epiphany understood 
in Bergsonian terms. I approach epiphany neither as a ‘moment’ captured in time nor as an 
aestheticised enhancement of manifest everydayness, but in terms of a Bergsonian typology 
which has cosmic, mystical and transcendental properties. My fourth chapter turns to 
Bergson’s two works Creative Evolution and Two Sources to think about the ways in which 
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cosmic memory denotes a movement from the individual inner mind towards a general 
mystic consciousness. I outline the ways in which Bergson and Mansfield were associated 
with mysticism: with cosmic consciousness in Bergson’s case, and with cosmic anatomy and 
‘the work’ of self-awakening associated with the Armenian-Greek spiritual leader Georgii 
Ivanovich Gurdjieff in Mansfield’s case.
124
 I provide a close textual reading of ‘Bliss’ in 
terms of Bergsonian epiphany and cosmic memory.  
My brief Conclusion examines Mansfield’s and Bergson’s attitudes to life after 
death in relation to the survival of memory as Mansfield, following a ‘spiritual crisis’, lived 
out her final months of life at Gurdjieff’s Institute for the Harmonious Development of 
Man.
125
 The thesis culminates in a reading of Mansfield’s last complete story, ‘The Canary’, 
as a means of reprising the four elements of memory traced in the previous chapters. 
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Generative Memory – The Aloe and Prelude 
[T]he past should be acted by matter, imagined by mind. – Henri Bergson
1
 




In my Introduction I indicated the historically specific grip that memory had on 
Mansfield’s generation of writers and suggested that, in confronting a crisis in memory, 
writers turned to the novelty of experimenting with the past in the present during the early 
changeful decades of the twentieth century. In identifying Mansfield’s generation as one 
unusually preoccupied with memory I found a homology with Bergson, as one of the shapers 
of a generation’s thought, although not necessarily the cause of that thought. I stressed that 
there may have been comparable influences of contemporaneity on both Bergson and 
Mansfield via common antecedents and that the work of the former makes helpfully explicit 
a set of responses to the moulding of the imagination of each. 
In this first chapter I turn to the idea of what I call ‘generative’ memory in the 
context of Bergson and Mansfield. While Clare Hanson has written about the ‘generativity of 
life’ in connection with Bergson’s vitalist psychology and what Mansfield refers to as ‘the 
life of life’, I focus on the ways in which memory is creative and insistent for both.
3
 I first 
establish that Mansfield had long been writing about memory as she developed her writing 
technique. I go on to look at the way in which Prelude was generated from The Aloe, 
identifying the ways in which Mansfield eliminated some aspects of her remembered past 
and of family memory in Prelude. Having set out Bergson’s theory of recollection and of 
memory, I take up Bergson’s concept of the ‘planes of memory’ as I believe it provides an 
unparalleled methodology for analysing memory in the story. I deploy Bergson’s Plane of 
Dream and Plane of Action to examine the presentation of memory in the fictional characters 
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of the Burnell family. Finally, I look at what I call the ‘Time Plane’ in relation to the two 
stories. 
Mansfield’s Early Memory Texts 
In 1916, in addressing her brother Leslie Heron Beauchamp (also known as 
‘Chummie’) in a notebook entry following his untimely death in a hand grenade accident 
during an army training exercise in France, Mansfield referred to the need to find a 
storytelling technique which would illuminate life, where death had precipitately foreclosed 
on life: 
[A]ll must be told with a sense of mystery, a radiance, an after glow because you, 
my little sun of it, are set. You have dropped over the dazzling brim of the world. 
Now I must play my part – –
4
 
Putting the three terms ‘mystery’, ‘radiance’ and ‘after glow’ together suggests a speculative 
illumination relating to the divine, even to Christian mysticism. This triad can also be seen as 
part of Mansfield’s debt to literary impressionism and to Symbolism; and as an aspect of her 
affiliation with Bergsonian views about significant memories coming into the light of 
consciousness.
5
 In alignment with other modern or burgeoning modernist writers who 
expressed anxiety about finding a new artistic form which could adequately represent the 
plethora of modern life, Mansfield went on to outline a new form for her writing, a blend of 
fictional lament with lyrical prose, which would represent both memory and mourning: ‘But 
especially I want to write a kind of long elegy to you perhaps not in poetry. No, perhaps in 
Prose – almost certainly in a kind of special prose.’
6
 Mansfield captures here the options 
open to the writer in memorialising the dead and in raising personal memories to the level of 
art. Truth to experience and fairness to memory may be forfeited or find themselves at 
variance with the necessities of artistic practice and literary form. 
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Critics have suggested that Mansfield turned to recollecting her early life and her 
‘own country’ of New Zealand either following the arrival of her brother in England in 1915 
or in the aftermath of his accidental death. But the ‘special prose’ to which Mansfield refers 
was probably The Aloe and was, as will become clear, an imaginative work of family and 
childhood memory already underway before her brother’s death. It is also apparent that 
Mansfield was preoccupied with the compelling power of memory and of utilising her own 
memories as part of her creative narrative process from an early age. While at school at 
Queen’s College in London from early 1903 to 1906, and on her return to London from New 
Zealand in August 1908, Mansfield re-inscribed her memories of her colonial childhood and 
home in beginning to forge her distinctively modern Anglophone identity. An early example 
is the story ‘About Pat’, published in the Queen’s College Magazine (December 1905), in 
which Mansfield shows an interest in recollecting her childhood home in Wellington. And in 
October 1908 she is framing her diary entries around childhood memories of New Zealand, 
following a turbulent sea crossing on a trip to Paris with her friend Margaret Wishart: 
A rough sea journey is a strange conglomeration of sensations. I, in a moment seem 
caught by a thousand memories – am a child again, sitting on the deck in my 
Grandmother’s lap – and me in a red riding cloak – going over to Nelson, to Picton, 
to England for the first time & the second – – –
7
 
In these evocations of her past, memories are depicted both in fictional fairy tale terms (‘in a 
red riding cloak’) and as a form of sensory recall. Another early text which appears as a 
diary entry (‘April 1st’) from 1906 titled ‘My Potplants’, mixes different generic elements, 
this time diary and fantasy modes, to produce a sense of memory’s protean qualities. In the 
‘diary’ entry, Mansfield as diarist records an evening spent thinking about the past: 
This evening I have sat in my chair with my reading lamp turned low, and given 
myself up to thoughts of the years that have past. Like a strain of minor music they 
have surged across my heart, and the memory of them, sweet and fragrant as the 
perfume of my flowers, has sent a strange thrill of comfort through my tired brain.
8
 
This seeming recollection of a day dreaming of the past, prompted possibly by the primroses 
Mansfield has bought from a passing flower-girl, presents a sophisticated doubling of 
memory and time: a recollection in a diary entry together with an inset narrative reverie. In 
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the ensuing paragraph, Mansfield then adopts the use of a first-person narrator caught up in a 
fictionalised fantasy of being orphaned as a child which contains fairy-tale elements: 
During my childhood I lived surrounded by a luxurious quantity of flowers, and they 
were my only companions. My Mother died when I was very young and I had no 
brothers or sisters. How I loved my life. […] I remember the year when Spring was 
very late in coming. (p. 33)
 
This ‘vulnerable’ child-self is demonstrably contrived, given that towards the end of the 
reverie, in which the narrator has wandered in the woods and met the ‘Goddess of the wood’ 
to whom she tells her story, Mansfield, as diarist, abruptly interrupts her own narrative: 
‘Stop! Why do I sit here and dream of all that is past, long past. Life is before.’ (p. 34) At the 
end of the dream-reverie, signalled in the text by a dotted line, Mansfield returns to the 
‘present’ of writing in the notebook, which is seemingly external to the story world, writing 
‘Ah! my poor little primroses in the blue dish, they have withered and died! FINIS’ (p. 34). 
‘My Potplants’ is worth lingering on as an early text for its oscillation between a first-person 
narrator and the ‘I’ persona of the diary-writer. Mansfield experiments here with narrative 
time and narrative mode to evoke memories of the past as well as to explore the memory 
motifs of childhood, flowers and places which she will recall in other stories and which mark 
her out as a writer of memory texts. 
As I noted in my Introduction, from a poststructuralist viewpoint all memories are 
mediated via language and narration and in this process, as Lorna Martens has observed, 
they are ‘no longer memories, but texts’.
9
 Memories, in this understanding, are aesthetically 
inscribed recollections and ‘the very effort of recording memories means translating into 
language what was once scene, image, or feeling’.
10
 Moreover, authors, whether of 
autobiography, memoir, fictionalised autobiography or memory-based story – that is, of 
‘literary’ memories – deliberately use rhetorical strategies and aesthetic design as a means of 
producing particular ‘effects’ on the reader.
11
 Bergson and Mansfield clearly precede this 
                                                 
9




 Ibid. There is a large body of feminist scholarship which deals with memory and/as narrative which 
is psychoanalytically inclined and focused on reconstructing the past through story that I am unable 
to deal with here. Similarly, I cannot cover the work which came out of Second-Wave feminism’s 
concerns with autobiographical memory, truth-telling and bearing witness which connects with the 
field of trauma studies, its concerns with recovered memory, and the ‘memory wars’ of the 1990s. 
For examples of this scholarship see: Annette Kuhn, Family Secrets: Acts of Memory and 
Imagination, 2nd edn (London: Verso, 2002) as well as Susannah Radstone’s work on the discursive 
construction of truth; memory understood as a ‘regime’; her critique of the trauma theory of Cathy 
Caruth and Shoshana Felman; and her analysis of memory in terms of ethics, power and fantasy: 
Katharine Hodgkin and Susannah Radstone, eds, Contested Pasts: The Politics of Memory (London: 
Routledge, 2003); Susannah Radstone and Katharine Hodgkin, eds, Regimes of Memory (London: 
52 
 
body of theorising. While Bergson acknowledges that ‘the word’ functions to ‘intervene’ 
between ourselves and an object, whereby the ‘original life’ of objects is ‘screened’ from us, 
he stops short of acknowledging that there is no memory without language.
12
 The purpose of 
artistry for Bergson is to render by means of colour and form and language ‘the inner life of 
things’ (p. 155). Even though ‘at a pinch’ emotions might be translated into language, writers 
do so in order to ‘grasp something that has nothing in common with language, certain 
rhythms of life and breath’ (p. 156). Art’s primary function is for Bergson, then, to ‘brush 
aside the utilitarian symbols […] in order to bring us face to face with reality itself’ (p. 
157).
13
 For Mansfield, her aesthetically rendered fictionalised memories as well as the 
imagined memories of her characters are not necessarily ‘false’ or any less ‘authentic’ if they 
remain true to feeling. 
As early as June 1907, Mansfield described the characteristics of the book she 
wanted to write, which included the deliberate use of a technique to arouse genuine emotions 
and sensations in her readers: 
I want to write a book – that is unreal yet wholly possible because out of the 
question – that raises in the hearts of the readers emotions, sensations too vivid not 
to take effect, which causes a thousand delicate tears, a thousand sweet chimes of 
laughter. […] it must be ultra modern.
14
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A young Katherine Mansfield is here testing out a ‘modern’ mode of writing by investing in 
the potential of technique to convey the memorable. Similarly in an early notebook entry of 
1909, Mansfield recorded an epigram by Prosper Mérimée for the way in which it captured 
the insistence of memory: ‘The artist becomes an artist by the intensification of Memory.’
15
 
This pithy sentiment encapsulates not only the centrality of memory to artistic practice but 
the way in which artistic practice represents memory: through accentuating, enhancing, 
heightening and inevitably altering the memory itself, while retaining the memory feeling. A 
feeling for the past, together with this emphatic sense of intensity and illumination, are ideas 
also framed later by Mansfield in a 1920 review of two novels for the Athenaeum: ‘And 
therefore the childhood that we look back upon and attempt to recreate must be – if it is to 
satisfy our longing as well as our memory – […] must have, as it were, a haunting light upon 
it.’
16
 As I noted in the Introduction, while the past, in Bergson’s view, cannot be repeated or 
re-lived, with the right expressive literary technique, the past can be made ‘present’ 
affectively and effectively in the reader’s mind. Mansfield seems to echo Bergson in 
suggesting that while no experience is actually repeatable, a significant purpose of literary 
technique is to generate memory affect; to produce something itself memorable, mysterious, 
moving, even haunting in the ‘after glow’ of story-making. 
Family Memory and Textual Generation 
Mansfield wrote in her notebooks of her ‘“debt of love”’ to her family which 
involved remembering the past.
17
 I contend that Mansfield’s writing presents a complex and 
ambivalent form of ‘tribute’ memory to her family. Kirsty Gunn has argued more literally 
that The Aloe is a text bringing together the ‘shattered pieces’ of Mansfield’s past, whereas 
Prelude, according to Mary Burgan, is Mansfield’s text of ‘reparative recollection’, a view 
for which I have more sympathy if Burgan means by this that the text is less mimetic and 
more re-constitutive.
18
 By looking at the way in which the texts of both stories were 
generated and altered, it can be shown that in the process of editing The Aloe into Prelude 
Mansfield not only edited out narrative description in favour of implication, but also pared 
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back elements of personal memory.
19
 As Vincent O’Sullivan observes, Mansfield was 
prompted to write about family memory ‘so that she both preserved a memory for herself, 
yet gave it radiance and solidity as a work of art’.
20
 That there are fewer direct personal 
memories retained in Prelude compared to The Aloe suggests that Mansfield’s aesthetic 
sense took over during the editing process. Mansfield edited from The Aloe some of the pre-
history of the Burnell family which related to her own family history, reducing the 
possibility of biographical interpretation. If the story is boldly modern for being multi-
perspectival, it is so in the sense of turning through one character’s psychological and 
memory perspective after another. 
Although it wasn’t published in its own right until 1930 (a fact which introduces a 
sense of belatedness into any critical comparison of The Aloe and Prelude), the earliest 
textual mention of The Aloe dates to December 1914. At this time, Mansfield wrote a list 
apparently of titles for stories between diary entries for 18
 




Given the […] 






Both Antony Alpers, in his edition of Mansfield’s stories as well as in his biography of 
Mansfield, and Cherry Hankin in her edition of the letters between Katherine Mansfield and 
John Middleton Murry, document that the story was begun in Paris in March 1915 when 
Mansfield borrowed the French writer and her recent lover Francis Carco’s empty flat and 
that she added to it in May 1915 when she returned there (for the third time) from London. In 
a well-known letter to Murry of 25 March 1915, Mansfield describes what may be a draft of 
The Aloe as a novel: 
I had a great day yesterday. The Muses descended in a ring like the angels on the 
Botticelli Nativity roof – or so it seemed to “humble” little Tig and I fell into the 
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open arms of my first novel. […] Its queer stuff. Its the spring makes me write like 
this. Yesterday I had a fair wallow in it.
22
 
If there might be doubt as to whether these comments in fact relate to The Aloe, the story’s 
identity is corroborated in a letter from Murry to Mansfield of 11 May 1915 in which Murry 
includes a drawing of a bookshop on which is written ‘THE ALOE 10
th





 (see Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1. Murry’s drawing of a bookshop projecting the future success of The Aloe 
Mansfield’s brother Leslie arrived in England in February 1915 to train as an officer 
in a British regiment. While on leave, Mansfield and Leslie are said – by Alpers and by 
Hankin – to have reminisced about their childhoods together in New Zealand. A month after 
Leslie’s death (on 6
 
October 1915), Mansfield and Murry left for Cassis and then Bandol in 
the South of France, where Mansfield worked on the story after Murry had returned to 
England. In a letter to Murry of 10 December 1915, Mansfield mentions she has taken a 
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walk by the sea at St Cyr and, in brackets, she notes it was ‘very beautiful & wild & like my 
NZ’. She goes on to say: 
My work is shaping for the first time today – I feel nearer it. I can see the people 
walking on the shore & the flowery clusters hanging on the trees – – if you know 




At the same time, Mansfield begins to use phrases in her letters that have a Bergsonian 
inflection to them. Thus, on 19-20 December 1915 in another letter to Murry, she explains: 
‘Writing to you I love you simply boundlessly. My love for you is always being new born.’
25
 
And again on 29
 
December 1915, in the second of two letters written to Murry that day, she 
writes to him: 
Love possesses me utterly love for you and for our life and for all our richness and 
joy. […] I seem only to have played on the fringe of love and lived a kind of 
reflected life that was not really my own but that came from my past.
26
 
The words ‘boundlessly’ and ‘new born’, as well as the idea of a ‘fringe’ and of life coming 
from the past, echo Bergsonian terms. Murry joined Mansfield again in Bandol at the end of 
December 1915; on 13 February 1916 Mansfield records in her notebook that she has written 
nothing: ‘There is nothing done.’
27
 By mid-February, she reflects on an ‘unfinished memory’ 
which she wants to turn into a story, ‘Lena’; by 16 February she mentions ‘finding’ The 
Aloe, and she addresses her notebook comments about the story directly to her brother: ‘I 
found The Aloe this morning. […] The Aloe is right. The Aloe is lovely. It simply fascinates 
me, and I know that it is what you would wish me to write.’
28
 Yet the actual ‘tribute’ to her 
remembered brother alters during the writing process because Leslie’s ‘resurrection’ in 
fiction is postponed until the later story, ‘At the Bay’, as I will come on to show. 
As Vincent O’Sullivan documents in the Introduction to his dual edition of The Aloe 
with Prelude, over three weeks Mansfield filled several exercise books with the story.
29
 The 
Aloe was completed in March 1916, although O’Sullivan suggests that Mansfield had 
reworked it by early summer. Virginia Woolf asked for a story for The Hogarth Press in 
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April 1917 and had accepted the text of Prelude by summer 1917.
30
 It was delivered in 
typescript in final form by early October. According to Alpers, it was Murry who suggested 
the new title.
31
 It then took Leonard and Virginia Woolf until June 1918 to set and print the 
volume. There is some question as to whether there is a rough written or typewritten draft of 
Prelude.
32
 Tracing the letters sent between Mansfield and Virginia Woolf, Mansfield wrote 
to Virginia Woolf in August 1917 accepting an invitation to visit her at Asheham, her house 
in Sussex, on 17 August and commenting on a typescript version of the story: ‘Do have me. 
My story I have sent to the typist who lets me have it back on Thursday. I couldn’t cope with 
the bloody copying: I’ve been so “ill”.’
33
 Mansfield’s letter suggests there is an earlier 
handwritten draft from which the typist is copying while John Middleton Murry’s note to 




At the same time during the summer of 1917, there was an intriguing triangular 
correspondence between Mansfield, Virginia Woolf and Ottoline Morrell relating to 
memories of gardens, which for both Mansfield and Woolf became the subject of creative 
endeavour. Mansfield wrote to Ottoline Morrell around 11 August 1917 referring to the 
‘perfect’ memory of the days they had spent together at Garsington, referring to both the 
house and garden, and her disturbed feelings: ‘But between these lovely memories and me 
there opened a deep dark chasm – it trembled open as if by an earthquake – and now it is 
shut again and no trace of it remains.’
35
 In her letter of around 15
 
August she mentioned the 
‘glimpse of the garden – all flying green and gold’ and had wondered ‘who is going to write 
about that flower garden’. Mansfield goes on to suggest that she might attempt it: ‘I must 
have a fling at it as soon as I have time’ (although she turns the memory into a poem, ‘Night-
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 In a subsequent letter to Virginia Woolf of around 23
 
August 1917, also 
referring to the memory (and possibly to a lost letter in which Mansfield had described 
Ottoline Morrell’s garden to Woolf), Mansfield praises a story of Woolf’s: ‘Yes, your 
Flower Bed is very good. Theres a still, quivering, changing light over it all and a sense of 
those couples dissolving in the bright air which fascinates me –’
37
 John Middleton Murry 
explains in his footnote to the letter in his edition of Mansfield’s letters, that ‘Flower Bed’ 
refers to ‘Mrs. Woolf’s story, Kew Gardens’.
38
 A generative intertextuality, then, seems to be 
based on the summoning of memories between the three women, especially between the two 
writers. Mansfield comments on their shared vocation in the same letter to Virginia Woolf: 
‘it is really very curious & thrilling that we should both, quite apart from each other, be after 
so very nearly the same thing. We are, you know; there’s no denying it’.
39
 While Mansfield 
is perhaps being tactful in suggesting that their creative imaginations work separately, it may 
be that a new poetics is emerging between them, based on memories of the qualities of light 
and a sense of ethereality which is reminiscent of Bergson’s description of an intuitive and 
rhythmic ideality achieved via language. 
If memories were being shared between Mansfield and Woolf, writing methods 
discussed and ideas mutually absorbed, the question arises as to whether Virginia Woolf 
herself advised or made specific alterations to the text of Prelude when she received the 
typescript from Mansfield; that is, whether she participated in the creative endeavour of 
generating the text. Nora Sellei suggests an interesting reciprocity: 
It seems a well-based supposition that Mansfield re-shaped her story at Virginia 
Woolf’s advice and request, as Mansfield was not in the habit of re-writing her 
stories several times. But it is also possible that the recommended changes coincided 
with her own better judgement as she was not easy to convince either. […] The 
changes from The Aloe to ‘Prelude’ thus, perhaps, show a delicate interplay of the 
two women’s literary theory and taste.
40
 
Sellei goes on to assert that the changes, ‘while remaining typical of Mansfield’s style and 
concerns, could satisfy also Woolf’s critical expectations, laid down in “Modern Fiction”’.
41
 
Yet Woolf’s essay, ‘Modern Novels’ (later republished under the title ‘Modern Fiction’) was 
not published in the Times Literary Supplement until 10 April 1919, whereas the first copies 
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of Prelude were sent out on 10 July 1918. Is it not equally conceivable, therefore, that 
Mansfield’s story had also given Woolf inspiration for her essay? Woolf accuses the 
‘materialist’ novelists Wells, Bennett and Galsworthy of ‘blotting out the light of the 
conception’ which picks up on Mansfield’s idea of the writing process as one of 
illumination.
42
 Perhaps also in a reference to Prelude – which is still a long story even after 
the editing process –Woolf notes, ‘There is, perhaps, no need that a short story should be 
brief and intense’ (p. 35). Woolf may also be alluding to Bergson’s emphasis on the spiritual 
over the material and on the role novelty and change might play in generating fiction when 
she comments that ‘every good quality whether of the mind or spirit is drawn upon and used 
and turned by the magic of art to something little or large, but endlessly different, 
everlastingly new’ (p. 36). 
An example of the way in which Prelude had an impact on the cultural memory of 
the period can be seen in a review of the story in the Times Literary Supplement in January 
1920 in which Harold Hannyngton Child drew attention to its formlessness and singled out 
the way in which Mansfield used light, colour and movement to represent the lives of her 
characters: 
The form of the tale is necessarily undefined; but the flashes of light are so adroitly 
directed, the whole thing is so lively with subtle movement and colour, that it holds 
the reader more firmly than many an elaborated study.
43
 
The review is juxtaposed with one by D. L. Murray in which he discusses the doctrine of 
‘philosophic materialism’ in a book on Modern Science and Materialism by Hugh Elliott. 
While matter and mind are approached by Elliott as part of the ‘stream of experience’, he 
still focuses on the physical functions of the mind rather than on its psychical components.
44
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A second example is the small multi-title advert for Virginia and Leonard Woolf’s 





 What stands out here is that the advert is juxtaposed with a review  
 
Figure 2. Hogarth Press advert for Prelude in the Times Literary Supplement, 1920 
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of A. S. Eddington’s Space, Time and Gravitation: An Outline of the General Relativity 
Theory, which discusses the new view of gravity, of space-time and the ‘fourth dimension’ 
(that is, the three dimensions of space and a fourth of time) which, according to the reviewer, 
is too complex for ‘ordinary language’ to present to the non-mathematically trained reader.
46
 
The adverts for Prelude and for Woolf’s Kew Gardens and The Mark on the Wall – stories 
which experiment with ‘modern’ literary technique as a means of generating the qualities of 
perception and memory – are indicative, like Eddington’s book, of an era whose mentalities 
moved beyond ordinary or natural language. These items, published in a prominent literary 
periodical, and which bring the latest philosophical thinking and new modes of story writing 
into conjunction, seem to underscore that writers of fiction in the period had further reason 
and ambition to be thinking about ways of newly representing unaccustomed dimensions of 
the mind as well as of time and space. 
Generating Prelude from The Aloe 
Various critics have outlined the principal cuts and alterations made to the text of 
The Aloe as it was transmuted into Prelude. Most critics seem to agree that Prelude is a 
technical improvement over The Aloe. In the Life, Antony Alpers comments that Mansfield 
‘refined’ The Aloe into Prelude.
47
 And John Middleton Murry explains in the Introduction to 
his 1930 edition of The Aloe that The Aloe material couldn’t be published in the ‘ordinary 
edition’ of Mansfield’s stories because ‘it repeats, in a less perfect form, the material of 
PRELUDE’.
48
 Patrick Morrow asserts that Prelude is ‘noticeably incomplete’, which could 
be read as indicating that the edits denuded the text, or that it fails to end; it is a puzzling 
statement.
49
 A response to Morrow might be that of Suzanne Ferguson who argues that by 
adopting the short story form Mansfield resisted the ‘novel convention of working 
everything out over time’, suggesting that inconclusiveness is part of the way in which 
temporality can be dealt with in the short story.
50
 Taken together, Morrow’s and Ferguson’s 
comments could be explained as Bergson’s appeal to Mansfield of the incessantly generative 
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nature of memory: memory itself is never complete; and in a short story not everything can 
be fitted in. What I turn to now is the question of whether, in generating the text of Prelude 
from The Aloe, Mansfield deleted descriptions of seemingly personal memories. At the same 
time, did she emphasise the generative capacity of the past to compound the present? 
In her critical study of 1951, Sylvia Berkman suggests that temporal digressions into 
the past were actually cut in order to retain a sense of the present: 
[H]owever much of the past history of her figures she might or might not be able to 
suggest […] she must keep her group within the limits of the single week she had 
chosen to represent. Each one of the digressive episodes was excised. 
51
 
Berkman also reinforces the idea that Mansfield was concerned to avoid writing 
autobiographically, suggesting that the character of Linda was the most decisively altered 
between the two stories, because the ‘earlier’ depiction of Linda might seem too closely 
modelled on Mansfield’s mother. By careful reshaping Mansfield ‘strengthened and 
integrated Linda’s original endowment of exterior detachment and interior absorption’ (p. 
91). 
Forty years after Berkman’s study, Sydney Janet Kaplan tracked the changes to The 
Aloe as Mansfield revised it for publication. Kaplan argues that the textual changes brought 
‘the narration closer to a specific character’s consciousness and away from interpretation by 
an omniscient narrator’, thereby generating a more psychological dimension to the story as 
well as multiple female viewpoints.
52
 Nora Sellei also notes that elements of traditional 
narrative technique are replaced by Free Indirect Style while also substituting words that are 
not consistent with the characters’ vocabularies.
53
 For Kaplan, Mansfield also importantly 
eliminated a ‘nostalgic, personal tone’ (p. 113). I take Kaplan’s line that Mansfield 
downplayed her own personal memories while enhancing those befitting her characters. In 
this way she also effected a more ambivalent attitude to family memory; representing the 
‘family’ not as a like-minded and integrated unit but as a loose assemblage of individual 
consciousnesses. 
The act of cutting ‘extraneous narration’ is regarded as feminine by Kaplan, and as 
rejecting male narrative modes located in the story’s ‘multiplicity, its fluidity, its lack of a 
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central climax, and its many moments of encoded sexual pleasure’ (p. 114). For Kaplan what 
makes Mansfield’s technique unique in this story is the way in which ‘the typical linear 
pattern of individual development is […] spread out among the female characters, who tend 
to represent the central consciousness at various stages of her life: early childhood, late 
adolescence, young motherhood, and old age’ (p. 117). These views are problematic in that 
they attribute gendered properties to the mode of narration and identify a single ‘feminine’ 
consciousness. I think Mansfield assigns a specificity of consciousness and memory to each 
character. This emphasis on the development of characters’ minds and memories serves to 
show Mansfield foregoing the personal in favour of the impersonal and experimenting with 
the constitution and depiction of consciousness in time. 
Picking up on the idea of the feminine, but valorising The Aloe over Prelude as the 
more ‘feminine text’, Sellei points to Mansfield’s use of typography and other graphic 
devices as a means of rendering a sense of ‘the ceaseless and unbounded flow of individual 
consciousnesses’ (p. 82). She suggests that Mansfield experiments in the earlier version of 
the story with what Woolf might have labelled ‘the psychological paragraph of the feminine 
gender’ in its use of long paragraphs and rolling pages (p. 82). But this tendency to 
essentialise the flow of consciousness as being somehow feminine is one I eschew for a more 
gender-neutral Bergsonian approach. That is, Mansfield can be seen to be taking up a more 
intuitive or sympathetic mode to her characters as she altered The Aloe into Prelude. Sellei 
does conclude that Mansfield’s narrative strategy in Prelude is ultimately the more effective 
in illuminating the subjective realities of the characters. By removing the ‘observer narrator’, 
she says (objecting to Kaplan’s use of the ‘omniscient narrator’), Mansfield ‘successfully 
adopted an exclusive use of the point-of-view technique, transferring all the experiences to 
the individual consciousness’ (p. 82). Sellei suggests that Mansfield’s final achievement was 
in shifting between the singular minds of her characters as a means of generating an 
‘interplay of truths’ to challenge the monolithic truth of ‘traditional narration’ (p. 82). The 
use of multiple viewpoints can also be read as a type of Bergsonian heterogeneity. 
While both Kaplan and Sellei focus on a feminine mode of consciousness encoded in 
the narrative technique, Vincent O’Sullivan looks to the operations of the mind and time in 
outlining Mansfield’s new method of storytelling: 
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Various minds in turn are entered into, then drawn back from. Anything like ‘reality’ 
is in how they converge, drift apart, lose touch, come back – the intricacies of time 
on the point of becoming memory. The story itself has become how it is being told.
54
 
As Mansfield told Dorothy Brett, she thought the form that emerged in Prelude was original: 
‘As far as I know, its more or less my own invention.’
55
 In textually representing the memory 
consciousness of her characters, Mansfield was effectively employing a Bergsonian intuitive 
method for literary ends. Mansfield’s personal memories are present only at the level of a 
description of the landscape and the atmosphere of early morning in New Zealand, conveyed 
‘with something of its sparkle and its flavour’.
56
 
The one personal, and traumatic, memory which may have been a prompt for 
Mansfield’s story, however, is the death of her only brother. Mansfield’s Notebook 45, 
known as the ‘Massilia’ notebook, includes a version of her elegiac poem to Leslie, as well 
as the last section of The Aloe in autograph manuscript draft.
57
 It also contains Mansfield’s 
well-known reactions to her brother’s death as well as her pledge to write ‘recollections of 
my own country’, which she describes both as a ‘debt of love’ to her family, as well as a 
‘sacred debt’ to her sibling: 
[B]ecause my brother & I were born there, but also because in my thoughts I range 
with him over all the remembered places. I am never far away from them. I long to 
renew them in writing.
58
 
The idea of ‘renewal’ does suggest a more literal revival whereas the phrase ‘in writing’ 
acknowledges the potential for textually modified re-inscription. Mansfield’s notebook 
entries suggest, therefore, both a personal valedictory and a fictionally rendered validatory 
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 The MS details for the last section of ‘The Aloe’ run as follows:  
[Notebook 45] [Mar?] 1916 – ‘The Aloe VI commencé March 12th [1916]’. Includes prose: 
Saunder’s Lane 
[Jinnie Moore …] 
The beautiful Miss Richardson 
The aloe 
[My dearest Ray] 
[A letter from Beryl …] 
[In a way of course …] 









impulse towards filial memory. However, Mansfield did not overtly write her brother into 
the text of The Aloe / Prelude: the arrival of the longed-for baby boy is deferred until ‘At the 
Bay’ (although he has been ‘conceived’). Nor did Mansfield dedicate the published text to 
her brother as she had stated in her notebook that she would.
59
 If Prelude is a memorial for 
anyone, it is more likely that it commemorates Mansfield’s maternal grandmother who died 
a few weeks after Mansfield returned to New Zealand following her school years in London 
and who Mansfield did not go to see. This is perhaps a guilt-laden memory for Mansfield 
which the text seeks partially and faithfully to assuage, with all the caveats associated with 
rendering ‘real’ memories in textual form. As far as propagating memory is concerned, it is 
to Bergson’s Matter and Memory that I now turn, and to a reading of the two versions of the 
story via Bergson’s multi-stranded theory of memory. 
Generative Memory and Bergson’s Theory of Memory 
In Matter and Memory, first translated into English in 1911, Bergson outlined his 
theory of memory, the purpose of which was both to demonstrate that human consciousness 
cannot be reduced to the activity of the brain and that memory can be separated from 
‘matter’ (‘the philosophy of matter must aim in the first instance […] at eliminating the 
contributions of memory’).
60
 Having established this separation during the course of his 
philosophical enquiry, Bergson later brings the two terms of matter and memory back 
together to indicate that each plays its complementary part. In dealing with what he regards 
as the limitations of both the idealist and the realist philosophy of his time, which on the one 
hand overemphasised the role of the mind and on the other overstressed the role of reality in 
our perceptual engagement with the world, Bergson proposes a dynamic rapprochement 
between memory and perception. What he terms ‘memory images’ (that is, past experience 
which is dormant rather than a visual representation) continually ‘mingle’ with our 
perception of the present.
61
 Because memory images are latent but not available until 
required, accessing a memory generally involves a degree of deliberate effort as well as of 
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 There is little sense, then, in Bergson’s theory that memories appear in 
random or completely spontaneous ways. 
Bergson outlines his thinking about the survival of memories and the past as early as 
1889 in Time and Free Will and again in his lecture on ‘Dreams’ in 1901, where he states: 
‘Yes, I believe our past life is there, preserved even to the minutest details; nothing is 
forgotten.’
63
 According to Bergson the past and the present cannot be separated as such.
64
 
There is no definitive present and no ‘point’ at which the present turns into the past. So too, 
our ‘psychical existence’ continues from the birth of consciousness without ceasing.
65
 
Bergson asserts that our past is indestructible and accessible: our ‘whole past still exists’ in 
our ‘unconscious’, which is virtual, while consciousness ‘has but to remove an obstacle, to 
withdraw a veil, in order that all that it contains, all in fact that it actually is, may be 
revealed’.
66
 Yet Bergson also values the future. While our past is ‘always behind us’ and to 
claim it we have ‘only to look back’, our real purpose is ‘to live, to act’, and ‘life and action 
look forward’.
67
 In Bergson’s theory of memory the active and ongoing aggregation of the 
past is also always inclined towards the future. 
Bergson’s Two Forms of Recollection 
I turn first to unpacking Bergson’s distinction between recollection and memory for 
the important reason that most recent interpreters of Bergson, including Mary Warnock, 
Suzanne Guerlac and Anne Whitehead, tend to divide Bergson’s theory of memory into a 
two-part schema represented by ‘pure’ and ‘habit’ memory when the theory is more subtle 
and complex than this.
68
 Bergson’s theory of memory distinguishes first between two forms 
of recollection, between what he calls habit-memory and representational memory, and then 
develops a distinction between recollected image-memory and unrecollected pure memory. 
John Mullarkey regards Bergson’s theory of memory as tripartite but I approach it as an 
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In outlining his theory of memory stage-by-stage, Bergson begins by looking at the 
way in which the past survives in two distinct forms of recollection: in ‘independent 
recollections’ and in ‘motor mechanisms’.
70
 Bergson establishes that of these two types of 
recollection, one ‘imagines’ while the other ‘repeats’ (p. 93). Independent recollections are 
‘spontaneous’ in the sense only of being temporally unique or ‘singular’, whereas motor 
mechanisms are repeated and become distanced from the past the more they are used (p. 95). 
The ‘independent recollections’ require an ‘effort of the mind’ in order to bring them into 
play in the present (p. 87) and rely on what John Mullarkey refers to as ‘iconic recollections 
representing the past’.
71
 They are attached to a particular occasion in the past, for instance, 
when we first learned to recite a poem or to ride a bicycle. This form of recollection is called 
representational memory by Bergson. The second form of recollection is based on automatic 
actions and relies on bodily movements. This form of recollection is termed habit-memory 
(‘habit interpreted by memory’, p. 95), or motor-memory. It is the memory that repeats via 
the actions of the bodily sensori-motor mechanisms, for instance, when the words of a poem 
learned by heart are recited on subsequent occasions or the bodily movements involved in 
riding a bicycle are reproduced. 
While both aspects of recollection have a function in ‘the utilizing of past experience 
for present action’ (which Bergson also refers to as ‘recognition’), the first form of 
recollection memory is less ‘useful’ in terms of everyday action, whereas the second has a 
‘use’ value and is most closely aligned with the routines of living. For Bergson 
representational memory consists in ‘dream images’ (p. 97) which are associated with a 
dependence on a past that does not act. The past is regarded by Bergson as being somewhat 
‘fugitive’, because it is always being eluded, while ordinary, everyday habit memory, 
directed towards action in the present and towards the future, embraces life. Bergson stresses 
that these two forms of recollection are extreme forms in a pure state at opposite ends of a 
spectrum (p. 103). He does not prioritise one form over the other because no individual can 
only dream or only act; there is a movement between both in each individual’s mind. 
I summarise the two forms of recollection in tabular form below. 
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Independent recollections   Motor mechanisms  
Representational Memory   Habit Memory     
Imagination      Action      
Preservation     Use      
Directed towards dream and the past    Directed towards the present  
Fugitive      Everyday    
Spontaneously recalled (singular)  Repeated     
Following the two forms of recollection, outlined in Chapter Two of Matter and 
Memory and equating to representational and habit memory, Bergson develops the idea of 
‘pure memory’ in Chapter Three. The important distinction to note between the two types of 
recollection and ‘pure memory’ is that ‘pure memory’ is unrecollected or ‘latent’ (p. 181); 
and it is ineffectual because it is virtual: ‘pure memory, though independent in theory, 
manifests itself as a rule only in the coloured and living image which reveals it’ (p. 170). 
Pure memory is without use or sensation as such; its ‘radical powerlessness’ is what allows it 
to be maintained in its latent state (p. 181) until it is drawn upon in the form of an image-
memory to mix with perception in the present. 
By the end of Chapter Three of Matter and Memory, Bergson has established a 
difference between ‘pure memory’ and ‘image-memory’, as laid out below. 
Pure Memory    Image-Memory 
Virtual; ‘an image not imagined’ Actualised in an image 
Unrecollected    Recollected 
Totality of the past   The moving present / immediate past 
Powerless without use   Useful for action 
Preserved in a latent state  Mixed with bodily sensation 
Unconscious (‘ineffective’)  Consciousness (‘immediate efficacy’) 
Crucially, Bergson has introduced the idea of the unconscious as an aspect of memory which 
is linked to the past (and which, by being virtual, is distinctly different from Freud’s theory 
of the Unconscious and of repression). The two forms of recollection have now been merged 
into the concept of ‘image-memory’ which is brought forth to mingle with perception in the 
present. 
Bergson’s well-known ‘cone’ diagram ‘SAB’ represents the totality of an 
individual’s accumulated and still accumulating memories, and brings together all 
recollections as well as the two types of memory on which he settles in his third chapter – 
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image-memory and pure memory, the one embodied, the other virtual (see Figure 4., p. 197 
and reproduced below).  
 
 
Figure 3. Bergson’s cone diagram from Matter and Memory 
 
The base of the cone (AB) represents the entire virtual or inactive past, while the 
pinnacle (S) is the moving present which touches the plane (P) which denotes an individual’s 
‘actual representation’ of and ongoing engagement with the world (p. 196). At S, the mind 
perceives an actual object and the body’s sensori-motor mechanisms actualise the images it 
receives from P. Importantly, for Bergson, there is ‘mutual support’ (p. 197) between these 
two planes. 
Bergson’s theory of memory turns out to be a dynamic one. It is movement in the 
‘shifting plane of experience’ of P (p. 197) that allows the interaction between bodily 
mechanisms and pure memory to be mutually supportive: ‘[T]hat a recollection should 
reappear in consciousness, it is necessary that it should descend from the heights of pure 
memory down to the precise point where action is taking place (p. 197).’ Memories thus 
move downwards to connect with action, which is for Bergson always where practical, active 
life is taking place. In the cone diagram Bergson illustrates and reinforces the core of his 
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theory in reanimating the dualism between mind and body by the intermediary function of 
the memory-image: it is the memory-image only which ‘partakes of the “pure memory”’, 
while perception of an object is ‘impregnated with memory-images’ which are required to 
‘complete it’ (p. 170). There is, then, an ongoing and mutually supportive relationship 
between pure memory and memory images and between memory images and perception, as 
well as movement from inaction to action, and an interaction between the mind and the 
body: ‘it is from the present that comes the appeal to which memory responds, and it is from 
the sensori-motor elements of present action that a memory borrows the warmth which gives 
it life’ (p. 197). 
The Plane of Dream and Plane of Action: Memory in The Aloe and Prelude 
Bergson explains in Matter and Memory that there are different ‘planes’ of memory 
ranging from the ‘plane of dream’, in which there are perfectly preserved past images 
(represented by the base of the cone at its widest) and which can be aligned with 
representational memory, to the ‘plane of action’ which can be aligned with habit memory 
(represented by the tip of the cone) where memory merges with action in being useful (p. 
137). 
Plane of Dream……… 
Representation, imagination, dream  
 
Plane of Action………………….. 
Repetition, habit, reality 
 
Bergson is careful not to attach any value judgements to these forms of recollection or to the 






Plane of Dream    Plane of Action    
The Past      The Present  The Future 
The Passive Dreamer     The Man of Impulse   
Linda Burnell (Mother)   Pat (the Handyman) 
The Man of Action  
Stanley Burnell (Father) 
The Practical Woman 
Mrs Fairfield (Grandmother) 
      The Present-Centred    
Child       
     Kezia  (Daughter)    
The Practical 
Dreamer 
Belle Dyer (Aunt) 
Clock Time   
Alice (The Maid) 
Figure 4. The Plane of Dream and Plane of Action 
In Bergson’s philosophy of memory the mind ranges ceaselessly between the two 
planes (p. 225). The plane of dream is where our ever-expanding past psychical life is 
exclusively ‘dreamed’, whereas the plane of action is where our psychical life is ‘acted’ and 
more narrowly related to immediate action in the present (p. 218). My reading of The Aloe / 
Prelude is in terms of these two planes: dream (imaginative memory; the past) and action 
(habit memory; the present), which represent lesser or greater tendencies of the characters 
towards taking action in the present or towards dreaming about the past as these planes 
pertain to the time during which the story unfolds. In the diagram above, I place the 
characters among (rather than ‘on’; this is not a linear placement) Bergson’s planes of 
memory according to their memory inclinations (what Bergson calls ‘dispositions’) 
according to whether they dwell on the past, act in the present or lean towards the future. 
In discussing the function of time and place in Prelude Mary Rohrberger uses 
Bergsonian terminology to explain that, in the story, past and present merge as the future is 
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poised to combine with the present. In the context of this fusion of temporalities Rohrberger 
finds a sense of the ‘generations of the family’ which is ‘delineated in all its tenses’. Time 
and motion are blended and: ‘The child becomes mother and the mother is child. Generation 
follows generation in an unbroken sequence.’
72
 In my reading of The Aloe and Prelude, 
memory is actively generated in different ways for different members of the Burnell family 
depending on age, experience, the generation they currently occupy, and their gender. There 
is the dreaming wife-mother Linda Burnell, Stanley, the active patriarch and father-husband, 
the pragmatic mother-grandmother Mrs Fairfield, the practical yet fantasising young woman-
aunt Beryl, and the girl-child Kezia for whom her most profound or ‘memorable’ 
recollections are in the process of being formed during the narrated time of the story. While 
Ruth Parkin-Gounelas suggests that Mansfield presents the ‘female life cycle’ in the story, I 
relate both female and male characters to the planes of dream memory and habit memory as 




According to Bergson, a well-balanced mind is one in which the two types of 
memory, pure and habit memory, ‘insert themselves each into the other’.
74
 The 
individual who lives only in the present Bergson refers to as a ‘man of impulse’ (p. 198). 
Using Bergson’s thought to think about the characterological aspects of the story, while the 
character of Stanley Burnell displays elements of impulsiveness, he more closely resembles 
Bergson’s ‘man of action’ who promptly summons memories most useful to the situation in 
hand and blocks those which are ‘useless’ or ‘indifferent’ (p. 198). Stanley moves along the 
plane of present-centred practical action and is inscribed as living predominantly in the realm 
of habit memory. The character of Linda Burnell is represented at the far end of the memory 
plane as the ‘dreamer’, who imagines escaping from her marriage and children, but is unable 
or unwilling to make a bid for freedom. Bergson describes the dreamer as someone ‘who 
lives in the past for the mere pleasure of living there, and in whom recollections emerge into 
the light of consciousness without any advantage for the present situation’; such a figure is 
‘hardly […] fitted for action’ (p. 198). 
Between these ‘extremes’ Bergson identifies the person with good, practical sense 
who displays a ‘happy disposition’ of memory and one ‘docile enough to follow with 
precision all the outlines of the present situation, but energetic enough to resist all other 
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appeal’, typified in the story by the character of the grandmother, Mrs Fairfield, content with 
living in the present while resistant to recollection that has no ‘advantage’ for the present. 
The child, represented principally by the character of Kezia, is aligned with what is 
happening in the present. As Bergson notes, most children ‘have not yet persuaded their 
memory to remain bound up with their conduct. They usually follow the impression of the 
moment’, while childish action is not beholden therefore to ‘the suggestions of memory’ and 
children ‘remember with less discernment’ (p. 199).
75
 In living life, elements of the plane of 
dream and the plane of action interpenetrate each other; in the story world, different aspects 
of the past are revealed through the focal point of each character while characters also 
respond to each other in relation to how active or dream-like they regard each other. Stanley 
Burnell, for instance, is to Linda like a ‘Newfoundland dog’ who bounds up to her (P, p. 140; 
A, p. 141); while to Beryl, Linda is mysterious and unfathomable (P, p. 148; A, p. 149). 
Linda’s character can be seen to be preoccupied with past time; her dream-memory, 
perhaps impelled – and imperilled – by the (medical) foreclosure of her likely future as a 
mother, attends to her distant past as a young adventurous woman. In The Aloe we learn that 
as a child Linda had been a ‘wild thing’; her eagerness in the past for the future has in the 
present of the story world been replaced by passivity and disillusionment as she struggles 
with the present burdens of family life. Beryl is practical in the present while inclined 
towards the future, while Mrs Fairfield represents an acceptance of the interpenetration of 
past and present with the unfolding future. While she is in comfortable harmony with present 
time, remembering validates both the present and the past. Stanley, by contrast, is fixed on 
taking repetitive and somewhat self-aggrandising actions in the present. I now turn to each 
main character in turn to assess his or her dream and action memory states. 
THE PASSIVE DREAMER 
At the beginning of each version of the story, Linda is already sitting on the buggy 
ready to depart. She is described by the narrator of Prelude as ‘trembling with fatigue and 
excitement’ (P, p. 22) and in The Aloe, as showing ‘over excitement’ (A, p. 23).
76
 In both 
stories, she lets out a ‘strange little laugh’ (P, p. 22 / A, p. 23). When she announces that she 
will have to leave two of the children behind, she seems fatigued: ‘she leaned back against 
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the buttoned leather cushions and shut her eyes’ (P, p. 22; A, p. 23; ‘upon’). These 
descriptions suggest that Linda is overcome by tiredness and emotion, and is experiencing a 
mental state bordering on hysteria. At the same time there is a textual clue that Linda is 
pregnant: ‘the grandmother’s lap was full and Linda Burnell could not possibly have held a 
lump of a child on hers for any distance’ (P, p. 22; A, p. 23; ‘Grandmother’s’; ‘Mrs’; ‘not 
possibly’; ‘for such a distance’). The luggage is apparently more important to her than her 
children: ‘“These are absolute necessities that I will not let out of my sight for one instant”’ 
(P, p. 22; A, p. 23; ‘absolute’; ‘one instant’: note that emphases tend to be removed between 
the earlier and later versions of the text as though Linda hasn’t the energy to be emphatic). 
The next episode in which Linda appears is when the children who have been left behind 
arrive with the storeman at the new house and Linda is lying down; she asks whether it is the 
children, ‘But’, we are told, ‘Linda did not really care; she did not even open her eyes to see’ 
(P, p. 48). In The Aloe, the following words were cut from Prelude either because they 
implied that Linda was worried about the children or that she was being melodramatically 
fanciful: ‘“Have either of them killed on the dray maimed for life”’ (A, p. 49). Without 
opening her eyes Linda’s voice is described as being ‘faint far-away’ as though she barely 
perceives present realities (P, p. 56; A, p. 57; ‘far away’; the repetition of ‘far away’ and the 
words ‘sleeping voice’ are removed). 
 While Linda dreams of the ‘long’ past prior to her marriage to Stanley, the recent 
past, symbolised by family belongings and mementoes, has been absorbed into the present: 
‘All the furniture had found a place – all the old paraphernalia […]. Even the photographs 
were on the mantelpiece’ (P, p. 60). But Linda repudiates this continuation of domestic life 
and imagines ‘going away from this house, too’ (P. p. 60). In a scene cut from Prelude Linda 
recollects a more active youthful past, ‘thrilling with life’, with plans for travel and 
adventure with her father, as ‘a couple of boys together’ (A, p. 73). The effect of such an 
excision is to focus on Linda’s passivity and her tendency in the present to drift into a dream 
state, encapsulated by what Bergson suggests is ‘The state into which you naturally fall when 
you let yourself go, when you no longer care to concentrate yourself on a single point, when 
you cease to will’.
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Dreaming requires no effort; it represents the relaxing of the ‘tension’ of our 
faculties: ‘The dream-self is a distraught self, a self which has let itself go. The memories 
which harmonize best with it are the memories of distraction, those which bear no mark of 
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 Linda’s dream-memory includes a disturbing one of her father and a tiny bird 
which swells and mutates into a baby with a ‘gaping bird-mouth, opening and shutting’ (P, p. 
60; A, p. 61). While in a psychoanalytic reading this dream episode might indicate 
incestuous father–daughter relations, it may also suggest Linda’s own distraught and 
incomplete sense of self: she is the ‘gaping’ bird/baby. While Linda is distracted by 
memories and dreams of the past, in the present time of the story-world she cannot seem to 
tolerate the present in which she perceives the world strangely. Things have the properties of 
swelling, of seeming to come alive and of frightening her. Her active perception of the 
wallpaper is disturbed and yet she is apathetic. Linda waits suspended from the action of the 
world, in a seeming out-of-body experience: ‘she floated, held up in the air […] waiting for 
someone to come who just did not come’ (P, p. 80; A, p. 81). She is disconnected from the 
present: the passive dreamer. 
This passive and detached state is represented by Linda’s sleepiness; she is often 
depicted in the text as recumbent. An incisive view of this passive sleep state is provided by 
Bergson in Matter and Memory as well as in an essay on dreams. Sleep, Bergson proposes, 
generates ‘indifference’ because the sleeper no longer acts; that is, he or she loosens his or 
her ‘attention to life’.
79
 The sleeper loses interest in the present and ‘phantom’ memories 
unite with sensation to produce dreams. Bergson’s description for such renegade memories is 
that they ‘rise and spread abroad and perform in the night of the unconscious a wild 
phantasmagoric dance’.
80
 In this view of the hidden forces at work in sleep Bergson grants a 
sense of volition to the past; the past manages to breach consciousness while the sleeper puts 
aside the needs of ‘effective action’ and places himself or herself back in the dream state.
81
 
In this way, the past has the power to haunt not only the present but the sleeper’s dream life 
too. At the same time, there is a risk associated with such dreaming because dreams also 
have the power to disturb the balance of the mind. They may ‘imitate insanity’ and generate 
a ‘psychic vertigo’ in which the brain stops attending and memory disassociates from 
reality.
82
 Linda Burnell seems to drift in and out of reality; her sensations, dreams, memories 
and perceptions collide, fuse and confuse. On the wallpaper she traces poppies with her 
finger and they feel to her both sticky and silky as well as hairy and rough; she has ‘often’ 
hallucinated that the tassels of the bed quilt have altered from their real state into ‘a funny 
procession of dancers with priests attending’ (P, p. 78; A, p. 79), indicating also, perhaps, a 
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spiritual malaise. Medicine bottles transmogrify into ‘a row of little men with brown top-hats 
on’ (P, p. 80; A, p. 81; ‘top hats’); her mind often seems to be elsewhere. 
Linda also imagines the aloe in the garden of the new house as a ship on which she 
dreams of rowing away from her world (P, p. 138; A, p. 139). Curiously, this image happens 
to mirror one offered by Mansfield’s contemporary, George Santayana, in describing 
Bergson’s doctrine of duration: 
In a sensuous day-dream past feelings survive in the present, images of the long ago 
are shuffled together with present sensations, the roving imagination leaves a bright 




In a psychoanalytic reading of The Aloe and Prelude, however, Bruce Harding argues that 
Linda’s dream of the aloe-as-ship is her means of fantasising an escape which would 
‘facilitate the construction of a mature, androgynous (sexually protean) self’. The fantasy of 
escape is Linda’s antidote to the psychosomatic guilt and rage she feels at her role as 
‘primary caregiver’ and one which she resists, albeit unconsciously.
84
 It is telling, however, 
that Mansfield cut from Prelude Mrs Fairfield’s comment, ‘“What a baby you are”’ (A, p. 
69), which would reinforce her daughter’s infantile state. My reading differs from that of 
Harding in that I think Linda’s fantasy falls short of any such resistance; her dream of the 
aloe/ship is an escapist fantasy of an impossible future which only serves to reinforce her 
present unbearable reality: ‘How much more real this dream was than that they should go 
back to the house where the sleeping children lay and where Stanley and Beryl played 
cribbage (P, p. 140; ‘natural this dream’, A, p. 141).’ Linda’s dream state is shown ultimately 
to be a false reality, because she returns indoors to the house to resume her ‘confinement’ (in 
both senses of the word – her domestic incarceration and her pregnancy); her fantasy is part 
of her ‘mania’ merely to ‘keep alive’ in the face of the intolerable and seemingly insoluble 
prospect of bearing more children. 
Towards the end of the narrative, however, Linda’s dream memory is overlaid by the 
idea of a more positive anticipated memory represented by the aloe in the garden of her new 
home: ‘“I am sure I shall remember it long after I’ve forgotten all the other things”’ (P, p. 
140; A, p. 141). This expectation – or ‘promise’ to use Lorna Marten’s term – of memory, 
based on the slow germination of the aloe’s fruitfulness, carries the narrative into an 
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imaginary future, an effect that would have been lost had Mansfield gone ahead with an 
earlier, more dramatic denouement for the story which she recorded in her notes: ‘They cut 
down the stem when Linda is ill. She has been counting on the flowering of the aloe.’
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Mansfield it seems had planned to deal the aloe and, in turn, Linda a Chekhovian-style blow, 
reprising elements of The Cherry Orchard. Instead, Linda’s dream state and her inability to 
harness memories for living adequately in the present in Bergson’s terms continue, at least as 
far as into Prelude’s ‘sequel’, ‘At the Bay’. 
THE MAN OF ACTION 
In stark contrast with the character of Linda, the character of Stanley Burnell 
exhibits a memory focused on successful action in the present; he is Bergson’s ‘man of 
action’. Linda refers to Stanley as ‘Mr. Business Man’ (P, p. 56; A, p. 57; ‘man’), mocking 
his self-important commercial activity; while Stanley congratulates himself (twice) on 
having driven a hard bargain to buy the new house to which they have just moved. As a 
character, his energy, keenness to do his fitness exercises and his ‘amazing vigour’ set him 
apart from the representation of the listless Linda (P, p. 60; A, p. 61). His memory is 
employed in fully experiencing the present and planning the future. His impatience, his joy 
in his new house, his eagerness to express physical love for his wife, and his action-centred 
plans for the weekend and the week following in the story-world, are all assertions of his 
exuberant future-directedness. Even in what might have been presented as a moment of 
regret towards the past, the reader is given a rare moment of insight into Stanley’s optimistic 
mind. During the externally focalised description of the children’s nursery at teatime, the 
narrative switches to a passage of rare internal focalisation for Stanley in which he reflects 
on the absence of a boy child in the family, while simultaneously, the child’s future presence 
is indirectly invoked: 
Isabel and Lottie sat one on either side of the table, Kezia at the bottom – the place at 
the top was empty. 
‘That’s where my boy ought to sit,’ thought Stanley. He tightened his arm round 
Linda’s shoulder. By God, he was a perfect fool to feel as happy as this. (P, p. 100; 
A, p. 101; ‘They sat […] Isabel and Lottie’) 
Yet it is worth noting two things: Stanley is also a somewhat diminished and derided male 
character when placed against the backdrop of the female-centred and often female-focalised 
story; and the polarisation of character types, especially between the ‘dominant’ male and 
the female characters, also serves a range of narratological functions in the text such as 
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setting up point of view and character motivations and interiority, as well as emphasising the 
ideological dimension of gendered relations. 
  THE MAN OF IMPULSE 
Stanley’s absence from most of the narrative of The Aloe and Prelude is 
counterbalanced by the masculine presence, in several episodes, of the character of the 
handyman Pat who is figured as the ‘man of impulse’ who takes action in the here and now 
and is content with living in the present. In the very first scene, it is Pat who has ‘swung’ the 
children onto the buggy (P. p. 22; A, p. 23); in the fourth scene he is ‘sprawled’ in his room 
off the kitchen; and in the seventh scene he drives Stanley home in the buggy. While Stanley 
is ‘impatient’ to get home, Pat, in a description focalised through Stanley and also 
representing Stanley’s apparent ‘mastery’ over his employee, ‘looked as if he was pleased 
with his job – happy and contented already’ (P, p. 94; A, p. 95). And it is Pat who is full of 
purpose in the shocking scene in which, with skilled violence, he quickly beheads the duck, 
rendered in mostly single-syllabled words which add a sense of immediacy to the action: 
‘Pat grabbed the duck by the legs, laid it flat across the stump, and almost at the same 
moment down came the little tomahawk and the duck’s head flew off the stump’ (P, p. 116; 
A, p. 117; text revised). Yet Pat also displays masculine sensitivity alongside his practical 
brutality in that he coaxes and smiles at the children and soothes Kezia during the beheading. 
THE PRACTICAL WOMAN 
The character of the grandmother is at the further reaches of family memory having 
passed through all the phases of girlhood and womanhood. In terms of the planes of dream 
memory and action memory, Mrs Fairfield contentedly lives in the present, with a 
demeanour which is practical and seemingly at peace with her past. The grandmotherly 
figure’s usefulness is in keeping family memories safe while also being able to utilise her 
habit memory for everyday life. This harmonious fusion is demonstrated in a scene in which 
Mrs Fairfield is in the kitchen of the new house washing the breakfast crockery (which uses 
her habit memory) when she has a recollection (evoked by the sight of the grapevine in the 
lean-to) of Beryl as a baby: 
And she remembered how Beryl when she was a baby had been picking some white 
grapes from the vine on the back verandah of their Tasmanian house and she had 




While this memory is suffused with emotion – ‘Mrs. Fairfield caught her breath 
remembering’ (P, p. 82; A, p. 83) – the scene ends with a description of the grandmother’s 
reassuring sense of familiar, habitual time: ‘It was very hard to believe that they had only 
arrived yesterday and that she had not been in the kitchen for years – she was so much a part 
of it’ (A, p. 83; P, p. 82; text shortened). Moreover, Mrs Fairfield repeats her habit of 
imposing order on the present, especially in the domestic sphere: ‘When she had finished, 
everything in the kitchen had become part of a series of patterns’ (P, p. 82; A, p. 83; 
‘finished tidying’). While the grandmother of the family might be expected to dwell on the 
past, this is not evidently so. The past is respected rather than revered; and when asked by 
her daughter Linda what thoughts the sight of the aloe in the moonlit garden has provoked, 
Mrs Fairfield replies: ‘“I haven’t really been thinking of anything”’ (P, p. 144; A, p. 145). 
Rather than dreaming of the past, or anticipating the future, the grandmother’s thoughts are 
practical ones in which the future also combines with habitual action: that of making jam in 
the autumn. 
THE PRACTICAL DREAMER 
If Linda’s character represents the passive dreamer lacking in will to draw down 
memories to act in the present, whose recollections are associated with dream memory of the 
past, and who is anxious about the future, and the grandmother’s character combines habit 
memories with recollections of the family’s past and is sanguine about the future, the 
character of Beryl Fairfield is that of a young woman who, mostly cheerfully, acts practically 
in the present while simultaneously anticipating the future. Beryl’s ‘habit’ memory is evident 
in the way in which she plays the guitar and plays cribbage with Stanley; she can ‘act’, in 
Bergson’s sense of the word, usefully in the present. Beryl also ‘acts’ her femininity not only 
in the contemporary theoretical sense of ‘performing’ her gender; her performance is based 
on the repetition associated with Bergson’s habit memory. Beryl’s self-conscious sense of 
how she looks to others as well as to herself (in a mirror), the way she elects to sit in the 
softened light with Stanley (the only man of her class habitually in her life), the way she 
tosses her hair, her pouting and the charm she exudes (regarded from Linda’s perspective) in 
wearing a velvet ribbon around her neck, are all attributes of a habit-forming and inhabited 
femininity. 
That Beryl’s femininity is also reiterated through gazing in mirrors also connects 
with Freud’s thinking on narcissism (or self-absorption) as well as with scopophilia (the 
pleasure derived from looking) and provides the basis also for a Freudian reading: 
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Standing in a pool of moonlight Beryl Fairfield undressed herself. She was tired, but 
she pretended to be more tired than she really was – letting her clothes fall, pushing 
back with a languid gesture her warm, heavy hair. (P, p. 54; A, p. 55; ‘charming 
gesture’) 
She jumped up and half unconsciously, half consciously she drifted over to the 
looking-glass. (P, p. 152, A, p. 151-53) 
In the absence of being scrutinised by any legitimately available male gaze, Beryl is curious 
about looking at her own body, which indicates autoeroticism. This activity is also a form of 
displacement activity: by making herself the object of her own desire, she circumvents erotic 
yearnings towards others, both male and female. 
The character of Beryl can also be regarded as being in a liminal state between 
febrile late adolescence and sexually active adulthood. In a perceptive reading, Claire 
Drewery argues that Prelude highlights the ways in which characters manage the social-
subject positions expected of women, which for Beryl is one of being trapped ‘in a liminal 
position between her fantasies of suitors and a sexual “role”, and her rejection of this 
experience when the opportunity arises’.
86
 In this reading, Beryl experiences the ‘painful 
“undecidability” of the liminal state’.
87
 However, I read Beryl’s restlessness as implying her 
emergent and frustrated heterosexuality. For example, Beryl writes to her friend Nan of 
being ‘buried’ in the country with only ‘big louts of boys’ (P, p. 146, A, p. 147) rather than 
sexually eligible men. 
Thinking with Bergson, if the character of Beryl could develop an ability to bring to 
the fore and integrate memories that would help her live contentedly in the present, she 
might be less inclined towards expectations of a more exciting future. In the last scene of the 
story, a romantic future starts to unfold for Beryl. Stanley has returned home to lunch 
bringing with him from the alluring city an unidentified, yet potentially enticing, sexually 
potent, man. Conscious of her femininity in smoothing her crumpled skirt, she automatically 
powders her nose (a gendered ‘habit’ memory perhaps) and runs out of the room in romantic 
anticipation. Mansfield cancelled The Aloe’s original ending, however, a scene in which a 
young Englishman is invited to the house to play tennis, not only, I suggest, to leave the 
story’s ending focalised through Kezia, but to withhold until ‘At the Bay’ a fuller and more 
ambivalent development of heterosexual desire in the form of Beryl’s dubious encounter 
with the sinister and yet sexually charged Harry Kember. 
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THE PRESENT-CENTRED CHILD 
Clare Hanson and Andrew Gurr have observed that the main theme of Prelude is one 
of ‘discovery and opening out’.
88
 My view is that in The Aloe / Prelude such ‘discovery’ is 
principally in terms of the formation of the character Kezia’s ‘childhood’ memory via a 
series of memorable ‘shocks’. While Kezia lives in the ‘now’ of the present, the main events 
of the story, as they happen to her specifically, are particularly memorable because they are 
related to sudden dramatic events. These ‘shocks’ generate apprehension and expanded 
awareness in the present, the implication being that they will lead to consolidated knowledge 
as well as worldliness in the future. They include: moving house; being left behind at the old 
house by her mother; arriving at a strange new house in darkness; witnessing the slaughter of 
an animal; and suddenly dropping an object which doesn’t belong to her. Shocking events, I 
argue, are memorable because they are powerful, exceptional or extraordinary. 
Bergson’s thought is helpful here because he registers that not all memories are the 
same. Some carry with them a greater affective power; some register more intensely, and 
carry more intensive sensations. Of course, not all memories are generated by shocks. But in 
relation to the characterisation of Kezia’s childhood memory-formation, it becomes 
significant that Bergson does distinguish clearly between ‘ordinary’ and ‘exceptional’ (or 
what he terms ‘dominant’) memories. Dominant memories are the ‘shining points round 
which the others form a vague nebulosity’.
89
 Such ‘shining points’, importantly for my 
argument, ‘are multiplied in the degree in which our memory expands’.
90
 My claim here, 
then, is that there are multiple shining points in the development of Kezia’s character, around 
which her memories congeal and expand; the ‘shocking’ memories’ will become her most 
‘memorable memories’. While her grandmother’s memory has accumulated more memories 
due simply to her greater age, Kezia’s particular experiences during the course of the 
narrative are, I suggest, represented as being the most memorable.
91
 
In describing the shocking experience which might prompt strong memories, 
Bergson puts the reader in mind of Virginia Woolf’s memory shocks discussed in my 
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 Bergson also coins the phrase ‘attentive recognition’ to describe shocks to perception as Mullarkey 
notes: ‘Attentive recognition […] is a set of circuits or reverberations within perception caused by 
the disturbance of some novel event. Conscious awareness is amplified by shock, resistance or 
disorder interrupting our habitual actions, following which perception is more and more enhanced 
with memory-images in an attempt to reintegrate the object or dissipate the shock of the 
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Introduction: moments which for Woolf began with a ‘sudden violent shock’ in which, she 
says, ‘something happened so violently that I have remembered it all my life’.
92
 As Bergson 
says, ‘A sharp shock, a violent emotion, forms the decisive event’ to which memories 
‘cling’.
93
 The affective dimension is clear here, as well: the shock is accompanied by intense 
emotion, although not in a destructive sense; the ‘violence’ is the power of intensity. The 
shock occurs in the present. It is not, therefore, the past that haunts us; it is rather that what is 
memorable first occurs in the present and is later reinserted into the then present if and when 
required. What may be an attitude equivalent for Mansfield to that of Bergson and Woolf 
towards the forging of strong or distinctive memories is expressed in a diary entry in May 
1915 in which Mansfield comments that she can tolerate reading any amount of Henry 
James’s ‘turgid’ prose if only ‘for the sake of that sudden sweet shock, that violent throb of 
delight that he gives me at times’.
94
 The shock, then, need not be traumatic in order to be 
insistently memorable. 
The character of Kezia is situated both in the ‘now’ of the plane of action and in the 
present of the temporal plane of memory as the narrative recounts what will come to seem 
the shockingly memorable events of her day. Left behind by her mother, she explores by 
herself the empty house she seems reluctant to leave. She notices small objects also left 
behind, to which she is mostly indifferent, although she picks up a black pill box from her 
parents’ bedroom which is lined with cotton wool and in which she thinks she could keep a 
bird’s egg. From a Bergsonian perspective, memory fuses Kezia’s immediate perceptual 
consciousness (of the black pill box) with her ‘memory images’ of the past (her memory that 
the object has been in her parents’ bedroom) which also opens out into the future (the 
anticipation of making a keepsake). Combined together these temporal elements coalesce 
with the event and its affect to make a significant memory. That is, Kezia is likely to 
remember being abandoned by her mother, roaming around her old home, picking up a 
personal memento, imagining a way of keeping it by making it her own. At least, by 
rendering this scene with these seemingly insignificant but particular details – displaying 
what Kirsty Gunn calls Mansfield’s ‘emotional tone’ which is a combination of memory 
feeling and physical detail – the narrative initiates this possibility.
 95
 Detail is important to 
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Mansfield as a way of giving specificity to her characters’ memories; she cherishes the sense 
of ‘an infinite delight and value in detail – not for the sake of detail but for the life in the life 




As a child character, Kezia’s past is necessarily limited to her earlier childhood. In 
looking through the coloured panes of the dining-room window, she bends down ‘to have 
one more look’ at a ‘blue lawn with blue arum lilies’ followed by a ‘yellow lawn with yellow 
lilies and a yellow fence’ (P, p. 34). This is a distinctive memory image associated with 
imaginative rather than habitual memory. Kezia’s sensory perception in the present is 
heightened by the quixotic hues of the coloured glass through which she looks, and which 
interpenetrates with her memory image of the same perspectival view in the past. The 
unusual perspective (the blue lawn, the blue lilies) adds to the sense of this being a 
captivating and precious perception and is clearly focalised through Kezia, whereas in The 
Aloe the narrator controls the viewpoint: ‘From the window you saw beyond the yard a deep 
gully filled with tree ferns’ (A, p. 35). This refinement in Mansfield’s technique not only 
renders Kezia’s consciousness more directly, but conveys a sense of the fusion of her past, 
present and beckoning future. The end of her present time in her childhood family home is 
definitively marked by the cessation of daylight when Kezia subsequently looks through the 
‘shining’ glass of the window in her grandmother’s room: ‘As she stood there, the day 
flickered out and dark came’ (P, p. 34; ‘As she stood the day flickered out and sombre dusk 
entered the empty house, thievish dusk’; A, p. 35, p. 37). In the revision from The Aloe to 
Prelude, natural time is allowed to preside, Mansfield having eliminated the adjectives 
‘sombre’ and ‘thievish’. Rather than a schism between dark and light, aspects of the 
temporal plane interpenetrate: the shining glass symbolising the future, the dark symbolising 
the unfolding of the ever-renewing past. 
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There are two scenes in the story in which Kezia is more forcefully initiated into 
time and memory through memorable shocks. The first is when Pat the handyman chops off 
the duck’s head. Kezia’s screaming to have the severed head put back is a naïve request, but 
the ‘coming off’ of the duck’s head is as strange as the way in which Kezia perceives Pat’s 
earrings. She asks Pat, ‘“Do they come on and off?”’ (P, p. 120; A, p. 121; “Do they come 
off and on”’). Things that come ‘on and off’ or come off that shouldn’t, like the head of a 
duck, invert the child’s known world and suggest, in that they are disturbing, that they are 
likely to be remembered. Kezia also finds it puzzling that earrings are worn by a man. In the 
act of sudden violence of the duck’s beheading, Kezia is, I suggest, introduced not only to 
death but to the troubles of gendered identity. 
The second initiation is at the end of the two stories in a scene in which Kezia, her 
calico cat and her aunt’s cream jar come into collision: 
And the top of the cream jar flew through the air and rolled like a penny in a round 
on the linoleum –and did not break. 
But for Kezia it had broken the moment it flew through the air, and she picked it up, 
hot all over, and put it back on the dressing table. 
Then she tip-toed away, far too quickly and airily…. (P, p. 158; A, p. 159; ‘put it on 
the dressing table and walked away, looking very guilty far too quickly – and 
airily’.) 
This scene is a source of a significant memory for Kezia, I suggest, due both to its 
suddenness and to the shock it induces which produces a dramatic culmination to the story. 
The toy cat seems to have the capacity for self-reflection: ‘The calico cat was so overcome 
by the sight that it toppled over’ (P, p. 158; A, p. 159; ‘was so appalled at the effect that it 
toppled over backwards’). A Freudian reading would see a parallel with Beryl’s propensity 
to look in mirrors as an example of the specular; but I suggest this reading is forestalled 
because it is Kezia who puts the cream jar lid on the toy cat’s ear, and commands it to look at 
itself. Kezia both puts something on (the cream jar on the head of the cat) and puts 
something back (the cream jar on the dressing table) with which she has meddled. This 
action contrasts with her unrealised desire to put back the duck’s head; that is, she cannot 
reverse time when it comes to the truly animate animal, compared with the 
anthropomorphised toy. 
While the lid of the cream jar does not break, Kezia has already anticipated and 
assumed that it will break, and reacts as though it has broken. With this event it seems that 
Mansfield manages, with a versatility of technique, to represent the fusion of time past, 
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present and future in a way which echoes Bergson’s idea of the indivisibility of time. The 
falling of the cream jar may signify, but by no means arrest, the passage of time and the 
remorseless momentum of the past and present in the process of becoming the future. The 
temporal markers, ‘When’, ‘Now’, ‘the moment’, ‘Then’, that occur at the very end of the 
story, also imply that Kezia’s future memory will now always include this ‘decisive’ event in 
her past to which her memories will ‘cling’ in Bergson’s formulation. In narratological 
terms, the implication is that the character of Kezia may breach the confines of this narrative. 
That is, what seems ‘modern’ about this ‘closing’ scene is that it is left unterminated and 
undetermined; Kezia tip-toes away from her aunt’s room and the final three dots punctuating 
the story suggest both the narrative’s ‘futurity’ – the future being in Bergson’s understanding 
an unforeseeable one – and the ‘future’ of the character ‘Kezia’, which is narrated, as it 
happens, in ‘At the Bay’. 
THE ALOE 
 The aloe plant has symbolised many things for Mansfield critics, but at its simplest, 
it represents longevity and natural growth. The aloe follows its own slow, flowering cycle, 
seemingly free of human intervention or human inventions of time. When Kezia and her 
mother observe the aloe, it is its height (they look up at it), its tenacity, its mystery and its 
‘blind stem’ that are most prevalent. There may be Freudian phallic connotations to the 
aloe’s ‘swelling’ upward-reaching ‘fleshy stem’ (P, p. 94; A, p. 95), but ‘swelling’ in the 
story may also suggest an identification with Linda’s implied pregnancy. The aloe in my 
reading contains the plant memory of its long past and its potential, perhaps endless, capacity 
to flower once a century. And as such, it seems to be a symbol of that which endures; an 
interpenetration of past, present and future. It is also an example of a Bergsonian 
heterogeneous multiplicity, for it represents a unity of temporal change and continuity. It is a 
shifting, elusive object to the human individuals who perceive it and one which functions as 
an ‘objective correlative’, in T. S. Eliot’s term, for the characters. Kezia, for example, 
perceives the aloe as something strange and unknown. 
 Linda, at the first time of viewing the aloe with her daughter Kezia, regards it as 
something sinister and frightening with its ‘cruel leaves’ and ‘blind stem’; she projects her 
anxiety onto it, perceiving the plant as having ‘claws instead of roots’ (P, p. 94; A, p. 95). 
Mrs Fairfield, in keeping with her character as one who sees the world as more benign and 
fruitful, believes the aloe is going to flower. Yet this may also be a misperception; the buds 
may be ‘only an effect of light’ (P, p. 138; A, p. 139). Linda, at the second time of observing 
the aloe alongside her mother, in an exquisitely crafted temporal parallel in the story, senses 
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that the aloe is inchoate and chameleon-like. It alters perception; it becomes an image of a 
ship; it apprehends her; it approaches. 
ALICE AND CLOCK TIME 
A second minor character, aside from Pat, is Alice the servant girl. Alice is both 
bound by ‘habit’ memory and the ‘privacy’ of her own dreaming, imaginative mind. Her 
place is in the kitchen where a feminised present time presides, giving a gendered aspect to 
mechanical clock time: ‘The clock ticked in the warm air, slow and deliberate, like the click 
of an old woman’s knitting needle’ (P, p. 120, A, p. 121; ‘kitchen clock’, ‘knitting needles’). 
The clock implies regularity, while knitting, in Bergson’s schema, invokes the habit memory 
required of a repetitive, learned action. But in her imaginative memory, Alice is caught up 
with superstition, ancient lore and the meaning attached to dream-symbols, such as beetles 
and spiders, which she divines from her Dream Book (P, p. 122, A, p. 123; ‘Dream Book’). 
But when Alice is given her own occasionally internally focalised thoughts in the narrative, 
she mentally constructs a meta-character who transcends both domestic habit and 
dreamscapes: an ‘imaginary Alice’ who is ready with bold retorts to bossiness from Beryl. 
The Time Plane – Leaving the Past Behind: Moving On 
My final approach to The Aloe / Prelude centres on the narrative trajectory of leave-
taking and arrival, of ending and beginning, of a period of time in which accumulated 
memories attached to one place, a family home, are detached as three generations of an 
extended family move from city to country, necessitating the forging of new memory 
attachments. Leaving the past behind is a wish-fulfilment of Linda Burnell signalled by her 
willingness to leave two of her children behind in the opening scene of the story during the 
crucial time of ‘removal’. In its theme of moving home, the story provides a sense of 
Bergsonian change, both in the sense of moving somewhere new and in the sense of moving 
forward in time. 
I diverge from Meghan Hammond’s view that in Prelude the ‘family feeling’ 
Mansfield generates is ‘what we might understand as a collective stream of consciousness’ in 
which the characters’ minds are ‘thinking and feeling together’; or that only a ‘we’ rather 
than an ‘I’ is encountered.
 97
 In my view, each of the characters is singular, alone, while the 
reader is permitted only intermittent access to each character’s thoughts and memories. 
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 See Meghan Hammond, Empathy and the Psychology of Literary Modernism (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2014), p. 112; p. 114. 
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Rarely more than a trio gather in the present time of the story and larger groupings tend to 
dissolve: Kezia wanders away from the Samuel Josephs and from Isabel, ‘just away’ (P., p. 
64; A. p. 65); Beryl is alone in a pool of moonlight; Pat is alone in his room behind the 
kitchen; Linda is by herself in bed; Linda leaves Stanley and Beryl playing cribbage (and 
Linda’s meeting with her elder and younger sisters is removed from The Aloe). Mansfield’s 
personal ‘Do you remember?’ game is not played among the family members in the story. 
The tribute to family memory, both personal and fictive family, is ‘removed’. 
Narrative time moves from an afternoon during which a house has already been 
emptied out, to the filling of a new house with familiar things such as photographs and 
furniture the next day, to the nocturnal vision of the aloe plant which may be coming into 
bud. In answer to her mother’s comment that she believes the aloe is going to flower ‘“this 
year”’ (P, p. 138; A, p. 139), Linda replies: ‘“I believe those are buds”’ (P, p. 140; A, p. 141, 
“I believe there are buds”). It might be the aloe’s time to flourish or there may be 
implications in the temporal alterities of moonlight as a departure from the ratiocinative 
clarities of daylight as the story moves to the deeper time of the long-enduring aloe. 
In The Aloe the story opens poised between the past and the future, signalled by the 
first chapter heading, ‘Last Moments Before’. On the title page of the autograph manuscript 
of The Aloe, Mansfield indicated that the story was to be divided into four parts: 
Chapter I  Last Moments Before 
Chapter II  A Journey with the Storeman 
Chapter III  The Day After 
Chapter IV 
In the first published edition of The Aloe, John Middleton Murry added the missing fourth 
chapter heading, ‘The Aloe’, thereby suggesting that the story culminates with the aloe. In 
Prelude, there are no titles for the headings of the twelve sections which open in medias res. 
The reader, then, might reasonably question what these ‘last moments before’ both precede 
and presage. It is only in the second scene that the reader learns, for certain, via a minor 
character’s observation, that this is the Burnell family’s ‘last day’ (P, p. 28; an addition to 
A). 
The narrative provides sufficient clues to suggest that the story begins in the 
afternoon; Lottie and Kezia are given tea by Mrs Samuel Josephs and they will be taken on 
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the dray ‘afterwards’. By the time they are on their journey with the storeman (scene three of 
Prelude, Chapter Two of The Aloe), it is dusk and the visual perspective again shifts: 
It was the first time that Lottie and Kezia had ever been out so late. Everything 
looked different – the painted wooden houses far smaller than they did by day, the 
gardens far bigger and wilder. Bright stars speckled the sky. (P, p. 38; A, p. 39) 
The time of the narrative’s passing is effected by Kezia and Lottie falling asleep, also 
marking the transition from the action-centred and moving present to the ‘timeless’ world of 
childish dream. As the children reach their destination, Kezia is reunited with her beloved 
grandmother, and in a significant moment in the text she is entrusted to carry the lamp, a 
‘bright breathing thing’ (P, p. 48; A, p. 49). The children emerge from the darkness of the 
night and the protective grandmother emerges ‘out of the dark hall carrying a little lamp’ (P, 
p. 46; ‘The Grandmother had appeared on the top step – she carried a little lamp’, A, p. 47). 
Kezia’s previous fears of ‘It’ / IT are of the dark. But at the end of the story she has 
exchanged darkness for light, emphasising Sydney Janet Kaplan’s point that Prelude as a 
whole emphasises ‘the initiating moments of the awakening consciousness’ and represents 
an ‘originary’ moment for Kezia.
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The narrative moves from the late afternoon (light enough for children to play out) 
to darkness (‘dark came’; P, p. 34) and to Beryl standing in the moonlight at the end of the 
moving day, to dawn and the morning glare on a second day (during which there are 
references to anterior time: ‘last night’; P, p. 62; A, p. 63), through to darkness on the second 
day and onto lunchtime of a third day. The natural rhythms of light and darkness frame – and 
illuminate – the story which is about the multiple rhythms of consciousness and memory. In 
Matter and Memory, Bergson distinguishes between the ‘illuminated part’ of our immediate 
past and the ‘dark’ past. This ‘dark’ past is where ‘memories preserved in the shadow’ are of 
less use to a present which ‘impends’ over the future.
99
 It is the member of the youngest 
generation, Kezia, who lives and moves in the natural light of day in the present, contrasted 
with the grandmother, symbol of the oldest generation, who has adjusted her eyes and her 
memories to her ‘illuminated past’. Somewhere in between, constrained by the child-bearing 
time of her life, Linda Burnell lives in a ‘dark’ past, unable to use her memories adequately 
to fully experience the pleasure of life in the present. 
 
                                                 
98 See Kaplan, p. 102. 
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In this chapter I have drawn on Bergson’s notions that the past exists as a whole to 
which memories are continually being added and that all memories are latent within us until 
either called upon for the purposes of acting in the world or are detached for dreaming. It 
should be noted that the action-led or the dream-driven individual is only a ‘type’ for 
Bergson. In life, he suggests these characteristics are not distinct or separate but 
‘interpenetrate’ and vary in ‘tension’ and ‘tone’. As individuals live out their lives, their 
dream states or action states will vary as their relationship to the quantitative multiplicity of 
spatiality and the qualitative multiplicity of duration varies. 
I have shown that for Bergson as well as for Mansfield an individual’s memories are 
pertinacious and creative and that significant memories are constituted by shocks. And I 
have demonstrated that in Prelude, the streamlined and ‘modernised’ version of ‘The Aloe’, 
aspects of Bergson’s planes of dream and of action, as manifested in the minds of the 
different characters in the story, can be traced. I have used these ideas to provide a new 
reading of the generative properties of memory and of the way in which the text contrives 
the characters’ various psychological dispositions towards the past, present and future in 
childhood, adulthood and old age, and in the liminal states between childhood and 
adolescence, and adolescence and adulthood.  
In the next chapter I turn to Bergson’s theory of duration to offer a close reading of 
Mansfield’s later, and related, story, ‘At the Bay’. I read Mansfield back into Bergson by 
showing how, through topological images of movement through space and in time, 







Temporality, Topology and Temperament: The Geometry of Memory in 
‘At the Bay’ 
Why will you always measure? Life is not a clock. – D. H. Lawrence
1
 




An analysis of memory is impossible without bringing in the dimension of time. In 
this chapter I draw on Bergson’s Time and Free Will as a rich philosophical source with 
which to think about temporality and memory in Mansfield’s texts. I invoke the 
mathematical concept of topology to argue that the topological bending of time, as time 
follows the course of the sun in Mansfield’s 1922 story ‘At the Bay’, represents not only 
time on the clock and the unfettered flow of real time, but also cosmic time.
3
 By deploying 
the idea of topology to explain movement through space and in time, I suggest Mansfield 
textually inscribes what I refer to as ‘time-space’ which addresses Bergson’s duality between 
spatialised, linear, external and homogeneous ‘clock’ time and the internally felt, 
psychological, indivisible ‘lived time’ (temps vécu) of ‘real duration’ (durée réelle). The 
topological bending or ‘curve’ of time is a trope for what I term the ‘geometry of memory’ 
which relies not on points, lines and angles but rather on the mobile properties of timespace.
4
 
                                                 
1
 D. H. Lawrence, ‘[Autobiographical Fragment]’, in Phoenix: The Posthumous Papers of D. H. 
Lawrence, ed. by Edward D. McDonald (London: Heinemann, 1936), pp. 817-36 (p. 836). 
2
 Jacques Chevalier, Henri Bergson, trans. by Lilian A. Clare (London: Rider, 1928), p. 45. 
3
 While topology relates to branches of several disciplines, including mathematics and geography, I 
adopt the term as it relates to a sub-discipline of mathematics concerned with specific changes to 
geometric configurations which are reversible even when deformed (for example, by stretching, 
bending or twisting). In this definition, topology is concerned with relationships between spatial 
objects and includes the features of proximity, separation, connectedness, compactness, 
convergence, continuity, curves, arcs and surfaces and the properties of inside and outside. For an 
introduction to topological terminology, see M. A. Armstrong, Basic Topology [1979] (Berlin: 
Springer, 1983); and James R. Munkres, Topology, 2nd edn (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 
2000). 
4
 Bergson refers in passing to the ‘curve of time’ when discussing the ‘indivisible present’ in Matter 
and Memory (M&M, p. 177).  
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My argument also develops the idea of character ‘temperament’ and gendered traits in 
relation to the way in which they are mobilised in time-space.
5
 
I begin this chapter by looking at ‘when’ and ‘where’, temporally and spatially, ‘At 
the Bay’ was written, before exploring the story’s narrative form. My analysis points to the 
modernist period’s attention to fluidities which were both temporal and spatial in the elision 
of firm boundaries between the objective and subjective, at least so far as narrative tactics 
                                                 
5 While I am unable to discuss developments in spatial theory at any length here, there are several 
spatial theorists whose work would be productive for reading some of Mansfield’s stories. In The 
Poetics of Space, as part of a poetics of intimacy, Gaston Bachelard outlines two principal ways of 
theorising space: on the one hand there is ‘felicitous space’, which harnesses imagination, dream and 
memory to think about space which is graspable and ‘the space we love’, and ‘topophilia’ which is a 
‘eulogized’ space. See Gaston Bachelard, [La poétique de l’espace, 1858]; [1964], The Poetics of 
Space: The Classic Look at How we Experience Intimate Places, trans. by Maria Jolas (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1994), p. xxxv. Intimate spaces feature in Mansfield’s stories as houses, rooms and 
the domestic ‘indoors’ and are contrasted with both the ‘wildness’ and the cultivated beauty of 
‘outdoors’. A Bachelardian reading could be made of ‘The Doll’s House’, for example, in terms of 
miniature spaces, special objects and Mansfield’s penchant for detail as well as for ‘littleness’ 
(which is not a belittling term in Mansfield’s lexicon). Two narrative fragments, ‘On her way back 
to the garden’ and ‘What was there about that little house’, would also yield interesting readings. 
See The Edinburgh Edition of the Collected Works of Katherine Mansfield, Volume 2: The Collected 
Fiction of Katherine Mansfield, 1916-1922, p. 436 and p. 437. Further references to this edition are 
abbreviated to CWKM2. The first fragment turns on a misunderstanding, the second on an 
atmosphere of foreboding in a house with its ‘expressionless’ windows (p. 437). In another critical 
vein, Michel Foucault refers to spaces and places as a ‘heterotopology’. See Michel Foucault [1984], 
‘Of Other Spaces’, trans. by Jay Miskowiec, Diacritics, Spring, 1986, 16: 1, 22–7, 
http://foucault.info/documents/heterotopia/foucault.heterotopia.en.html [last accessed 21 May 2016], 
1-9 (p. 4). Within this description, the concept of ‘heterotopia’ has been especially productive for 
literary and cultural critics. For Foucault, heterotopias are physical ‘real’ spaces or ‘countersites’ 
which are the antinomy of utopias, which are ‘unreal’, ‘perfected’ or what might be called ‘non’ 
spaces (p. 3). Another of Foucault’s concepts, ‘heterochronies’, has a dual dimension: 
heterochronies are heterotopias which either place objects in ‘accumulating time’ and are orientated 
towards preservation, such as museums, or are related to ‘transitory time’, such as festivals and 
fairgrounds (p. 7). A Foucauldian reading of heterotopias in ‘At the Bay’ could be made looking 
particularly at spaces of ‘temporary relaxation’ (such as the beach) and of rest (such as the houses at 
the colony) (p. 3). Furthermore, heterotopias which form ‘contradictory sites’ such as the garden (p. 
6) or the boat, which for Foucualt is a ‘floating piece of space’ (p. 9), could provide the basis of an 
insightful reading of the several garden scenes in ‘At the Bay’, for example, when Kezia explores 
the different textures of the garden at the new house and when Linda dreams of sailing away from 
her life. A Foucauldian utopia / heterotopia might be traced in Mansfield’s stories such as ‘In the 
Botanical Gardens’, a story which plays with the idea of the ‘artificial and the natural’ (CWKM 1, p. 
84), or ‘The Tiredness of Rosabel’ in which the real spaces of workplace and lodgings are at 
variance with the protagonist’s imagined spaces. In ‘The Woman at the Store’ the grim physical 
space of the outback is in sharp relief to the ideal of the ‘mother’ country, represented by the pages 
of English periodicals used as wall coverings (CWKM 1, p. 270). Foucault’s heterochrony might 
find purchase on stories such as ‘Her First Ball’ or ‘The Garden Party’, places of transitory time. 
Other contemporary critics have focused on topography and the phenomenology of memory as they 
relate to place, as such, including Dylan Trigg, The Memory of Place: A Phenomenology of the 
Uncanny (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2012); while Julia Kristeva in her psychoanalytical study 
of Proust introduces the idea of ‘polytopia’ to denote the ‘perverse’ desire connected with Proust’s 
time regained and to think about why and how such ‘monsters’ find their places within us. See Julia 
Kristeva, Proust and the Sense of Time, trans. by Stephen Bann (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1993), p. 25. 
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are concerned. The use of Free Indirect Discourse in the story strengthens the idea that 
Modernist authors’ capacity to move into the subjectivities of their characters, discussed in 
the previous chapter, involves the taking up of a spatial position within the mind from where 
a character sees and hears. I suggest that examples of Free Indirect Discourse and of multiple 
focalisation in the multi-perspectival narrative of ‘At the Bay’ relate to both temporal and 
spatial ‘flux’ which I regard as topological. I also discuss Bergson’s concerns about 
symbolising duration given the seeming impossibility of representing the fluidity of time in 
words or symbols. I then provide temporal and topological readings of ‘At the Bay’, 
demonstrating the way in which Mansfield reconciles Bergson’s time dualism via ‘time-
space’. Finally I discuss the critical reception of ‘At the Bay’ to determine whether, in 
‘looking back’ on the story in the light of later interpretations, anything further can be 
gleaned about Mansfield and memory from a Bergsonian perspective. 
Personal Memory 
‘At the Bay’ was one of the stories that Mansfield wrote as time was running out for 
her. By May 1921, having arrived in Switzerland from Menton on the French Riviera, she 
had less than two years to live. While she could not have anticipated exactly when she would 
die, her early death from tuberculosis was by then almost certain. As Vincent O’Sullivan 
recounts, Mansfield went to Switzerland hoping for new spiritual direction and her writing 
was to be a response to the ‘debilitating intellectualism that followed the First World War’.
6
 
This attitude echoes a Bergsonian idea: that one should be intuitively on the side of life as a 
counter-balance to the overarching rigidities of the intellect which are especially in evidence 
in times of war.
7
 Mansfield lived in various hotels for nearly two months before moving to 
the Chalet des Sapins in Montana-sur-Sierre in late June 1921. It was here that she wrote 
some of her most memorable stories, ‘The Doll’s House’, ‘The Garden Party’ and ‘At the 
Bay’, while she was also writing to commission during the summer of 1921 a set of six 
magazine stories for the Sphere.
8
 
 ‘At the Bay’ was partly the result, according to Antony Alpers, of Mansfield’s 
challenge to herself to write a long story with ‘more difficult relationships’ than she felt she 
                                                 
6 CLKM, 4, p. 213.  
7
 See, for example, Bergson’s lecture ‘The Meaning of the War: Life and Matter in Conflict’ which he 
gave to the annual public gathering of the Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques as its 
President on 12 December 1914. Henri Bergson, The Meaning of the War: Life and Matter in 
Conflict, trans. by H. Wildon Carr (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1915). 
8
 See Antony Alpers, ed., The Stories of Katherine Mansfield, Definitive Edition (Auckland: Oxford 
University Press, 1988), pp. 568-71; hereinafter abbreviated to Stories. 
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had achieved in a recently completed story, ‘An Ideal Family’. The story was thus 
‘prefigured’ in the Journal for 23 July 1921.
9
 Alpers speculates that ‘At the Bay’ was 
Mansfield’s depiction of family love, and, as such, an answer to D. H. Lawrence’s novel 
Women in Love (in which Mansfield, in a provocative fictional transposition, was the model 
for the character Gudrun).
10
 Living in Switzerland, she could not imagine returning to 
England, which represented ‘a kind of negation’ where ‘Nothing goes forward’; whereas 
when she was outside England, she felt as though ‘every thing & place is near’.
11
 The story 
carries with it, then, a set of multiple charges: it is intuitive; it expresses family feeling; it is a 
response to the pathological imaginings of a fellow writer; it reflects Mansfield’s sense of 
herself in mobile time and place, virtually in ‘exile’ yet going ‘forward’, while going back, 
in time, to the past. 
According to Alpers, during August 1921 Mansfield temporarily stopped writing ‘At 





August) and ‘A Married Man’s Story’ (c.20 August; unfinished).
12
 The writing 
was compulsive and yet arduous. ‘At the Bay’ was finished after ‘9 solid hours’ of writing 
on 11 September, as noted in a letter to Brett the following day.
13
 And in a letter of around 
12 September to Richard Murry, John Middleton Murry’s younger brother, Mansfield says 
that she had ‘been at it for seven hours a day all this last week’.
14
 Mansfield was clearly 
concerned about her writing time and consumed with a sense of urgency to complete the 
story; she wrote to Michael Sadleir on 24
 
September, having just sent her book off to her 
agent J. B. Pinker: ‘Never have I had my pen so snatched away by The Furies.’
15
 And in a 
letter of the same day to Sylvia Lynd, she commented that finishing the book had 
                                                 
9
 Ibid., p. 569, Note 421. 
10
 ‘At the Bay, among all the other things which it is, is a response by Gudrun to Gudrun’s creator on 
the subject of “family love ..... warm, vivid, intimate – not ‘made up’ – not self-conscious.”’ Life, p. 
341. That Mansfield’s reaction to Lawrence’s novel was hostile is conveyed in a letter to Ottoline 
Morrell of 24 July 1921, in which she referred to the book as ‘almost purely pathological’. CLKM, 
4, p. 252. 
11
 See the letter to Brett of around 25 July 1921, CLKM, 4, p. 255; and the letter to Brett of 29 July 
1921, CLKM, 4, p. 257. 
12
 Stories, p. 571, note 441. Mansfield mentions the story in a letter to Dorothy Brett of 4 August 1921 
(dated 8 August according to Alpers): ‘I must stop this letter & get on with my new story. Its called 
At the Bay & its (I hope) full of sand and seaweed and bathing dresses hanging over verandahs & 
sandshoes on window sills, and little pink “sea” convolvulus, and rather gritty sandwiches and the 
tide coming in. And it smells (oh I DO hope it smells) a little bit fishy.’ CLKM, 4, p. 261. 
13
 CLKM, 4, p. 279. The date of the letter is given in brackets as being around 12 September 1921 (in 
which Mansfield notes that she ‘Finished last night at 10.30’ (p. 278)); Alpers suggests the story was 
completed 10
 
September 1921. See Stories, p. 571. 
14
 CLKM, 4: p. 280. 
15
 Ibid., p. 282. 
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perpetuated time: ‘Its last moments lingered on and on.’
16
 Mansfield had already written to 
Pinker ten days earlier, referring to her new collection of stories as ‘At the Bay and Other 
Stories’.
17
 She wrote again to Pinker on 10 October 1921 explaining that she wanted to add a 
more ‘substantial’ story as well as provide a more ‘solid’ title: ‘At The Bay now seems to me 
flimsy and vague. One forgets it –’.
18
 It is ironic to think that the story’s title might be easily 
forgotten, given that the story is replete with ideas about time and memory. ‘At the Bay’ was 
first published in the London Mercury in January 1922. Alpers notes that for the American 
edition, Mansfield made a ‘shapely improvement’: the final paragraph was set as a separate, 
numbered ‘episode’, giving thirteen sections to the story.
19
 It can also be viewed as 
comprising twelve episodes together with a coda. 
 While writing ‘At the Bay’, Mansfield was more than once reminded of her 
childhood. Among the letters written from the Chalet des Sapins during the summer of 1921 
was one of 30
 
July to John Ruddick, the father of Mansfield’s childhood friend, Marion, who 
had sent via her sister Chaddie (Charlotte Beauchamp Perkins) two ‘old and quaint’ 
photographs of themselves as children. In response, Mansfield speculated, somewhat 
rhetorically, whether Marion might remember their shared childhood: ‘Does she remember 
Island Bay, I wonder, and bathing her doll in the rock pools with me. But perhaps so much 
has happened since then that these things have faded.’
20
 While ‘At the Bay’ may be said to 
contain uncannily resonant references to a similar seeming actual past, the point to note is 
the insistence of memory per se for Mansfield: ‘If we are ever together down the Kenepuru 
Sounds come off with me for a whole day – will you? And lets just remember.’
21
 In this 
letter to Jeanne, Mansfield seems to suggest that remembering (‘lets just remember’) is a less 
mediated activity, less self-consciously textually driven, less motivated to use memories as 
the basis for textual reconstruction; remembering the unfiltered past fulfils a personal need, 
in the present, which may have enhanced her sense of her temporal and spatial dislocation 
from that past. At the same time, ‘At the Bay’ may reconfigure the co-ordinates of the actual 
place, ‘Day’s Bay’, where Mansfield’s family spent some of their summers, the very name 
also implying a temporal dimension in keeping with the focus on the daily lives of a holiday 
community during a single day. However, in the story, Mansfield used the name ‘Crescent 
                                                 
16
 Ibid., p. 283. 
17
 Later to become The Garden Party and Other Stories, when in October of that year she finished the 
new title story. 
18
 CLKM, 4: p. 293. 
19
 Stories, Note 441, p. 571. 
20
 CLKM, 4, p. 258. 
21
 Ibid., p. 294. 
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Bay’ instead to significant effect to suggest the image of the ‘curve’ of time as I go on to 
discuss. 
Alpers comments that the characters who are ‘at the bay’ are set apart spatially and 
temporally, but in a recognisable, recollected location, from the rest of the community: 
‘Their sense of isolation in time and place is implied by numerous local details, wonderfully 
remembered […]’.
22
 But I would query this sense of the particularity of place. And having 
completed the story, Mansfield reflected on the apparent specific resemblance of several of 
her characters to family members: ‘Theres my grandmother, back in her chair with her pink 
knitting, there stalks my uncle over the grass. […] All is remembered.’
23
 What interests me 
most about these ‘memories’ is not the personal dimension nor the possible temporal 
connection to a real past or place, but a spatiality in time and a temporality in space: the 
figure of the grandmother is given a particular spatial location in the past – ‘back in her 
chair’ – while the figure of the uncle moves over the grass: the temporality of the past takes 
on a spatial dimension. The sense of a fluid temporality (anytime) combined with an un-
localised spatiality (anywhere) is a feature of what I am calling ‘time-space’. 
Writing many years later, and comparing her stories with those of Chekhov, V. S. 
Pritchett criticised Mansfield for her weak impression of place and for failing to account for 
the ‘unseen’ or ‘anonymous’ characters which form the backdrop to a successful story: ‘who 
are these people, who are their neighbours, what is the world they belong to? We can 
scarcely guess,’ he observes.
24
 Pritchett’s disappointment is with an apparently nebulous 
quality to the narrative. But perhaps this sense that the stories are pendulous with a 
significance that is never fully articulated is what gives them their unique appeal of a 
particularly scriptable (or writerly) kind in Roland Barthes’ sense of the term.
25
 Pritchett 
associates the ‘gaps and silences’ he finds in Mansfield’s ‘plotless’ stories with her 
rootlessness and isolation. But such aporias may equally be Mansfield’s technical means of 
‘implying’ rather than ‘telling’, a view which is not inconsistent with simultaneously 
invoking and disguising personal memories; transmuting the personal into the fictional for 
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 Life, p. 342. 
23
 CLKM, 4, p. 278. 
24
 V. S. Pritchett, ‘Books in General’, a review of The Collected Stories of Katherine Mansfield, The 
New Statesman and Nation, 2 February 1946, 87. What previous critics tend to overlook is that 
Pritchett’s view is not all negative; he also refers to ‘At the Bay’ as ‘one of the minor masterpieces 
of our language’ (p. 87). 
25 See Roland Barthes [1970], S/Z: An Essay, trans. by Richard Miller (New York: Hill and Wang, 
1974). Barthes’ terms lisible and scriptible translate into the ‘readerly’ and ‘writerly’ text, the 
former typically being related to conventional realist novels, the latter to largely twentieth-century 




her readers’ pleasure. In doing so, Mansfield, as Pritchett I think rightly notes, ‘liquefied’ the 
short story and her characters’ lives ‘as they dissolved and formed again’.
26
 
Mansfield wrote to Dorothy Brett that ‘At the Bay’ was a ‘continuation’ of 
Prelude.
27
 The story follows on from Prelude in several senses. It moves the Burnell family 
on in conventional time. While Linda Burnell is ‘expecting’ and Stanley Burnell is longing 
for a boy in Prelude, in ‘At the Bay’ the son has been born. The narrative also incorporates 
intertextual ‘memory’ traces of Prelude in that it looks back to and reprises elements of the 
earlier story. One example concerns the characters’ temperaments in relation to temporality: 
Stanley remains full of vigour and vitality in the present and demonstrates an enthusiasm for 
buying gifts (a pineapple and cherries for Linda in Prelude; gloves, for himself, in ‘At the 
Bay’); Mrs Fairfield remains sensibly practical in the present; Linda still dreams of the past; 
Alice occupies her present-centred everydayness; and Beryl still exhibits dissatisfaction with 
the present and a desire to bring about a more exciting future. There is also novelty and 
change in the new story: there is a new location, new characters, such as the Kembers and 
Mrs Stubbs, and a sense of returning to a familiar place compared to the leave-taking in 
Prelude. Perhaps the most significant change is that of Linda’s emotional state, from 
indifference to her female children to something like maternal affection for her baby son. 
Alpers refers to the story as an ‘after-Christmas pastoral’.
28
 That a baby boy has been born 
might suggest the Christ child; and Mansfield’s younger brother’s textual ‘resurrection’ is 
intimated, perhaps, in the very opening of the story: ‘the sun [the son] was not yet risen’. The 
boy’s arrival is presaged but not delivered in Prelude; in ‘At the Bay’, the un-named child is 
alive, and he is loved. 
Narrative Time 
In reading ‘At the Bay’ the reader is ‘placed’ in what I am calling ‘time-space’, a 
claim bolstered by the first word of the story’s title, ‘at’. That this ‘at’ mattered to Mansfield 
is underscored in a letter she wrote to Michael Sadleir on 10 October 1921 outlining her 
concerns that the story’s title had been misquoted: ‘I received yesterday two letters about the 
story At the Bay & in both cases the title was wrong: i.e. In the Bay & On the Bay.’
29
 The 
preposition ‘at’ can be used to indicate both a point occupied in space suggesting proximity 
(for example, to stand at the gate) as well as a location in time (for example, at noon; at the 
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end). To give an ontological meaning to the word ‘at’ would be to suggest that individual 
subjects are ‘at’ the bay, ‘there’ in time-space. 
The story’s form reproduces this doubled sense of ‘at’-ness. Like Prelude, it is 
divided into unequal segments: either thirteen episodes, or twelve episodes and a ‘coda’. The 
musical term hints that the ‘ending’ arises through the prolongation of the other episodes, 
giving to the temporal the quality of interpenetration and a Bergsonian quality. Peter 
Mathews notes that the story ‘lacks continuity and narrative drive’ and this not a criticism; it 
is left to the reader to form ‘a unity from its heterogeneous parts while resisting this process 
at every step’.
30
 In their analysis Clare Hanson and Andrew Gurr suggest the opposite, 
arguing that the story has a ‘controlling narrative framework’, tracing the passage of a single 
day, like Virginia Woolf’s The Waves.
31
 My view is that each of the twelve episodes and the 
coda occur at randomly occurring times according to what is happening in the characters’ 
time-space (where they are in their temporal flow), during the same summer’s ‘day’ (in 
natural time), only rarely punctuated by measured time (on the clock). In this way, each 
section of the narrative is left deliberately un-concluded, under-narrated, ‘lingering on’. 
Joan Silber notes that all fiction has to deal with the experience of time that passes, 
given that fictional events tend to unfold in sequence.
32
 Her classification of fictional time 
includes ‘classic time’ which covers a ‘natural span’ such as a month, a season or a year.
33
 
The time frame of ‘At the Bay’ is a single day, from at dawn – and it is wonderfully liminal 
with sheep straying into dream and sleep – until after dusk in summertime, in no specific 
year, during which the various families in the story are seemingly enjoying ‘holiday time’. 
According to Helen Rydstrand, both Prelude and ‘At the Bay’ are organised around ‘brief 
slices’ of time often containing minor incidents and frequently involving meal times. In this 
analysis, Prelude’s timeline runs from teatime to lunchtime two days later, while ‘At the 
Bay’ includes breakfast time as well as teatime; meal times could be said, therefore, to 
structure time within both texts.
34
 But Rydstrand does not push the point any further to 
suggest that meal times therefore impose regulated, punctuated time on everyday life. 
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In narratological terms, of Genette’s four types of narration, ‘At the Bay’ is a 
‘subsequent narration’ in which the narrator relates what has happened in a past time. In 
terms of narrative time order, the sequence of events in the story is in chronological order 
apart from several anachronous analeptic moments. Mansfield’s use of flashback, and a shift 
into past time, is to recount memories and thus the temporal progress of the events in the 
story is not interrupted as such. As Mark Currie has observed, the recounting of memory is 
not, strictly, analepsis.
35
 A focus on remembered time is then brought back to the present 
time of the narration. The two flashbacks involve Linda’s and Mrs Fairfield’s memories. The 
temporal distance in each case is of several years: for Linda, the memory is of her pre-
marital state before she assumed the burden of child-bearing; while Mrs Fairfield recalls the 
time when she lost her son in a mining accident. The temporal reach in each case is long 
although the recalling of the memory within the narrative is relatively brief in both cases, but 
they mirror each other: if Mrs Fairfield recalls the loss of her son, Linda recalls the loss of 
herself. Linda remembers a time when she was free to make her own future: a dream of a 
future that does not arrive. The link between these two memories is the death and birth (or 
the awakening to the existence) of a son. 
In Currie’s view, the ‘now’ of the narrator’s telling clearly refers to ‘back then’, and 
in ‘At the Bay’ the ‘what has been in the past’ is generally invested in the women characters. 
Recounting a memory indicates to the reader that the past is still there, in its virtuality in 
Bergson’s terms; and even though it cannot be repeated, it can be called up. Mansfield also 
plays with narrative speed (in Genette’s typology).
36
 Narrative tempo seems to slow for 
emphasis when evoking the memories of Linda and Mrs Fairfield, and seems to increase 
around Stanley. While in scenes of dialogue, according to Genette, narrative time generally 
equates to story time, Mansfield interjects summary between dialogues in which Stanley 
features, which, together with the use of active verbs, accelerate the story. A primary 
example is when Stanley is getting ready to leave the house for work in the town and has 
mislaid his stick: 
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‘But I put it here,’ Stanley began to bluster. ‘I remember distinctly putting it 
in this corner. Now, who’s had it? There’s no time to lose. Look sharp! The stick’s 
got to be found.’ 
[…] 
Stanley dashed into the bedroom where Linda was lying. 
[…] 
Stanley waved his arm to Linda. ‘No time to say good-bye!’ he cried. And 
he meant that as a punishment to her. 
He snatched his bowler hat, dashed out of the house, and swung down the 
garden path. Yes, the coach was there waiting.
37
 
The narrative also sets up a series of ironically gendered contrasts between Stanley’s male 
sense of urgency and the women of the household’s mockery. Certain repeated words serve 
to accentuate the way in which the narrative tempo slows and quickens according to the 
women’s temperaments. There is Linda’s unhurried dreaminess, Beryl’s quick, sharp 
imperiousness, and Mrs Fairfield’s equability: 
‘Stick, dear? What stick?’ Linda’s vagueness on these occasions could not 
be real, Stanley decided. Would nobody sympathize with him? 
‘Coach! Coach, Stanley!’ Beryl’s voice cried from the gate. 
[…] Into the living-room she [i.e. Beryl] ran and called ‘He’s gone!’ Linda cried 
from her room: ‘Beryl! Has Stanley gone?’ Old Mrs Fairfield appeared, carrying the 
boy in his little flannel coatee. 
‘Gone?’ 
‘Gone!’ (pp. 347-8) 
The iteration of the word ‘gone’ mockingly echoes Stanley’s abrupt tempo as he accounts for 
time, his hat and stick standing in metonymically, and with humour, for his self-
aggrandisement as a man of business, while the women wait for him to leave. 
In ‘At the Bay’, the reader is immersed both in the ongoing occurrences of the day 
and in the consciousnesses of the characters. All is mobile. Storytelling, it might be said, is 
itself movement: the on-going recounting of time, memory and event. And in this story all 
kinds of time and memory are in play: remembering and forgetting; anticipating the future 
and regretting the lack of time in the present; squandering time and opining over misused 
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time; grasping and losing time. Currie comments that while all novels are ‘about time’ there 
is also a ‘backwards time’, or a backwards temporality at work in narrative.
38
 The reader’s 
present in fictional narrative is really the past. It is a character’s present related to us in the 
past tense: either the past perfect or the past historic. Yet there is also an inevitable temporal 
disjunction involved between the times of reading, of writing and of narrating. And there is 
the fact of an ending in each case. The end will come, as Frank Kermode has famously 
observed. A story requires its own past and the reader cannot be ‘denied’ an end: ‘it is one of 
the great charms of books that they have to end.’
39
 But for Kermode, this is not a teleological 
understanding on the part of the reader; while the beginning might seem to imply ‘the’ end, 




According to Silber, the ‘real end’ is the finality of death which has a role in 
storytelling as ‘mortality’s natural link with closure’.
41
 In ‘At the Bay’ Mansfield inverts this 
idea. There is neither a death within the story nor at the end of the story. There have, though, 
been at least two deaths in the time prior to the story’s narration: that of Mr Stubbs and that 
of Mrs Fairfield’s son, William. In the seventh episode when Mrs Fairfield and Kezia are 
enjoying an afternoon siesta together and speak of the death of Kezia’s uncle, the narrator 
invites the reader into the present of both characters via a playfulness which seemingly 
repudiates (or holds ‘at bay’) the pressures of time. For Mrs Fairfield, this teasing deflects 
the pain of memory while for Kezia it reserves further knowledge about the inevitability of 
human mortality for a later time (only the reader is potentially reminded of the traumatic 
episode with the killing of the duck in Prelude). In ‘At the Bay’, the notion of Memento mori 
(‘remember that you must die’) is replaced by that of Memento vivere (‘remember that you 
must live’). Kezia’s kisses and soft tickling function to overcome the grandmother’s 
memories of death, while the narrative ‘remembers’ the forward momentum of life as Kezia 
and her grandmother both forget the time they have just lived through (p. 358). 
Memory is built into most narratives because most stories recount the ‘already has 
been’ of time’s passing for their characters. Randall Stevenson has argued that memory 
characterises modern and modernist novels in particular while functioning locally within at 
least some vestigial chronological (clock-based) construction. For example, in Joyce’s 
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Ulysses, the reader always knows what hour Leopold Bloom is in, even if his mind may not 
remain there. That is, time and memory work in conjunction to narrate time’s flow within 
discreet temporal scaffolding: ‘For modernist novelists, memory becomes an essential 
structuring device in the creation of a “time in the mind” able to move – through the 
randomness of recollection – away from “mechanical succession” and the oppressive control 
of the clock.’
42
 Mansfield moves us discreetly through a sense of time-space in the story by 
continually advancing the time of day in each episode, although, importantly, not by regular 
amounts such as by the hour. Time is more fluid and loosened around the clock: it is ‘about’ 
or ‘just gone’. The more overt rigidity of clock time is reserved for Stanley and the daily 
habits and routines of the women of the household. A sense of time-space as experienced 
internally by the characters is described through Free Indirect Discourse, while time in flow 
and space being lived in follow myriad and not linear temporal rhythms. In order to follow 
the implications of ‘time-space’ as a Bergsonian multiplicity, I now turn to explicating 
Bergson’s theory of time to establish a methodology for reading Mansfield’s story and to 
read Bergson back through Mansfield. 
Bergson’s Philosophy of Time 
In this section I look at Bergson’s two notions of time as outlined in Time and Free 
Will; that is, the ‘unreal’ or external, spatialised and segmented time associated with 
nineteenth-century materialism and mechanistic science, and the ‘real’, internal, fluid and 
lived time of duration (durée) which stems from the ‘inward turn’ of late nineteenth and 
early twentieth-century metaphysics, psychology and narrative.
43
 I then look at the later 
works in which Bergson augmented his theory of time which gives us a third notion of 
temporality: cosmic time. I examine the ways in which memory is not only implicated in 
these considerations of time in the mind and in the cosmos, but, in the case of duration, helps 
constitute time. 
A principal example of ‘mechanical’ or external time was ‘Railway Time’, first 
established in Britain as early as 1840 while Greenwich was set as the zero meridian for 
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world time in 1884. As Stephen Kern has amply demonstrated, in 1912 at the International 
Conference on Time, a system was set up to implement standard time, while on 1 July 1913 
the Eiffel Tower transmitted the first standard time signal around the world.
44
 By dividing 
the world precisely into twenty-four discrete one-hour time zones, the idea of uniform time 
was established. In the realm of physics, also, individual experience was an irrelevance; 
physicists looked for a ‘purely impersonal definition of time’.
45
 The homogenising temporal 
impositions, or ‘new systems and rationalizations’ of life, represented by Greenwich Mean 
Time or ‘clocking in’ at factories, and the synchronisation of time experienced by soldiers in 




If some modernists and others of the age rebelled against the commodification of 
time, it is perhaps not surprising that Bergson and Mansfield, while by no means precisely 
causes of a new temporality and as much a consequence of it, were exploring new and 
similar discourses about time and were valid commentators on this aspect of each other’s 
work. In the prolonged debate in philosophy concerned with whether time was 
‘homogeneous or heterogeneous, atomistic or a flux, reversible or irreversible’, Bergson was 
concerned to account for and Mansfield to represent both, giving proper place to the 
fluidities of internally experienced time. Bergson also had his detractors, especially in 
Bertrand Russell and Wyndham Lewis.
47
 
The British Hegelian philosopher John Ellis McTaggart took the opposite approach 
to time from that of Bergson, mounting a philosophical case for the ‘unreality’ of time.
48
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McTaggart regarded time as ‘a succession of distinct, non-interpenetrating units, directly 
apprehended only one at a time’, in other words, as discrete temporal units or ‘moments’.
49
 
Contemporary analysis of a modernist aesthetics of time has split along philosophical lines. 
For example, Ann Banfield has placed Virginia Woolf on the side of Cambridge time 
philosophy, rejecting the implications of Bergson’s philosophical duration, whereas James 
Hafley has read Woolf entirely through Bergson.
50
 
The following diagram outlines the elements of Bergson’s dual aspect of time upon 
which I elaborate below. 
Spatialised Time    Duration  
Homogeneity     Heterogeneity 
Mathematical Time    Living Time 
Abstract Time     Concrete (or Real) Time
51
 
Scientific     Metaphysical 
Quantitative     Qualitative 
Spatial      Temporal 
Juxtaposed Objects    Interpenetrating Consciousness 
Moments     Duration 
Divisible     Indivisible 
Immobile     Mobile 
Objective / Intellectual    Subjective / Intuitive 
Extensive / Numerical Multiplicity  Intensive / Qualitative Multiplicity 
of Things in Space    of Conscious ‘States’ which 
    Interpenetrate 
Linear      Flux 
Fixity      Change 
Repetition     Singularity 
Surface      Depth 
                                                                                                                                          
‘A’ series that we would require any and all events to be simultaneously past, present and future, 
which would be impossible. Bergson does not abandon these terms but avoids simultaneity; in his 
theory of time, the past is brought into the present by way of adding to it while the future unfolds 
from the present in a process of ceaseless becoming and change. Duration is felt as real because it is 
continuous.  
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Social Self     Fundamental Self 
Law      Life / Nature 
While time had been generally thought of in terms of a form of mathematical quantification 
or measurement, Bergson approached it in terms of the intensities of states of consciousness 
or inner experience. In Time and Free Will, he rejects intensity as a property of magnitude 
(that is, ‘greater than’) and distinguishes between different conscious states which are felt 
either as immediately qualitative (demonstrating differences in kind) or as quantitative 
(demonstrating differences in degree).
52
 The qualitative refers to how we sense things as we 
experience them, whether that may be as brightness, darkness, heat, coldness, happiness or 
beauty. The quantitative describes how much there is of something. Bergson asserts that 
there is a multiplicity of our conscious states in which different sensations and affects 
correspond to qualitative changes that cannot simply be measured. 
Bergson uses his distinction between the qualitative and the quantitative to 
distinguish between two forms of multiplicity. The first is quantitative (‘discrete’ or 
‘numerical’) multiplicity in which things are placed alongside one another in space and are 
thus homogenised. The second is a qualitative multiplicity in which states of consciousness 
interpenetrate and unfold in heterogeneous ways; it is this multiplicity which constitutes pure 
duration (durée réalle): ‘[A] succession of qualitative changes, which melt into and permeate 
one another, without precise outlines, without any tendency to externalize themselves in 
relation to one another, without any affiliation with number’.
53
 A criticism of duration was 
posed by Darcy Kitchin, one of Bergson’s contemporaries, who questioned whether Bergson 
regards our inner life as having or as being duration; for the answer impacts on the relation 
of the reality of duration to consciousness.
54
 Bergson’s response was that we recognise 
duration only when we sense the power, movement and flow of it; that is, duration working 
through our consciousness and our consciousness working through duration.
55
 
The principal image that Bergson uses to depict the idea of the interpenetration of 
mental states is that of a melody: ‘as happens when we recall the notes of a tune, melting, so 
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to speak, into one another’.
56
 Note that it is in the recalling of the notes from memory that 
we experience them as having melted into each other. Memory’s insistent and integrating 
power therefore plays a significant role in duration. The melody image represents a 
‘temporal synthesis of memory that knits temporal dimensions together’.
57
 In duration there 
is no spatial distinction, no gap or stop: ‘[P]ure duration excludes all idea of juxtaposition’.
58
 
It is important to Bergson’s theory of time that in pure duration there is ‘succession’ in 
which the immediate past folds into the present and which allows for a distinction between 
‘past’, ‘present’ and ‘future’, but without an interruption to time’s flux: ‘Pure duration is the 
form which the succession of our conscious states assumes when our ego lets itself live, 
when it refrains from separating its present state from its former states.’
59
 
The idea of the indivisibility of time or duration concerns some of Bergson’s 
commentators, however. J Alexander Gunn, for example, argues that Bergson sidesteps the 
question of whether we have any knowledge of the past as past and ignores the difference 
between the ‘no more’ and the ‘not yet’ feeling in consciousness.
60
 Bergson does partially 
overcome the first part of this problem and it is memory that provides the answer. He 
suggests that we must be placed in the past in order for memory to bind the sense of present 
and past together: memory is ‘the very basis of our conscious existence’ which facilitates 
‘the prolongation of the past into the present’.
61
 In terms of the individual experience of lived 
duration, the past and the present, the feeling of the ‘no more’ and the ‘not yet’ are folded 
into each other but can be distinguished because the ‘no more’ is extended by the just lived 
through present; that is to say, the difference in feeling must be down to the sense that the 
past is growing. David Balsillie questions the role of memory altogether: ‘what need would 
there be for memory on the author’s theory that past states enrich the present by permeation? 
Memory would be an unnecessary and cumbrous duplicate. We should have an intuitive 
understanding’.
62
 However, permeation by itself would lack differentiation; memory allows 
for that sense of pastness to which Gunn refers. And as Bergson explains in Matter and 
Memory, it is memory that is required to blend with immediate perceptions in preparing for 
action in the present. 
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While in Time and Free Will Bergson seems to confine duration to an individual’s 
internal consciousness, his thinking changes in his later works.
63
 Duration in Time and Free 
Will is presented as an experience of inner consciousness, as non-spatial and a continuous 
multiplicity, while external reality is depicted as being simply space. In Matter and Memory, 
Bergson questions whether duration can be attributed to external things but does not supply a 
conclusive answer. It is not until Creative Evolution, when Bergson extends his thinking 
about time to life, evolution and creation as a whole, that he asserts that duration is 
‘immanent to the whole of the universe’ and that the universe ‘endures’.
 64
 In the later work, 
Duration and Simultaneity (1922), Bergson seems to back-track a little, restating that time is 
principally ‘identical with the continuity of our inner life’, but he then takes a giant leap in 
adding that time and memory also extend to the ‘whole physical world’ which would seem to 
include all matter as well as all things and creatures.
65
 
In Time and Free Will, Bergson acknowledges the role of spatialised time in 
everyday life, but strenuously critiques the idea of an external spatial dimension (extensity) 
to inner temporal consciousness: ‘introducing space into our perception of duration […] 
corrupts at its very source our feeling of outer and inner change, of movement, and of 
freedom’.
66
 If this were to happen, homogeneous time would be ‘nothing but the ghost of 
space haunting the reflective consciousness’.
67
 But in Duration and Simultaneity, Bergson 
suggests that duration extends to all of space (the material / physical world) where the 
duration of the universe takes on the form of a superior ‘impersonal consciousness’ 
connected to every consciousness.
68
 At this stage, Bergson introduces the idea of cosmic 
time or memory which is ‘endlessly prolonged from past to future’ in a continual 
unfolding.
69
 Bergson thus establishes the full extent of what is at stake in his time theory: 
while individually we cannot and need not be disencumbered of measured time, only the 
flow of temporal consciousness within each of us and within the cosmos at large meets the 
need for change, movement and freedom. 
In summary, Bergson argues that scientists have immobilised time by approaching 
and measuring it as so many juxtaposed positions in space conceived along a line; spatialised 
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time hampers the individual’s ability to subjectively experience change, movement and 
freedom. Duration is not related to quantity; it is heterogeneous, continuous and ‘with no 
analogy to number’.
70
 The real time of duration simply is. It is the continuity of memory and 
consciousness which brings something new to the experience of time. Bergson’s theory of 
time is closely related to his theory of memory. On the one hand, pure memory like duration 
is internal and unreflective. On the other hand, spatialised time like habit memory is 
externalised and repeats actions in segmented time. Duration is ultimately ‘made up of 
moments inside one another’.
71
 This interpenetration takes us to the limits of what is 
thinkable. But that is Bergson’s point: we cannot ‘think’ time, we must live it. 
According to Bergson, we rarely experience our duration because we live in the 
everyday world of spatialised and symbolic (represented) time which is a requirement for 
social life. Once we reflect on consciousness we introduce symbols.
72
 The act of writing is 
part of this symbolising process: the ‘word’ with its ‘well-defined outlines […] overwhelms 
or at least covers over the delicate and fugitive impressions of our individual 
consciousness’.
73
 But for artists and writers the use of symbolisation would seem to exclude 
the possibility of representing true duration. Katherine Mansfield found her answer in the 




Mary Ann Gillies asserts that of all the Modernist writers, Dorothy Richardson 
comes closest in Pilgrimage to representing time as it is lived in her character Miriam. The 
length of this thirteen-book novel also suggests that it takes considerable page space in 
which to present the temporality of consciousness. Richardson represents Miriam’s duration 
in two ways according to Gillies: by transferring the past into a vividly realised present; and 
via the solitary act of contemplation which puts Miriam in touch with her inner world, and 
therefore with reality.
75
 Miriam’s consciousness is rendered by ‘a series of meaningful 
moments’ each appearing to be the present one, with Richardson using frequent ‘haphazard 
shifts’ in narration and tense to achieve this effect.
76
 Even more important is what Gillies 
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refers to as the use of ‘memory-enhanced special moments’ which structure Miriam’s ‘ever-
changing inner world’.
77
 It is therefore memory which plays a vital part in narrating 
Miriam’s duration and in presenting it to the reader. 
But Gillies does not mention Mansfield at all in discussing the function of memory 
in modernist narrative technique. In her analysis specifically of ‘At the Bay’ Saralyn R. Daly 
argues that in the story there are ‘many passages which dwell with fondness on the quality of 
the living’ which might be taken as a Bergsonian comment on the qualitative aspects of 
duration, but the comment is not developed further.
78
 For Alpers, while the story is 
outwardly shaped by ‘ancient universals’ such as sun, moon and tide, it is more profoundly 
structured within by the characters’ reflections, some in dream and others through deeper 
reflection on ‘the mysteries of birth and love and death’.
79
 This observation focuses on the 
story’s narrative structure: on the narrated ‘external’ description combined with the 
rendering in Indirect or Direct Discourse of the character’s inner thoughts. Alpers does not, 
however, explore the ways in which the development of modernist experimental technique, 
particularly Free Indirect Discourse, might mirror Bergson’s ideas about duration and the 
multiple rhythms and tensions of inner consciousness. 
It is Eiko Nakano who has gone on to identify the Bergsonian elements of duration 
in several of Mansfield’s stories.
80
 In her reading of ‘At the Bay’ Nakano suggests that 
Mansfield is concerned particularly with the different rhythms of duration, regarded in terms 
of slowness and speed, and that Mansfield describes time as passing more slowly in some 
sections of the story than in other sections.
81
 However, Nakano unexpectedly focuses on the 
untypical (for Mansfield) delayed opening to the story. She argues that Mansfield describes 
‘the time before the story really begins […] the time before you could see where things begin 
and end’ and asserts that Mansfield ‘makes the reader wait for the characters to wake up and 
move’.
82
 The close of the story is also important in Nakano’s analysis. The day’s ending, she 
claims: 
[S]uggests the discrepancy between spatialized duration, describable in words in a 
‘story’, and ‘real’ duration by showing that the ending of the story is the opening of 
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While Nakano’s reading is suggestive, especially the idea that real time cannot be contained 
by boundaries imposed by the telling of a story and that duration overflows the narrative, I 
want to argue that Mansfield attends both to a more fluid space and time within the structure 
of the story itself. I therefore turn now to asking: what sense of time do we encounter in a 
story like ‘At the Bay’ if we deploy Bergson’s theory of time in reading it? 
Temporal Readings 
Temperament and the Temporal Plane 
There are, as I have indicated, three kinds of time in Bergson’s philosophy: 
spatialised time, duration, and cosmic time. Katherine Mansfield, I maintain, presents these 
three kinds of time in her story ‘At the Bay’, the last of which is fashioned by her as 
‘immemorial’ time: the time of the cosmos related to the duration of all life. In what follows, 
I offer a reading of ‘At the Bay’ through the lens of Bergsonian time but with Mansfield’s 
augmentations, which bring together spatialised time and duration in a topological 
movement through space, or ‘time-space’. I begin with the individual characters’ gendered 
temperaments as they relate to what I identify as the ‘temporal plane’. 
Of the male characters in the story, Stanley lives in spatialised, public, clock time, 
counting and apportioning time and, as a result, paradoxically, he feels he has ‘no time’. 
Jonathan by comparison is ‘too late’; he lives in belated time (although from Stanley’s point 
of view, he arrives too early at the bay for Stanley’s liking). Both characters’ temperaments 
are related to habit memory, and both are tethered to their habit-memory by spatialised, 
regulated and masculine ‘work time’, which Stanley embraces and which Jonathan eschews. 
The shepherd moves in natural time, associated with the rhythms of the land and of animal 
life and the cosmos, while the Burnells’ baby boy represents the novelty of felt durational 
time, continuous and unreflective. 
Of the female characters, Linda dwells in dream time which, as noted, in Matter and 
Memory Bergson categorises as belonging to the ‘unconscious psychological states’ of pure 
memory which is neither durational nor spatialised and to which is attributed a ‘radical 
powerlessness’.
84
 This passivity is identified with the past which also does not act. However, 
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Linda’s temperament is temporally and temporarily adjusted, it seems, when she experiences 
the first feeling of joy towards her baby son in the real time of her duration. Of all the female 
characters, Mrs Fairfield is comfortable in the time of her surroundings and within herself; in 
the house and garden; and in full acceptance of the past. She is capable of living comfortably 
in the world and of ‘casting on’ memories as they are required for everyday life. Beryl’s 
temperament is one of hesitancy related to anticipation of the future. That her desire is 
seemingly thwarted signals the ebb and flow of her romantic imagination. Her nocturnal 
wakefulness inclines her towards both a possible freedom – in Bergson’s terms, towards ‘the 
radical unforeseeable’ future
85
 – as well as the curtailment of that freedom by the shackles of 
domesticity. Beryl’s sense of temporality matches her temperament: it is one of anticipatory 
retrospective; she tends to look forward to a past that has already happened. 
Mrs Stubbs, a minor character, is depicted as existing in public, spatialised time, that 
of running a shop and of entertaining. In recounting the cause of death of her late husband, a 
recollection prompted by an apparently ‘life size’ photographic portrait of him, memory is 
both figured and enlarged through the spatial quality of dimension: 
‘Size,’ said Mrs Stubbs. ‘Give me size.’ 
[…] 
Mrs Stubbs creaked and seemed to expand herself at the memory. (p. 360) 
Photographs and pictures occur in several of Mansfield’s stories and function as a means of 
codifying memory. According to Mark Currie, photographs ‘structure the present as the 
object of a future memory’ yet they also make a claim on the past when viewed in a later 
present.
86
 Couched in Bergsonian terms, photographs represent an interpenetration of time 
present, time future and time past. But as Jacques Chevalier has commented in relation to 
Bergson, photographs are necessarily incomplete as a form of knowledge because the 
object(s) within a photograph cannot be fully apprehended ‘absolutely’, intuitively.
87
 
Because they are constituted out of change and movement, their temporality cannot be fully 
grasped; they are never truly ‘still’. If the photograph both eludes the presence of the subject 
of the photograph as well as that of the photographer, the kind of memory it gives rise to is 
indeterminate, comprising a shifting temporality as well as a ‘non-fixity’ of space, for space 
is neither ‘here’ nor (any longer) ‘there’. This loosening of the conventional meanings of 
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‘time’ and ‘space’ together with this indeterminacy are features of what I am calling time-
space in relation to the geometry of memory. 
The ‘Curve’ of Time 
Time is represented as mobile and indivisible in many of the episodes of ‘At the Bay’. There 
is the sense of a day beginning and ending, but in relation to indeterminate temporality such 
as: ‘a few moments later’; ‘by this time’; ‘as the morning lengthened’; ‘it’s getting late’. The 
unnumbered episodes in the story do not relate to the hours on the clock, although clock time 
is clearly marked at different points in the story. In the first episode, it is ‘very early 
morning’ and yet in the second episode it is only ‘A few moments later’. Later than what, the 
reader is not told; it could be the time elapsed since ‘early morning’ or from the time of the 
colony sleeping, or waking, or the time of the shepherd moving across the landscape. 
That the landscape is shrouded in white mist also imparts a sense of temporal 
indeterminacy in space – a time-space – rather than sequential time. In episode three, time on 
the clock dominates, although clock time passes more quickly than the implied narrated time 
of the story: ‘Twenty-five minutes’ very quickly dwindle to ‘Twelve and a half minutes’. 
Mansfield’s representation of time here can be regarded topologically: clock time is bent out 
of shape into story time, as the household pursues its multiple, time-bound rituals ‘every 
single morning’. 
When the story begins the reader does not know what time it is: ‘Very early 
morning. The sun was not yet risen.’ (p. 342) The negative of ‘not yet risen’ is just one of 
several negations of perception or consciousness in which the bay is ‘hidden’, the hills 
‘smothered’, the sandy road ‘gone’ and time is hazy. Space and dimension are also negated 
for there is ‘nothing to mark which was beach and where was the sea’ (p. 342). By contrast, 
time’s indeterminate flow in a perpetual present is signalled throughout this opening scene, 
in phrases such as ‘For a time’, ‘And now’ and ‘Now the leaping, glittering sea’. As the mist 
clears, spatial qualities of proximity and distance and perspective are brought into the scene 
but are topologically altered in phrases such as: ‘There ahead was stretched the sandy road’ 
(p. 343; emphasis added). Distance is collapsed and turned back on itself: ‘The far-away sky 
[…] was reflected in the puddles’ (p. 343). The dual Bergsonian terms of the spatial and the 
temporal come together in the phrase ‘The sun was rising’ (p. 343) which expresses the 
movement of time: the sun had not yet risen; now it is rising in and across the sky. The sun 
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In the first episode, there are no references to a specific historical time in which the 
story is set – only the time of year which is that of the ‘summer colony’ – just as there are 
few references to any place beyond the immediate bay and the town except in memory 
(when China and Tasmania, vast distances away, are recollected in present time). The 
crescent-shaped curve of the bay area is established as well as movement around the bay in 
the form of the shepherd who appears in the landscape. The white mist may even provide a 
metafictional suggestion of the blank page and of the story not yet unfolded on it; even a 
kind of blankness or partial blindness and obscurity in the narrator. The non-characterised, 
and perhaps noncommittal, narrator’s aloofness established by this opening description 
compares with Conrad’s in Nostromo where the narrative is also distanced and the narrator 
obscured or ‘disowned’ in parenthetical phrases such as ‘– it is said –’; ‘The sun – as the 
sailors say – is eating it up’; and ‘– as the saying is –’.
88
 This opening section also contrasts 
with Woolf’s use of ten very definite interspersed sections in The Waves which track the 
movement of the sun very deliberately from dawn to dusk. In ‘At the Bay’ the liminality of 
the seashore further enhances the image of topological shape-shifting and a fused time-space. 
The opening words of the second episode are ‘A few moments later’ (p. 344), 
implying a very short temporal span, in which the ‘First man’, with its gesture towards an 
idyllic Eden, is apparently Stanley. But this is a temporal misapprehension, for Jonathan 
Trout is already at the bay. Jonathan’s first words, ‘“Hail, brother! All hail, Thou Mighty 
One!”’ (p. 344), mock Stanley. The phrase possibly references Cardinal John Henry 
Newman’s epic poem of 1865, ‘The Dream of Gerontius’, which recounts the fall of 
Gerontius into death and purgatory, although Stanley’s plunge into the water is a delight. 
Jonathan’s ‘velvety deep bass voice’ may similarly resonate with a musical intertext, that of 
Elgar’s oratorio The Dream of Gerontius of 1899-1900. The symphonic flow and the gradual 
unfolding of the music of the Dream seem to recall Bergson’s metaphor for time as a 
melody, as well as suggesting a musical metaphor for the undertow and movement of the 
flowing sea. 
In the third episode Stanley’s preoccupation with quantifying time (‘he pulled out 
his watch’, p. 346) is a clear example of Bergson’s time on the clock and when Stanley 
counts backwards, precisely noting that he has twenty-five and later twelve-and-a-half 
minutes until his coach leaves, consciousness attached to the interests of impending action is 
taken to extremes. Stanley’s ‘stiff collar’ is perhaps a synecdoche for his stiffness as well as 
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his ‘mechanical’ clock-watching. Once Stanley has departed, the women of the household 
sympathetically come together in their empathic everydayness: ‘Their very voices were 
changed as they called to one another; they sounded warm and loving and as if they shared a 
secret’ (p. 348). As the women relax, Stanley’s paternalistic individualism recedes from the 
space of the narrative. 
Episode four opens with the repetition of Lottie’s call, ‘“Wait for me, Isa-bel! Kezia, 
wait for me!”’ (p. 348). The repeated call suggests Lottie’s habitual straggling as she is ‘left 
behind again’ (p. 348). Here the child who is not yet able to keep up with the pace of her 
sisters in exploring outdoor spaces, and who only and ‘at last’ manages to climb over the 
stile with Kezia’s help, contrasts with Stanley’s adult sense of keeping to time on the clock. 
The words ‘As the morning lengthened’ (p. 350; emphasis added) open episode five and 
indicate that when the members of the different families are brought together in the time of 
play and relaxation at the beach, time seems to stretch out. 
In episode six, the time of memory and the time of the present are brought together. 
Initially, time and memory are deflected into dream and inertia: ‘Linda Burnell dreamed the 
morning away’ (p. 353). Linda’s tendency towards dream and inattention to the present is 
indicated by a memory-image from the past: ‘… Now she sat on the veranda of their 
Tasmanian home’ (p. 354). This shifty temporal deixis alerts the reader to the Free Indirect 
Discourse move into the character’s consciousness and her temporality. Linda recalls her 
father’s promise that they would escape the world together; her recollections reflect her past 
desire to journey into the future, but these memories are ineffectual in Bergsonian terms 
because they do not lead to action in the present. This is a form of what might be called 
‘retrospective anticipation’. If Linda relapses into the past, she simultaneously grieves for the 
lack of time in the present: ‘If only one had time to look at these flowers long enough, time 
to get over the sense of novelty and strangeness, time to know them!’(p. 354).
89
 Linda is 
sensitive to the mutability of all things, such as exquisite flowers, but her time is squandered 
on Stanley: ‘Her whole time was spent in rescuing him, and restoring him, and calming him 
down, and listening to his story. And what was left of her time was spent in the dread of 
having children’ (p. 355).
90
 It is Linda who listens to Stanley’s narratives (‘his-story’) of his 
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daily life, while Linda’s dream time lacks a narrative, or a space for ‘retelling’. When Linda 
finally has time to attend consciously to her son, the baby has forgotten his need of her. 
Linda’s awareness may function in the narrative to indicate her entry into fully maternal time 
as well as to reinforce her essentialising state of motherhood while the male baby enjoys his 
own, unfettered temporal rhythms. 
The seventh episode serves as a narrative interlude which invokes an empty time-
space; empty, at least, of human kind: ‘The tide was out; the beach was deserted’ and 
‘Nothing seemed to move but the small sand-hoppers’ (p. 356). The rhythms of the earth and 
sea occur unseen except as recounted by the apparently aloof narrator. In the summer colony 
the blinds are closed in the bungalows against the heat of the midday sun. This episode also 
contains Kezia and her grandmother’s siesta, in which the grandmother recalls the death of 
Kezia’s Australian uncle William, who died of sunstroke. There is no sorrow in the memory, 
however: 
Did it make her sad? To look back, back. To stare down the years, as Kezia had seen 
her doing. To look after them as a woman does, long after they were out of sight. Did 
it make her sad? No, life was like that. (p. 357) 
If the word ‘them’ refers to the years, then the grandmother is the keeper of family time yet 
also of measured time, symbolised by the way in which she counts the stitches in her knitting 
(‘Mrs Fairfield began counting the stitches in threes’, p. 357). She is the guardian of 
memories of the dead, yet death is both more natural and somehow more forgettable than the 
immediacy of the present activity of knitting (‘“It just happened,” she said in an absorbed 
voice’ p. 357). In this scene Kezia is exposed to human mortality and to the limits placed on 
temporality for every living being, which is a potential future traumatic memory (like the 
episode with the duck in Prelude) for Kezia. But at this point in the narrative, I think the 
power of love in the present triumphs over death in the past as the child and the grandmother 
‘forget’ time in the time-space of the here and now. 
In episode eight, the sun is ‘still’ on the garden, indicating that the sun has continuity 
(even when it is not observed). The back door serves (spatially) as the backdrop for the 
servant Alice’s (temporal) afternoon off, and she goes out to tea at the house of Mrs Stubbs. 
                                                                                                                                          
types of temporality are ‘cyclical’ and ‘monumental’ (p. 192). The first relates to ‘repetition’ (the 
cycles and biological rhythms which combine with cosmic time to produce jouissance) and the 
second to ‘eternity’ (which is ‘infinite like imaginary space’) (p. 191). But in what seems an 
essentialising explanation, women’s time is bound up with ‘maternal time’ (or motherhood) set 
against the linear time of politics and history. There is a similarity here also with Ricoeur’s 
distinction between ‘lived’ and ‘cosmic’ time, with the latter relating to infinite or eternal time. I 
draw on Ricoeur’s ideas in more detail in Chapter Three. 
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The phrase ‘“Shan’t be long now”’ is spoken by Alice to the ‘distant gum-tree’ (p. 359), and 
distance and proximity are invoked here as a signal that Alice is able, occasionally, to 
remove herself from the confines of domestic space and time. While the narrative events of 
episode eight focus on the taking of tea, episode nine takes place after tea, signalled by a 
shift in the sun’s movement and the age-old struggle between light and dark: ‘While they 
were playing, the day had faded; the gorgeous sunset had blazed and died. And now the 
quick dark came racing over the sea, over the sand-hills, up the paddock’ (p. 363). In 
depicting the movement of the dark over the land Mansfield also, I think, represents time-
space: temporal mobility is evoked in the use of different tenses, the fading of the day, the 
sunset that has come and gone, and the movement of the dark across the sea, the sand and the 
paddock. The blinds are now pulled down against the dark rather than the heat of the sun. 
Significantly, several of the characters have changed locations during the time before and 
after dark: Jonathan peers through the window of the washhouse having been in the sea 
earlier in the day. Beryl has been at the beach and sitting at the window and finally moves 
out into the moonlit garden, the moonlight which ‘stared and glittered’ (p. 370) having 
penetrated the dark. Movement and stillness are framed by windows, while the artificial light 
of lamps illuminates the passing of time in unidentified, approximate space: ‘And 
somewhere, far away, grandma was lighting a lamp’ (p. 363). 
The sun is described as being on its apparent downwards curving path in episode ten, 
‘The sun was sinking’ (p. 364), and Jonathan is once more untimely, as he was from 
Stanley’s point of view at the beach: ‘He had meant to be there before’ (p. 364). Such 
temporal markers continue to be indefinite in terms of time on the clock. In narrative time, 
this episode is an analepsis. The sense of belatedness matches the belatedness of the scene to 
the chronological time of the story. Jonathan, who has come upon Linda ‘with her little air of 
remoteness’ in the garden, has delayed going to fetch his children home after tea. Jonathan’s 
refrain is ‘“The shortness of life”’ (p. 366) and he likens himself to a moth or butterfly 
whose time on earth is especially, movingly, brief. The natural time of the cosmos represents 
this sombre mood: ‘The sun had set’ (p. 366) and, in keeping with his time-anxious 
character, Jonathan seems to feel that the sun has set on him. 
In episode eleven as lights shine through the windows from inside the bungalow, 
time is channelled through Florrie, the cat, to whom consciousness is attributed. In Florrie’s 
time-space, time has seemingly come about sitting on the step: ‘as though she had been 
waiting for this moment all day’ (p. 367). Florrie is placed in the tensed time of the present: 
‘“Thank goodness, it’s getting late,” said Florrie. “Thank goodness, the long day is over”’ (p. 
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367). She is not reflecting on time past; even though the day has gone, its being ‘over’ is 
now. That the narrator gives tensed speech to a cat perhaps captures the sense of exhaustion 
among the human inhabitants, with animal time taking over from human time. Late in the 
day, Stanley returns from work seeking Linda’s forgiveness for consciously not having said 
goodbye to her that morning. But Stanley’s self-important time at work is undermined as 
Linda (perhaps like the reader) has, without embarrassment, forgotten Stanley and feels no 
need to forgive him. 
By the penultimate episode it is night-time and one of thrilling and queer sensations. 
Beryl, in a textual echo of Prelude, is again fantasising a romance and anticipating her 
future. Beryl’s time is at variance with space, a rare example in the story where ‘time-space’ 
does not occur. The external world is a conspirator and in the moonlight the vegetation is 
anthropomorphised and given emotions – sad, imploring, full of sorrow – a projection of 
Beryl’s represented affective state. Depicted in her loneliness, Beryl imagines being hailed 
(also heralding perhaps the opening of Virginia Woolf’s Jacob’s Room, published nine 
months after ‘At the Bay’ in October 1922): 
[I]t’s as though, in the silence, somebody called your name, and you heard your 
name for the first time. ‘Beryl!’ 
‘Yes, I’m here. I’m Beryl. Who wants me?’ 
‘Beryl!’ 
‘Let me come.’ (p. 369) 
Beryl particularly wants to be remembered in future time. In a proleptic vision (or 
anticipatory retrospective), she imagines a future conversation about the past: 
It wasn’t possible to think that Beryl Fairfield never married, that lovely fascinating 
girl. 
 ‘Do you remember Beryl Fairfield?’ 
‘Remember her! As if I could forget her! It was one summer at the Bay that 
I saw her. She was standing on the beach in a blue’ – no, pink – ‘muslin frock, 
holding on a big cream’ – no, black –‘straw hat. But it’s years ago now.’ 
‘She’s as lovely as ever, more so if anything.’(p. 369) 
This passage is significant because Beryl holds both sides of a conversation which plays with 
tenses, even to the extent of interrupting herself in the memory she prefigures: what would 
she have been wearing all those years ago in order to have made an impression on her two 
imagined interlocutors, one of whom is a longed-for lover? Beryl doesn’t want the absence 
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of love to define her past. Beryl’s desire (signalled perhaps by the sensually suggestive ‘wide 
open flowers’ which are as ‘bright as by day’ in the moonlight and which therefore seem to 
adjust to time’s passage) for Harry Kember is one of both terror and excitement. The 
external world itself witnesses the encounter: the moonlight ‘stared’; the garden is ‘stern’. 
This desire comes to an abrupt halt, however, and is therefore figured as being untimely, as 
Beryl realises that she has the wrong man; it is too soon to be at a man’s beck and call: 
‘Nobody answered him’ (p. 371). 
The coda is set in darkness, which I would suggest is not a limit-point for natural or 
cosmic time, but an aspect of its unceasing, diurnal flow. The inhabitants of the bay are 
asleep. Syntactically, agency is given to a cloud which moves away from the night sky only 
to awaken from a ‘dark dream’ during the night. By contrast, human minds, in the 
unconsciousness of sleep, have relaxed their grip on measured time and have ceased to 
experience their duration or movement in space: ‘All was still’ (p. 371). 
Topological Readings 
According to Bergson, the time of lived duration is related to movement: time and 
consciousness figured as flux. In this section I argue that movement in and through space in 
‘At the Bay’ configured topologically is related to temporality as well as to consciousness 
and memory. This ‘geometrical’ approach is, I suggest, one of Mansfield’s major 
contributions to the modern short story. Given the short story’s limitations, compared to the 
novel, for disrupting narrative chronology on a long timescale, Mansfield instead uses 
movement and lack of movement through space as a means of figuring temporal differences. 
In this section, I assert that the spatial topologies of the ‘At the Bay’ can be mapped 
onto memory using the features of distance and proximity in relation to the past and the 
present. In approaching distance and proximity in temporal and spatial terms, it is the 
character Linda who is most distant from the present and often immobilised in that present. 
Linda is rarely seen ‘in action’. For instance, the reader discovers her on the garden lawn 
rather than following her movements there. Beryl is also depicted as being uncomfortable 
with her proximity to the present and to the spaces around her and shown as being 
preoccupied with moving, psychologically, towards the future. While Stanley moves too 
close to Linda in spatial terms, in terms of distance he travels furthest, leaving the colony for 
the town. His movements are physical and spatial as he is rarely given a sense of interiority 
or of consciousness via Free Indirect Speech. The shepherd moves through the familiar 
landscape of the bay yet the mind of this mobile figure is opaque to the reader. The Burnells’ 
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youngest daughter, Lottie, seemingly cannot yet avail herself fully of her durational 
consciousness; at the same time, as noted above, she struggles with traversing space and with 
keeping up with her older siblings: 
There was poor little Lottie, left behind again, because she found it so fearfully hard 
to get over the stile by herself […]And when she did finally put one leg over with a 
sort of stamp of despair – then the feeling was awful. She was half in the paddock 
still and half in the tussock grass. She clutched the post desperately and lifted up her 
voice. ‘Wait for me!’ (p. 348) 
Lottie’s predicament here is one of being ‘de-fence-less’ in topological or deformed space; 
the stile, like Lottie, straddles two spaces, paddock and tussock grass; and stiles are 
impediments to her small form. In this episode time is also distorted; Lottie is ‘left behind’. 
However, the three girls together do traverse space as they are described climbing a 
hill. As they halt at the top to survey where to place themselves on the beach when they 
reach it and as they judge the proximity of the people who have already staked their claim 
there, the narrative bends the perspectival view of the girls, topologically distancing them 
from the reader in the same way that the girls are distanced from the location they are 
viewing: ‘Seen from behind, standing against the skyline, gesticulating largely with their 
spades, they looked like minute puzzled explorers’ (p. 349). The reader is located behind the 
girls looking at them looking, topologically compacted to ‘minute’ size. This ‘back view’ is 
not the same view as that of the narrator, however; on this occasion only the narrator seems 
to have the privileged proximity to the scene to facilitate a description of the children 
looking ‘puzzled’. In the paragraph that follows, the narrator describes the Samuel Josephs at 
the beach with the lady-help and the previously stretched perspective reverts to normal. 
Various spaces are given dimensions in which relationships of proximity and 
distance are played out. In the holiday home, interior space seems regularly rectangular: it is 
a house containing boxes which are used for furniture and of window frames and windows 
where the women and children are contained. Mrs Stubbs’s space is confusedly divided 
between her living and working space while the fully commercial spaces of the town and the 
city are at some unspecified distance from the seaside bay where Stanley Burnell carries out 
business. The garden is a topological space in which nature and life, as well as human 






Topological Movement and Memory 
Key: 
(   = bend 
∟= corner 
→ = forward movement or progression 
╠ = open threshold 
╢ = blocked threshold 
∩ = gateway 
□ = open space 
■ = building or room 
/ object or thing 
═ = ledge 
< = opening to freedom 
▌= blocked freedom 
_ = horizontal / flat 
← = memory 
O = contemplation of life 
There are very distinct types of topological movement in and through space in ‘At 
the Bay’ which are related also to time, temperament and memory. Movement through space 
may at first appear to be an opening to duration and to freedom, yet movement is often 
impeded or blocked, especially for female characters. For male characters, an intervening 
object or thing may halt their progression through space but is subsequently negotiated. In 
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what follows each character is given a ‘geometrical equation’ to represent a particular 
movement in and through the story in relation to memory according to the key noted above.
91
 
The shepherd’s trajectory through the story is via the spaces in the landscape 
between the two bays. His progress is from ‘Crescent Bay’ to ‘Daylight Cove’, ‘taking his 
time’ (p. 343); a movement forwards in time-space. His flock moves around a corner and 
‘between’ broken rock, a natural threshold, the shepherd finally emerging through a ‘rocky 
gateway’ (p. 343). He passes the gum tree, the shop, the fisherman’s hut, the whare and the 
rocky pass and moves past a ledge of rock, and round the bend towards the cove. His 
perspective is wide and broad like a bay; he looks ahead ‘in the direction of the sea’ (p. 343) 
and the summer colony. The narrator recounts his journey as one of familiarity based on the 
repetitions of habit memory as well as movement through familiar space. 
The Shepherd, cove-to-cove: 
(∟→╠ ∩→ / → □ → □ → □ ╠  ═ ∟) 
Stanley’s movements in the narrative are recounted in terms of constant physical and 
spatial movement forwards, eschewing memory and promoting impending action in the 
continuous present. He is confronted by unexpected objects and things in space which he 
overcomes. In the second episode, however, Stanley comes closest to being temporarily in 
the time of his duration, as he runs, albeit somewhat clumsily, from the summer bungalow to 
the sea. This scene brings hints of the durational flow of his consciousness together with 
spatial impediments as Stanley negotiates his way through a paddock, over a stile, across the 
tussock grass, a hollow, a sandy hillock, and stones and pebbles, until he plunges, 
triumphantly – he ‘waded out exulting’ (p. 344) – into the sea. A vast expanse seems to open 
up to him, life is seemingly precious (‘dear life’) and he is seemingly free; and yet his inner 
sense of duration is soon stymied and his calculating, social mind takes over when he 
discovers that his brother-in-law has preceded him in being first to swim in the sea that 
morning. 
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Stanley’s impeded progress to the beach: 
■ → / → / → / → / → / → / → / → <  ▌ 
Linda is generally reclining: lying down in the bedroom or in Beryl’s hammock; or 
sitting: in the steamer chair, or on the front grass, of the holiday home. In her memory she 
recalls sitting on the veranda of her Tasmanian home. ‘Now she sat’ (p. 354) sums up 
Linda’s relative lack of movement in the story. However, while spatially moribund, she 
roams further than any other character in her dream reveries. Yet with each memory, the 
possibility of real action towards conscious freedom seems to recede and Linda’s hopes are 
spatially, temporally and psychologically bounded, and confounded, by her reality as a wife 
and mother. 
Linda, immobile and reminiscing: 
 _ _ O (_< < ▌) ← < ▌_O ▌ 
Jonathan is similarly horizontal: floating in the sea, or lying down beside Linda on 
the front grass. He is similarly a dreamer who wishes for a life elsewhere, and towards which 
he is unable to move, psychologically and emotionally. Just for a while, bathing in the sea, 
Jonathan is able to glimpse his freedom: ‘not to fight against the ebb and flow of life, but to 
give way to it – that was what was needed. It was this tension that was all wrong. To live – to 
live!’ (p. 345). Bergson relates a relaxing of tension to the lessening of dream memory; 
Jonathan’s attachment to the plane of dream, symbolised by his horizontality, prevents him 
from gaining his freedom and moving towards a fulfilling future. 
Jonathan, immobilised: 
<_ ■ <_ ▌ 
Beryl is beset by numerous obstacles to her free movement in space; such 
impediments perhaps symbolise her bodily inhibitions in the present. There are various 
negative thresholds or liminal spaces through which Beryl either does not pass or through 
which she passes reluctantly. The thresholds represent her fear of freedom and of her 
sexuality. During the course of the narrative, she is stationed at the garden gate, at a barrier; 
she stands in front of Mrs Kember, which feels awkward to her, while she gets undressed at 
the beach; she sits at the window of the office and, later, on her bedroom window seat. It is 
this last threshold through which she eventually ventures in trepidation but only to stop at 
another gate: she ‘stepped over her low window, crossed the veranda, ran down the grass to 
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the gate’ for a rendezvous with the ominous Harry Kember (p. 370). Her fear overcomes her 
desire and she retreats to the haven of the house. The moon’s shadows are ‘like bars of iron’ 
(p. 370), a metaphor for Beryl’s powerlessness to act and her present self-imprisonment, 
both psychologically and in the home. 
Beryl, her future blocked: 
╢ ╢ ╢ ╢ /  ▌■ 
By comparison, Alice, the maid, confined to domestic spaces such as the kitchen 
(where she is action-centred, washing up or wielding a teapot) ventures freely into outside 
space for a social encounter. She moves across the threshold of the back door (a mark also of 
her class standing), along the path, through the garden gate, along the road and into the 
domestic space of Mrs Stubbs’s parlour where she is given a lesson in freedom: ‘“freedom’s 
best!”’(p. 361), declares Mrs Stubbs, twice; this emphatic advice surely signals to young 
Alice that any wished-for freedom should be from ‘burly’ husbands. Alice moves between 
the confines of rooms, spatially, and lives in the present, temporally, in her own time-space 
in the story. 
Alice, venturing out: 
■ ╠ →  ╠  → ■ 
Mrs Fairfield represents living harmoniously in duration and in public time, stable in 
her ‘deep content’ (p. 347) with the time of the present, past and future and in the multiple 
spaces she inhabits. Her long-living memory is balanced with her present-centred activity, 
whether in the domestic space of the living room, in the public space of the beach or in her 
shared private space with Kezia. Once in the story there may be textual evidence of a muted 
longing when Mrs Fairfield halts at a threshold: she ‘paused […], to gaze out of the open 
door into the garden’ (p. 346). Here the hesitation can be regarded as a positive one in terms 
of Bergson’s schema, for Mrs Fairfield simultaneously looks out from within through an 
open door to the enclosed space of the garden, but into a space which she neither craves nor 
fears. Her siesta indoors with Kezia is when past and present time and domestic space come 
together in a serenely mature acceptance of her place in the world. 
Mrs Fairfield, balanced in time and space: 
■  □  ■  ╠  ← O 
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Kezia and the other Burnell children, by comparison, roam freely in open space and in 
present time, and are little preoccupied with memory. Despite Lottie’s impeded progress 
down to the bay, the children bound through the paddock and the tussock grass, confront and 
eventually overcome the stile and traverse the hill. Their lives and minds are unbounded. 
Only indoors, in the living room, are they subject to adult social rules or, while in the 
washhouse, bound by the shared rules of play. 
Kezia, towards the future: 
■  → → → → □  ■ 
Elizabeth Bowen comments on how expertly Mansfield could present locations as 
well as people in action: 
Scenically, how keen is her eye for the telling detail! The street, quayside, café, shop 
interior, teatime terrace, or public garden stand concretely forward into life. […] Her 
liking for activity, for the crowd at play, for people going about their work, her close 
interest in process and occupation, give an extra vitality to stories.
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Bowen here touches upon an element of Mansfieldian time-space: the spaces in and through 
which the characters move signal varying tendencies towards inner freedom as well as 
towards the freedom to act within the ‘spaces’ of their lives. Bowen also relates Mansfield’s 
scene-making to the creation of emotions (themselves ‘movements’ in affective states): ‘She 
engraves a scene all the more deeply when it is […] contributory to a mood or crisis.’
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Movement through space and in time in ‘At the Bay’ is accompanied by various affects, 
from trepidation to contentedness and from frustration to the celebration of life. 
The Mobile Narrator 
Although I have discussed the significance of the narrator in the story, I would like 
here to extend this discussion to frame it in topological terms. Mansfield creates a narrator in 
‘At the Bay’ who takes on various forms and for this reason I call a ‘mobile’ narrator. That 
the narrator seems to be overtly mobile in the story relates to Mansfield’s technique of using 
Free Indirect Discourse: of moving into the minds of her characters. Kathryn Walls has 
suggested that the narrator in the story is cast as Mansfield’s ‘(necessarily fictional) post-
mortem self, her ghost.’
94
 According to Walls the narrator exhibits a certain ‘ghostliness’ in 
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the opening episode while also showing signs of ‘real, human presence’ in her idiosyncratic 
responses to the scene (p. 347). Walls goes as far as to say that Mansfield’s narrator becomes 
the main character of the story while Mansfield as author haunts her own autobiographical 
childhood self in the story through the medium of hallucination and dream (p. 354). Walls 
implies that Mansfield’s own past encroaches on the narrative because the narrator seems to 
have access to more ‘history’ and knowledge than might be thought possible. The narrator 
knows the bay in more detail than any other character, for example, which suggests to Walls 
that the narrator is ‘not unambiguously omniscient’ (p. 348). Peter Mathews, while agreeing 
that the narrator’s voice is ‘ghostly’ and ‘anonymous’, by contrast suggests that the 
narrator’s point of view is a ‘subversion’ of omniscience.
95
 
While Walls focuses on Mansfield’s authorial ‘intervention’ – the author saturating 
the text by the superimposition of herself in the form of a narrator-as-character – I propose a 
different way of framing omniscience which draws on Bergson’s idea of ‘supra-
consciousness’. Supra-consciousness is for Bergson the ‘origin of life’; a consciousness 
which is a ‘need of creation’ which he outlines in Creative Evolution.
96
 Applied to narrative, 
the supra-conscious narrator in my view is therefore one who occupies the characters’ minds 
from the perspective of a cosmic mind. The concept of supra-consciousness thereby extends 
the notion of conventional omniscience to a narrator who does not just ‘see’ but becomes the 
characters and who occupies their mind-time and their movements through external space in 
a time-space which permeates the text. 
The principal example of this ‘supra-insight’ is from the opening scene of the story 
when the narrator seems to extend [her] knowledge to all things, times and places: 
Ah-Aah! sounded the sleepy sea. And from the bush there came the sound of little 
streams flowing, quickly, lightly, slipping between the smooth stones, gushing into 
ferny basins and out again; and there was the splashing of big drops on large leaves, 
and something else – what was it? – a faint stirring and shaking, the snapping of a 
twig and then such silence that it seemed some one was listening. (p. 343) 
The narrator is here re-constituting the external world for the reader in a way which exceeds 
chronicity and knowledge while simultaneously placing herself within the narrative: ‘what 
was it?’, the narrator asks on behalf of the reader and the characters. One unusual effect of 
this textual permeation is that the narrator may seem to over-remember in a way which 
overwhelms the time of the narrating. Kathryn Walls suggests that in addition to the narrator, 
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the characters and the reader, there is ‘someone’ else over-hearing the story. She surmises 
that it is Mansfield’s dead brother, another ghost at the bay (immortalised as the baby boy). 
While the ‘You’ of the opening sequence of the story may retain some resonance of address 
to Mansfield’s earlier self, or even to a dead brother, my reading maintains that the ‘you’ 
functions in heterogeneous terms: as ‘any and everyone’. The narrator who in her supra-
consciousness is everywhere invites everyone to listen to the story, while including herself 
among that community of addressees. 
As Mathews perceptively notes, in the opening section of the story, the narrator 
brings temporal markers into play with a variety of ‘spatial transitions’.
97
 But the narrator 
further ushers time and memory into the story via the sheep. The cries of the sheep enter ‘the 
dreams of little children’ and the children in turn absorb the memory of their cries as they 
‘cuddle the darling little woolly lambs of sleep’ (p. 344). Then the cries are given back to the 
sheep as they move from the colony of sleeping people at Crescent Bay to Daylight Cove. In 
this inter-animation of time, consciousness and memory, the potential for duration is given to 
both human-kind and animal-kind brought within the interpenetrating consciousness of an 
overall cosmic mind. 
Looking Back at ‘At the Bay’ 
‘At the Bay’ was positively received both when it was first published in the London 
Mercury in January 1922 and when it was included shortly after in Mansfield’s third short 
story collection, The Garden Party and Other Stories (1922). But her cousin Elizabeth 
unsettled her with a comment about the story as Mansfield recorded in a diary entry later that 
month: 
In the afternoon Elizabeth came. […] She spoke of my ‘pretty little story’ in The 
Mercury. All the while she was here I was conscious of a falsity. […] No, she is not 




Mansfield was irked enough to write to Elizabeth around the same day, 11 January 1922: 
Ah, Elizabeth, what can I do to know that my little figures projected on the bright 
screen of Time make a ‘pretty little story’ in the Mercury. Good God! How I worked 
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Elizabeth’s comments diminish Mansfield’s handling of a significant human theme: the 
illumination of the lives of her characters against the backdrop of time and memory. Later, in 
a diary entry for 16 October 1922, Mansfield recalled: 
It took me nearly a month to ‘recover’ from At the Bay. I made at least three false 
starts. But I could not get away from the sound of the sea and Beryl fanning her hair 
at the window. These things would not die down.
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The memory is not only of writing the story; it is also a powerfully lingering impression of 
one of the characters. Reflecting much later on the New Zealand stories as a whole, 
Elizabeth Bowen commented that Mansfield’s characters seemed so real that they must come 
from a larger, longer memory that existed ‘before stories began’.
101
 Not only have the stories 
come from a deep memory, suggests Bowen, which also implies a Bergsonian supra-
consciousness, but they seem to be everlasting: ‘The stories are more than moments, instants, 
gleams: she has given them touches of eternity.’
102
 This idea of lingering on has something 
in it of Bergson’s concept of duration and the continual unfolding of an irreversible 
temporality, although Bergson stops short of implying that duration might be eternal. 
Contemporaneous critical reception of Mansfield’s stories also seems steeped in 
Bergsonian language. What is notable about the review of Mansfield’s work by Martin 
Armstrong in the Spectator Literary Supplement a month after Mansfield’s death is the 
strongly suggested Bergsonian terms in which his appraisal is couched: ‘She is like a delicate 
spring in tension, quivering at the smallest stimulus: she is waiting, it seems, for the moment 
of release, waiting for something to happen.’
103
 This idea of waiting provides another way of 
reading ‘At the Bay’ with Bergson. According to Joseph Solomon, a contemporaneous critic, 
duration ‘is most plainly felt when our purpose is not to do or observe anything, but simply 
to wait for something, and when – just because we are awake and doing nothing – we attend 
to our waiting’.
104
 Waiting, therefore, does not imply stasis: waiting occurs while time passes 
and there is a ‘motion’ of attention given to waiting. There are numerous examples of 
attending to ‘waiting’ in ‘At the Bay’: Linda waiting to feel something like love for her 
children, or the two older Burnell girls waiting for Lottie to climb the stile, or Florrie the cat 
waiting for darkness to fall, or Beryl waiting for romantic love. It seems counter-intuitive, 
perhaps, but for Bergson and for Mansfield, temperaments which include a willingness to 
                                                 
100
 Notebook 31, qMS-1278; TKMN, 2, p. 290; published in CWKM4, p. 443, from which the text is 
taken. 
101
 Bowen, p. 25. 
102
 Ibid., p. 26. 
103
 Armstrong, p. 211. 
104
 Joseph Solomon, Bergson (London: Constable, 1911), p. 17. 
128 
 
wait (contrasted with, say, Stanley’s impatience) are those which are more likely to 
experience real duration. 
Armstrong cites Prelude and ‘At the Bay’ as examples of stories in which ‘the 
writer’s sensibility acts upon the whole as a flux and melts it into a single experience’.
105
 His 
use of the word ‘melting’ recalls Bergson’s metaphor for duration as the notes from a 
melody melting one into the other. Similarly, Raymond Mortimer, in his 1923 review in the 
New Statesman of Mansfield’s fourth short story collection, published posthumously as The 
Doves’ Nest and Other Stories, also captures the Bergsonian sensibility of Mansfield’s work: 
‘Few writers have better described the unorganised flow of thoughts and feelings that 
continually move through the different layers of human consciousness.’
106
 Mortimer’s 
comment touches on Mansfield’s successful symbolisation of duration, the achievement of 
depicting life in its temporal flow. 
Conclusion 
These critical assessments show Mansfield working, like other artists, critics and 
cultural commentators, and like Bergson, within the same manifold. As Randall Stevenson 
suggests, they were caught up in the modernists’ preoccupation of ‘looking within’.
107
 They 
did so, I suggest, using a particular philosophical lexicon. But what Mansfield and Bergson 
additionally seem to do is to suggest that as well as looking ‘within’ the mind to experience 
psychological time in its flow, looking ‘without’ also required a temporal aspect, and one 
associated with universal or cosmic time. Bergson and Mansfield I believe were not merely 
contributing to Modernism’s interest in what Virginia Woolf describes in Orlando as that 
‘extraordinary discrepancy between time on the clock and time in the mind’.
108
 Rather, they 
both sought a rapprochement between these assumed manifestly opposite temporal impulses.  
In this chapter I have argued that Mansfield experiments with narrating the 
topological bending of time which brings space and time together in time-space. Such time-
space permits individuals who live rarely in their own duration and more commonly within 
spatialised time to be open to a geometry of memory, longing and freedom. The ways in 
which I have traced the characters’ spatial movements in narrative time has then been 
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extended in a second series of readings of the topological bending of time acutely rendered 
by what might be called Mansfield’s ‘perspectival prose’ which has, I suggest, productive 
implications for thinking not only about Mansfield’s fiction, but about the short story as a 
form, with its particular deployments of narrative time.   
In the following chapter interlude, I analyse several other stories which have 





Chapter Interlude: Before and After ‘At the Bay’  
In this brief interlude, I examine whether Bergson’s philosophy of duration and of 
spatialised time drives the narrative structures of two of Mansfield’s less well-known stories, 
‘The Wrong House’ and ‘Such a Sweet Old Lady’, and whether these stories help to shed 
light on Mansfield’s approach to time. When writing about older women Mansfield often 
depicts them knitting. In Bergsonian terms, the activity of knitting represents habit memory 
in that it is an automatic, learned action. A point that Bergson overlooks, however, is that a 
learned habit performed multiple times until it is ‘second nature’ might actually free 
consciousness into the flow of duration. The image of knitting, like the concept of time-
space, yokes together in rather less philosophical terms but in a very particular way two 
aspects of Bergson’s theory of memory: the habitual and the imaginative or dream-like. 
In the first published version of ‘The Wrong House’ the character of Mrs Bean is 
incanting her knitting pattern: ‘Like an old song, like a song that she had sung so often that 
only to breathe was to sing it.’
1
 Tired as she is, she counts the stitches, sighs and drops her 
knitting and then pauses until resuming again: ‘What did she think about when she sighed 
like that? Nothing. It was a habit. She was always sighing’ (p. 210). Having established that 
Mrs Bean is a creature of habit, the narrator then invokes several mechanical timepieces: a 
clock, which strikes three o’clock in the dining room, and a kitchen clock which strikes three 
o’clock two minutes late. The paragraph is preoccupied with Bergson’s spatialised or 
measured time, but the means of measurement are shown to be faulty because the clocks in 
the house are unsynchronised. Furthermore, the maid’s absence ‘since a quarter to two’ 
suggests that the individual, while being subject to mechanical time, might also circumvent 
its measurement, in this case by dawdling: ‘Really, she got slower and slower!’(p. 211). The 
character of the maid is therefore associated with habit memory but also with ‘wasting’ time, 
indicating that her own particular rhythms of duration are set against clock time. Mrs Bean is 
puzzled by the seemingly untimely external actions of Dollicas because she does not 
empathise with her internal sense of time: ‘What did she do with the time? One cannot spend 
more than a certain time buying a chicken….’ (p. 211). The narrator seems to be mocking 
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time measured on the clock by pointing up Mrs Bean’s habit of keeping track of her maid’s 
‘misuse’ of it, while also suggesting that lived time variously speeds up and slows down 
when one is not attending to measured time. 
A funeral procession which sends one of the pall bearers down Mrs Bean’s own 
garden path, as though to claim her while she is still alive, sends her into a state of shock like 
a stopped clock: ‘the blow fell, and for the moment it struck her down’ (p. 211). The old lady 
falls into a reverie and at some unspecified time later comes round with a ‘deep inward 
shock’ (echoing perhaps Bergson’s sense of the shocks which accompany memory). Because 
time seems to be missing from her self-remembering, Mrs Bean undoes her habitual activity 
seemingly to regain time: ‘when she took up the knitting she drew out a needle of stitches 
and began to unwind what she had done’ (p. 212). This unravelling questions the 
irreversibility of time, perhaps, and comments humorously on habit memory, given that the 
two women’s lives are ones of long-term interrelated co-dependence, which anticipates 
elements of the later story, ‘The Daughters of the Late Colonel’. 
‘Such a Sweet Old Lady’ also includes the elements of spatialised time and 
Bergsonian duration. The story begins with a question: ‘Why did old Mrs. Travers wake so 
early nowadays?’
 2
 Not only does she wake ‘early’, but she wakes up ‘every morning at 
almost precisely the same time, at half-past four’. When she wakes, each time it is with a 
‘small shock’ as though she is also trying to remember herself and her surroundings: ‘as if 
she were trying to remember for certain whether this was the same wallpaper, the same 
window she had seen last night’ (p. 310). In a temporal interlude (which need not be a hiatus 
of suspended time, however) of waiting between waking and fretting, the old lady is happy; 
in Bergsonian terms, she inhabits her duration rather than living in quantitative, measured 
time. 
Mansfield further undermines the reliability and stability of clock time by attributing 
temporal rhythms and affects to time: ‘Now the church clock sounded from outside, slow, 
languid, faint, as if it chimed the half hour in its sleep’ (p. 310). Mrs Travers’s watch is 
endowed not only with a sense of mechanical time, but with purpose, personality and 
cunning: ‘And, staring at the prim, severe face of the watch, it seemed to her that the hand[s] 
– the minute hand especially – knew that she was watching them and held back – just a very 
                                                 
2
 ‘Such a Sweet Old Lady’ was first published in The Doves’ Nest and Other Stories, ed. by John 
Middleton Murry (London: Constable, 1923). Margaret Scott includes a two-line notebook entry: 
‘10.iv[?].1921. A Sweet Old Lady / Montana.’ Newberry Notebook 7, TKMN, 2, p. 279. Kimber and 
O’Sullivan give the MS date as ‘10 vii 1921’. Published in CWKM2, pp. 309-11 (p. 309) from which 
this text is taken. Further references to this story are given in brackets in the text. 
132 
 
little – on purpose….’ (p. 310). The old lady believes that the watch, since being removed 
from her late husband, has hated her; time has been given agency to run amok; clock time 
has been topologically stretched out of joint; the watch is vulnerable as a time-keeper as it 
must be wound or it will stop dead. 
In an introspective mood Mrs Travers reflects on foreign clocks and being at a distance 
from her home, in a seaside hotel, abroad. She feels out of place and time: ‘Foreign clocks 
never go. They are always stopped at twenty minutes to two. Twenty minutes to two! Such an 
unpleasant time, neither one thing nor the other’ (p. 310). She longs for that ‘timeless’ English 
habit: a cup of tea. The rhythms of clock time are set against the world outside the confines of 
the hotel where there is a sense of freedom and movement and of a world animated with living 
things in their own duration: ‘at this early hour you could smell the sea, you could hear it 
breathing, and flying high on golden wings sea-gulls skimmed past’ (p. 311). Sea and sky are 
endowed with feeling and are contrasted with the solidity, fixity and sterility associated with 
internal spaces, ‘shut in by the same wallpaper’ (p. 310). Duration is associated with animal 
life and the natural world in this story, while in unfamiliar interior spaces mechanical 
timepieces are absurd or uncanny. In this story Mansfield gives a topological twist to 
Bergson’s two theories of time by mocking clock time and embracing durational or lived time, 
but not for human kind. The story ends as though Mansfield has run out of time because time 
itself has run out, and the old lady is tired of looking at palm trees. Yet the concluding ellipsis 
simultaneously implies that the story might keep unfolding, even if along much the same lines 





Memory and Forgetting: Aphasia, Amnesia and Hyper-Reminiscence in 
‘The Garden Party’ and Other Stories 
[Bergson] stood the question of memory on its head, asking not how we remember, 
but why we forget. – Paul Douglass
1
 




The previous two chapters have explored memory and time in the fiction of 
Katherine Mansfield drawing on the philosophy of Henri Bergson as a strategy for reading 
Mansfield’s stories in a new way. In the last chapter, in detecting the movement of ‘time-
space’ following on from Bergson’s theory of spatialised time and duration in my reading of 
‘At the Bay’, I asserted that Mansfield’s writing responds to the issue of how to bring space 
into an understanding of time without ‘spatialising’ time in terms of dimension and 
measurement. In this chapter I turn to the concept of forgetting to argue that forgetting is also 
a requirement for living. My premise is that Mansfield is aligned with Bergson, both in 
subscribing to the idea that there is the potential for remembering all that has passed, and in 
observing that there are times when memory is temporarily impaired and fails to be useful. 
Rejecting the idea of forgetting as permanent memory failure, I argue that the two types of 
‘pathological’ memory loss, aphasia and amnesia, discussed by Bergson in Matter and 
Memory, can be mapped onto several of Mansfield’s stories to elucidate the idea of 
temporary forgetting. But whereas Bergson recuperates memory loss from the denigrations 
of pathology by claiming that there are no lasting ill effects, Mansfield leaves such 
recuperation open to question; the stories I discuss suggest not only that remembering can be 
restored subsequent to forgetting but that there may be occasions of forgetting when 
memories or memory trauma remain irrecoverable. 
According to Bergson, both amnesia and aphasia occur when the remembering 
functions are disordered, are put under intolerable strain or are subject to multiple external 
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pressures, conflicting values or mixed semantic signals. Taking up several of these factors, I 
argue that in some of Mansfield’s stories there are occasions when it is prudent or practical 
for the mind to temporarily forget. In ‘The Garden Party’ I argue that the protagonist’s 
forgetting is an instance of temporary amnesia and aphasia. Laura’s memories, and memory 
for language and speech, are not permanently lost; rather, she is overwhelmed by the 
heterogeneity of sensation prompted by the eventfulness of the day presented in the 
narrative. In ‘The Daughters of the Late Colonel’, however, I assert that Mansfield exceeds 
Bergson’s position on forgetting in that the daughters’ memories seem utterly incapacitated. 
Forgetting is also for Mansfield as a writer a form of surrendering personal memories to her 
fictional writing practice. Paradoxically, an active memory for the personal past and a 
creative imagination capable of generating images of characters’ memories in her stories also 
provide the conditions for the effective textual rendering of forgetting. 
I begin this chapter by briefly contextualising the different approaches to forgetting 
of several major thinkers who precede Bergson, such as John Locke, Friedrich Nietzsche and 
William James, before looking at Paul Ricoeur’s work on ‘happy forgetting’ for further 
comparison with Bergson. In the context of contemporaneous developments in neurology, 
experimental psychology and aphasiology in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, I compare Bergson’s theory of ‘unforgetting’ and researches into aphasia and 
amnesia with those of Freud. I then deploy the concepts of aphasia and amnesia as 
understood by Bergson to provide new readings of Mansfield’s ‘The Garden Party’ and ‘The 
Daughters of the Late Colonel’. Finally, I briefly analyse the stories Je ne parle pas français 
and ‘A Married Man’s Story’ in terms of what I term ‘hyper-reminiscence’, regarded as a 
form of dismal and destructive over-remembering. 
Necessary Forgetting and Unforgetting 
In his An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689), Locke expounds his 
view of the decay of memory. In a chapter on the idea of retention, he regards memory as 
‘the Store-house of our Ideas’ on the basis that the ‘narrow’ human mind cannot retain 
‘many’ ideas all at once.
3
 Although Locke suggests that a ‘Repository’ is required, a notion 
which Bergson rejects, he is prescient in introducing the notion of the utility of memories, 
noting that such a store is required to house ideas which the mind ‘might have use of’.
4
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Locke also believes that ideas fade in the memory when they have not been stamped into the 
mind via repetition: 
The Memory in some Men, ’tis true, is very tenacious, even to a Miracle: But yet 
there seems to be a constant decay of all our Ideas, even of those which are struck 
deepest, and in Minds the most retentive; so that if they be not sometimes renewed 
by repeated Exercise of the Senses, or Reflection on those kinds of Objects, which at 




While the concepts of use and of memory retention through repetition seem to prefigure 
Bergson’s ideas about utility and habit memory, Locke also speculates that disease can ‘quite 
strip the Mind of all its Ideas’.
6
 In a theory that associates memory loss with the 
‘constitution’ of our bodies as well as the ‘temper’ of the brain, Locke’s view is that 
memories can be permanently erased. 
Nearly two hundred years later, in ‘On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for 
Life’ of 1874, the second of his Untimely Meditations, Nietzsche posited a dichotomous 
struggle between memory and forgetting, or the past and the future.
7
 According to Nietzsche, 
history should be directed towards living ‘life’ in the present and should break with the past, 
a view which was anathema to Bergson. Furthermore, Nietzsche takes the somewhat 
provocative view that happiness is equated with lack of memories, a repudiation of 
Bergson’s view that memory is vital to consciousness, duration and living. For Nietzsche 
animals live entirely in the present of instant forgetting, living ‘unhistorically’ (p. 103). The 
human being, fettered to the past, envies the happiness of the animal and wonders why he or 
she cannot ‘learn to forget’. Even death is not a solution to historical living: while death ‘at 
last brings the desired forgetting’, it simultaneously ‘extinguishes the present and all 
existence’, letting us know that ‘existence is only an uninterrupted has-been’ (p. 103). Thus, 
even the inevitability of death does not deliver happiness in the time of living. Nietzsche’s 
pessimistic conclusion, in sharp contrast to that of Bergson, is that happiness is the human’s 
‘ability to forget’ by fully denying the past (p. 103). 
By contrast, William James, whose work straddled physiology, psychology and 
philosophy, also addresses the question of forgetting towards the end of the first volume of 
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The Principles of Psychology (1890). James, like Bergson, is clear about the usefulness of 
forgetting: 
If we remembered everything, we should on most occasions be as ill off as if we 
remembered nothing. It would take as long for us to recall a space of time as it took 
the original time to elapse, and we should never get ahead with our thinking.
8
 
Although James conceives the temporal dimension in spatial terms (‘a space of time’), his 
important contribution is to frame forgetting as a way in which human beings progress with 
thinking forwards (‘ahead’) in time. Unlike Nietzsche, James takes the view that what we 
remember is significant to us. For James, what is important is whether an experience was 
memorable at the time it occurred while in Bergson’s view, while a present ‘shock’ might 
lay down a memory for the future, it is the time of the remembering which is most important 
for the efficacy of action in the present. 
Katherine Mansfield subscribed to the idea that powerful ‘shocks’ in the present 
would help trigger her writing memory when it seemed to fail (‘I can’t write. […] I believe if 
I had another shock […], I might manage’).
9
 Yet she also saw memory as a form of 
hibernation, like Bergson’s pure or virtual memory; from girlhood, her memories had been 
forming her ‘treasure’ and ‘weaving’ into a ‘pattern’ ready to be rediscovered when 
required.
10
 The inter-animation of the past and the present in memory may also help to 
answer Lily Briscoe’s question in To the Lighthouse about the survival of particular 
memories over others: ‘Why, after all these years had that survived, ringed round, lit up, 
visible to the last detail, with all before it blank and all after it blank, for miles and miles.’
11
 
For Virginia Woolf, the answer lies in what she calls the ‘extraordinarily fertile’ 
moment.
12
 For Mansfield, it is in the combined atmospheric and aesthetic effect of the light, 
the rain and the flowers in their vividness which bring memory forth in the present. What 
Mansfield and Woolf seem to share is the idea that the raw perceptual immediacies of 
childhood form particularly ‘shining’ memories. These are examples of Bergson’s 
‘dominant’ memories, memories strongly formed in childhood before memory ‘expands’ 
with memory-images. Nietzsche came to the opposite conclusion but for the same reasons: 
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In his discussion of forgetting, James addressed the pathology of memory in cases 
either of hypnotised patients or amnesiacs and provided a brain-centred view of dysfunction 
in which he was given to think that recollections might not be entirely destroyed: ‘in certain 
matters apparent oblivion is no proof against possible recall under other conditions.’
14
 Even 
so, he relegated Bergson’s position that nothing we experience can be absolutely forgotten to 
the realms of the ‘transcendental’.
15
 In regarding amnesia and aphasia in terms of the ‘lost 
paths of association between the brain-centres’, James’s explanation is associated with 
nineteenth-century psychophysicalism and is one against which Bergson determinedly 
argues in theorising memory and forgetting from a philosophical point of view.
16
 
As discussed in my first chapter, in Bergson’s thinking each individual’s pure or 
virtual memory includes the whole of her or his past experience and memories are 
potentially available to be drawn down to meet action in the present when required. Thus, as 
Rudolf Bernet argues, it is difficult to find ‘a force of forgetting of one’s past’ in Bergson’s 
work.
17
 This is because the past, in being always virtually available, always responds to the 
appeal of the present. Bernet’s analysis is worth quoting in full: 
Each memory one wishes to remember brings with it (more or less explicitly or 
distinctly) all the other memories of this same consciousness. The same has to be 
said in the case of concrete perception: it is never an isolated pure memory that 
comes to aid the lack of the present perception. Rather, the whole past presses itself 
into the encounter with the present and contracts itself to fit through the eye of the 
needle that is the tip of the cone. Thus, no memory is excluded, no memory is too 




Bernet’s last sentence requires some further explanation, however. Bergson actually states, 
on the one hand, that a consciousness aware of all of the past in its totality would not be able 
to select the one most useful to the present perception. To remember each memory would be 
impossibly recursive with the memory of memories proliferating ad infinitum. Individuals 
could not function in the world faced with the simultaneous actual recall of all of our 
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memories; even the attempt would lead to an engulfment of psychotic proportions.
19
 On the 
other hand, Bergson also states that potentially ‘any’ memory could be called up to assist the 
present: ‘the moment that the recollection is linked with the perception, a multitude of events 
contiguous to the memory are thereby fastened to the perception – an indefinite multitude’.
20
 
It is clear to Bergson, and to Mansfield in her appeal to writers to select their memories, that 
while memory is a ‘multiplicity’ of recollections (p. 226), and insistently motivated as such, 
there is still the necessity to bring forth memories which are useful in the present. 
The role of the brain in Bergson’s analysis plays a specific and finite role in this 
process. The brain cannot ‘give birth’ to a recollection (p. 315). Rather, it assists with the 
contraction of memories which are drawn down into the present; it is a ‘motor ally’ (p. 152) 
just as the body must also be disposed to assist with recollection. The most important feature 
of ‘necessary forgetfulness’, then, is that it allows Bergson to refute the prevailing scientific 
claims of his day that memories are ‘stored’ physically in the brain, which would be to 
contain and spatialise them as ‘matter’ (‘Memory is something other than a function of the 
brain’, p. 315). The role for spatialised time in ‘necessary forgetfulness’ is the way in which 
it ‘hinders everything from being given at once’, as Bergson explains in The Creative 
Mind.
21
 Thus, the brain and measured time have a part to play alongside duration, just not in 
relation to ‘locating’ or ‘storing’ memories. 
In historical terms parallel investigations were being made into memory with the 
development of psychoanalysis, particularly in the work of Freud, and Freud’s theory of 
forgetting offers a further interesting comparison with Bergson. In reviewing his major 
papers, I have found that Freud identified at least six forms of forgetting: there is what might 
be called a benign form of forgetting associated with parapraxis, slips of the tongue or 
forgetfulness in misplacing objects; there is the ‘normal’ forgetting of memory-traces as well 
as the repression of memory-traces which involves distortion; there is forgetting which is 
temporary and memory can be reawakened; there is faulty recollection; there are screen 
memories, based on a form of forgetting; and there is infantile amnesia. For the purposes of 
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my argument in this chapter, Freud’s theory of repression and his ideas about faulty 
recollection are most germane. 
In a chapter on ‘The Forgetting of Impressions and Intentions’ in a note that was 
found in Freud’s copy of the 1904 edition of The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, Freud 
distinguishes between ‘normal’ forgetting and repression.
22
 Whereas ‘normal’ forgetting 
involves the process of condensation, repression utilises condensation but produces 
confusion, distortion and falsification. And in work which dates back to 1901 in the chapter 
on Determinism and Superstition, but in a footnote added in 1907 to the text of the chapter, 
Freud repeats his theory regarding the mechanism of forgetting in its ‘proper sense’. That is, 
the forgetting of past experiences, in which memory traces are subject to both condensation 
and distortion: ‘[T]he distorting trends feed on the indifferent material if they have remained 
unsatisfied at the place at which they sought to manifest themselves.’
23
 Thus distortion 
occurs when memory traces exhibit resistance to condensation, whereas traces that have 
grown indifferent succumb without resistance to the process of condensation. 
In an extension of the concept of repression in a paper of 1914, the ‘blocked’ 
memory that Freud outlines in ‘Remembering, Repeating, and Working Through’ is not one 
of irretrievable forgetting; rather repressed memories re-emerge in the patient’s relationship 
with the analyst in the process of the transference (i.e. the clinical encounter).
24
 The patient 
repeats rather than remembers the past trauma (p. 151). Repetition might, then, be likened to 
a reiteration of forgetting. The ‘compulsion to repeat’ is tied both to the transference and to 
resistance: to the transference in that it is a repetition of aspects of the patient’s past worked 
through via the analyst (‘the transference is itself only a piece of repetition’, p. 151); and to 
resistance in that ‘the greater the resistance, the more extensively will acting out (repetition) 
replace remembering’(p. 151). The psychoanalyst therefore treats the illness not as a past 
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event about which the patient remembers nothing, ‘but as a present-day force’ with the aim 
that the analysis will work to link the illness consciously with the patient’s past experience.
25
 
In his classic work on memory from the later twentieth century, Memory, History, 
Forgetting, Paul Ricoeur observes that it might be argued that the techniques of 
psychoanalysis were developed partly to enable what is apparently forgotten to return under 
supervision. While both Bergson and Freud can thus be regarded as two proponents of 
‘unforgetting’, they differ in their understanding of whether that unforgetting is aberrant. 
Whereas Bergson suggests the pure past is waiting for us, unencumbered and only 
temporarily in abeyance until required, it is Freud who tends to pathologise memory, treating 
it as a function of the mind concerned with the forbidden and the repressed. Here purity and 
pathology are opposed and to Freud is ascribed the seemingly more negative view. However, 
when it comes to power or efficacy, whereas Bergson suggests the past – and unconscious 
‘pure memory’ – is powerless to act, Freud’s unconscious, in being linked to the instinctual 
drives, is conceived as energy and thereby motivated to act.
26
 
 In his magisterial phenomenological investigation, Ricoeur comes down on the side 
of what he calls ‘happy memory’ over forgetting (p. 494). From the outset he hypothesises 
that in remembering, we remember something, thereby counselling against approaching 
memory on the grounds of its deficiencies or dysfunctions (p. 21). Rather, he favours an 
approach which looks to memory’s capacities and their ‘happy realization’. Why should he 
work so strenuously to emphasise the ‘good’ memory? It is because human beings have no 
other means of being ‘faithful’ to the past: ‘To put it bluntly, we have nothing better than 
memory to signify that something has taken place, has occurred, has happened before we 
declare that we remember it’ (p. 21). Ricoeur urges that the so-called defects of memory 
which stem from forgetting should not automatically be viewed in terms of ‘pathology’, but 
rather as ‘the shadowy underside of the bright region of memory’ (p. 21). It is this underside 
which, crucially, gives us a sense of what has passed. Ricoeur takes an optimistic view of 
remembering and forgetting and one which rebuts that of Nietzsche: there is an historical and 
political impetus to remembering given that forgetting equates to oblivion of the historical 
past. 
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It seems clear to me that Ricoeur shares Bergson’s view that what is remembered is 
a unique and unrepeatable event and is therefore historicised. The singular event is 
accompanied by a ‘discrete appearance’ (Ricoeur gives the example of a certain sunset one 
particular summer evening) which ensures the event reappears as the same when recalled 
and it is due to this ‘sameness of reappearing’ (p. 23) that we remember the particularity of 
events. This sounds similar to the way in which Bergson describes a ‘spontaneous’ 
recollection in which there is temporal and spatial specificity: ‘Spontaneous recollection is 
perfect from the outset; time can add nothing to its image without disfiguring it; it retains in 
memory its place and date.’
27
 But there may be a leap of faith at work here, both for Ricoeur 
in trusting that what has reappeared once will reliably reappear in identical form, the same in 
kind, quality, feeling and without addition, distortion or diminishment, and for Bergson, that 
the memory is pure from its temporal inception. 
In addition to his notion of ‘happy memory’, Ricoeur also allows for a certain kind 
of ‘happy forgetting’. By comparing the very different understanding of the neuroscientific 
and the phenomenological approaches to forgetting, he identifies two types of ‘profound’ 
forgetting: ‘forgetting through the erasing of traces’ (the neural trace) and a ‘forgetting kept 
in reserve’ (the psychical trace).
28
 Whereas neuroscience does allow for the ‘reactivating’ of 
the neural traces, it is closer to what Ricoeur calls a definitive forgetting through erasure. By 
contrast, phenomenology instead refers to the ‘persistence’ of the psychical trace or the 
original impression and carries with it the notion of reversible forgetting or ‘the reserve of 
forgetting’ (p. 416; emphasis added). From this reserve come the pleasures of recollection (p. 
417). It turns out, then, that the ‘reserve of forgetting’ is really a reserve of remembering, 
which is similar to Bergson’s idea of the enduring nature of memory images. Ricoeur 
surmises that we might learn from Kierkegaard’s extolling of forgetting as the ‘liberation of 
care’ in wishing for a ‘happy forgetting’ (p. 500). But he settles finally on the idea of a 
‘carefree memory’ which is one that both forgets and yet does not forget (p. 505). Such 
memory might thus be seen as a form of responsible remembering. 
Bergson and Freud on Aphasia and Amnesia 
Aphasia is defined within the neurosciences and psychology primarily as a 
dysfunction of language that occurs with acquired brain lesions. In what is called ‘anterior’ 
or ‘non-fluent aphasia’, the dysfunction is accompanied by errors of initiation, timing and 
syntax, phonetic sequencing and production. With ‘posterior’ or ‘fluent aphasia’ there are 
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manifest lexical-semantic and phonemic errors.
29
 Amnesia is the Greek word for 
forgetfulness and refers to a loss of memory, or an inability to recall past experiences. It can 
be ‘organic’, when caused by head trauma, for instance, or ‘psychogenic’, when resulting 
from emotional stress, hypnotic suggestion or inner conflict. Both Freud and his 
contemporary the neurophysiologist Josef Breuer contended that this form of amnesia was 
the result of a splitting of consciousness arising from psychological trauma.
30
 
As Arthur L. Benton notes, by the mid-nineteenth century the main aphasic 
syndromes of expressive aphasia (which relatively preserves the capacity to understand 
speech), ‘amnesiac aphasia’ (word-finding disturbance), jargon aphasia and jargon agraphia, 
as well as the distinction noted above between fluent and non-fluent types, had been 
identified. Impairment of speech which yet preserved the ability to sing had also been 
described.
31
 Given advances in experimental psychology, by 1861 the French physician Paul 
Broca had demonstrated that aphasia could be linked to brain lesions in particular locations.
32
 
Historically, aphasia was a word proposed by Armand Trousseau to replace the term 
‘aphemia’ first suggested by Broca. The disturbance identified by Broca later came to be 
known as ‘motor aphasia’.
33
 Benton records that in 1874 the German neurologist Carl 
Wernicke developed an advanced theory of the nature of aphasic disorders focused on 
disease and its impact on the neurological mechanisms. Crucially, for materialist – 
psychophysical – approaches to the brain, Wernicke’s model proposed the existence of 
‘inter-connected cerebral centers of speech in which memory-images of the different 
modalities of speech were stored’.
34
 It was this storage model of the brain to which Bergson 
was especially antipathetic, likening the brain to a telephone exchange which lacks the 
capacity for containing memory traces.
35
 
Bergson was familiar with the work of Freud and Charcot on amnesia and aphasia.
36
 
And Freud had already written his book On Aphasia before Bergson published Matter and 
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 What was it that made for such similar but independent thought? I would argue 
that Freud and Bergson were each reacting to the mechanistic view of mind and memory, 
derived from the emerging formal discipline of experimental psychology of the period. By 
the 1890s, the prevailing theory of aphasic disorder was neurological and related to lesions in 
specific cortical areas of the brain.
38
 While Freud, like Bergson, criticised the idea of there 
being a specific central area in the brain in which memory images are stored, he did assert 
that all types of aphasia were brought forth by interruptions in the neural connections within 
the brain. Freud also thought that the aphasic disorders resulted not from the loss of 
memory-images, as such, but from the impairment of the speech apparatus as a whole and in 
this he comes closer to Bergson’s view.
39
 
In focusing on memory as a way to distinguish between and then reconnect body and 
mind, the material and the spiritual, Bergson assessed existing clinical studies in 
experimental psychology and memory studies, especially those on aphasia.
40
 In Matter and 
Memory, he asserts that a brain lesion would have an impact on the motor schema involved 
in connecting memory-images to bodily perception, but not on the memory-images 
themselves. For Bergson, the language disorders of memory are due to a fault in the faculty 
of recognition. Such failures are not because recollections occupy an injured region of the 
brain. Rather, there are two possible explanations: that our body may not be able 
automatically to make a choice among our memories; or that the memories are unable to find 
‘a fulcrum in the body, a means of prolonging themselves in action’.
41
 Significantly, 
however, it is only actual movements which are prevented from occurring: ‘there has been 
no destruction of memories’ (p. 133). Thus in aphasia, it is the function which is diminished, 
not the recollections themselves (p. 149); and Bergson is adamant that the dynamism 
required for a memory-image to pass into perception has been inhibited (p. 162): 
Our contention […] is that no trace of an image can remain in the substance of the 
brain, and that no […] centre of apperception can exist; but that there are merely, in 
that substance, organs of virtual perception, influenced by the intention of the 
memory. (Footnote 1, p. 164) 
However, Bergson does raise the possibility in certain cases of amnesia that ‘definite groups 
of representations have disappeared from memory’ (p. 149). Such ‘disappearance’ falls into 
two types – ‘abrupt’ and ‘progressive’ (p. 150). In the first case the recollections which are 
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‘detached from memory’ may be the result of a violent shock. In these instances, the patient 
may ‘often recover the lost memories’ (p. 151). The second type is caused by ‘the faculty of 
actualizing the recollection of words’ (p. 151). But in neither case are the images to be found 
in the cells of the cortex or are memories actually destroyed (pp. 151-2; p. 153). Rather, 
these occurrences can be explained by acknowledging that for their actualisation memories 
require ‘a motor ally’, and ‘a kind of mental attitude which must itself be engrafted upon an 
attitude of the body’ for their recall (p. 152). The brain merely organises motor movements 
for the purposes of calling up past memories according to different levels of ‘psychic 
tension’ for action in the present. 
But is there room for disturbed, false or inappropriate memories in Bergson’s 
schema? Marie Cariou suggests that habit memory inhibits ‘pure memory’ from allowing 
movements which would bring about ‘inopportune reminiscences’.
42
 In her phrase the 
‘hygiene of forgetting’, Cariou describes what she terms a ‘spontaneous asceticism’ in the 
memory which ensures for Bergson’s theory in Matter and Memory, a ‘mental 
equilibrium’.
43
 In her analysis, Cariou is one of the few commentators to suggest that 
Bergson never allows for the possibility that we might call up ‘untimely reminiscences’ 
which might not serve the individual’s present interests. According to Cariou, Bergson 
presents an ‘ideal’ operation of memory rather than describing fully the ‘phenomena of 
forgetting’.
44
 Where, she asks, is Bergson’s explanation for occasions of difficult 
remembering or ‘harmful or corrupt’ memories? It may be that Bergson puts to one side 
negative memories which are not purposeful for everyday living given the pre-eminence of 
‘utility’ for his theory of memory. Where he does acknowledge that memory-images are 
anything but practical, however, is in dream: as I noted in the last chapter, the dreamer is one 
who calls up past memories even when they have little apparent immediate use in the 
present.
45
 It does seem to be the case, however, that ‘false’ or distorted memories are not 
admissible in Bergson’s theory. 
Mansfield: The Unforgettable and Self-Forgetfulness 
For Mansfield, remembering is associated with affect and with strong visual and 
synaesthetic cues such as touch, colour, light and scent. Such qualities constitute what I refer 
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to as the ‘unforgettable’ and attend intense experience and the remembering required for the 
creative act of writing. A prime example is a memory of Garsington manor and its gardens, 
recalled in a letter to Ottoline Morrell: 
You have sent me flowers and Garsington lavender & Ive never said a word – for all 
that I have loved them. The lavender is in a big sachet. It breathes of that afternoon 
when we gathered it – of the cool darkened green room where the trays were spread 
– of the aeroplane high up, glittering above the trees – that looked so lovely – I feel 
that all waits to be written – its as though something magical drew a circle about that 
afternoon holding it for ever …
46
 
An example of almost-anticipated retrospection, the experience seems to have lent itself to 
being especially memorious: living, breathing, imbued with emotion, beauty and colour. 
Memory is drawn down into the present to meet the sensory actuality of the lived moment, 
efficaciously evoked by the particularity of the Garsington lavender, both then and now 
interpenetrating. The past demands attention. And there is no more powerfully Bergsonian-
inflected statement than that the past is recalled to the present and that memory joins 
perception to participate in the living of life. 
 The textual example which demonstrates most clearly both the unforgettable as 
active remembering and as temporary forgetting is contained in a letter to her cousin 
Elizabeth in which Mansfield evokes Elizabeth’s Swiss home, the Chalet Soleil: 
[D]o you remember smelling the geraniums in the late afternoon in the hall? It 
seemed just the time and the place to smell those geraniums – I can’t even imagine 
what going back there would be like; it would be too great happiness. But I shall 
remember that day for ever. 
Oh, I’ve just remembered that you asked me about Ernestine.
47
 
The first paragraph demonstrates Bergson’s trust in the singularity of memory in its very 
specificity of time and place (‘in the late afternoon in the hall’) while the second records the 
remembering of something temporarily forgotten. A doubled temporality of remembering is 
at work here: the recall of a past experience in the present and the recall in the present of a 
more recent question in the past. 
Mansfield’s writing method, as she explained it, often in letters to Richard Murry or 
to Dorothy Brett, involves a form of ‘self-forgetfulness’. Such forgetfulness is caught up 
with Mansfield’s Bergsonian method of intuitively ‘becoming’ her characters in 
identification with them which also involves losing her own sense of self: ‘One must learn, 
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one must practise to forget oneself. I can’t tell the truth about Aunt Anne unless I am free to 
enter into her life without selfconsciousness.’
48
 The role of self-forgetting for the purposes of 
following an artistic life is encapsulated in Time and Free Will in a section in which Bergson 
identifies the role of images, and the feelings which are their ‘emotional equivalent’, in 
discussing the function of rhythm in poetry. The ‘regular movement’ of rhythm is a means of 
lulling the soul into ‘self-forgetfulness’.
49
 In self-forgetting, the self is removed from the 
process of writing, allowing the feel of writing’s rhythms to take over. Bergson and 
Mansfield happen to coincide because the importance of rhythm to Mansfield’s style is well 




Recalling Bergson’s discussion in Time and Free Will regarding the double sense of 
the self, the forgetting of the self that is required for writing and the self that Mansfield 
relinquishes is the socially functioning personal self. But the ‘fundamental’ living self is 
unfettered and unforgetful. A letter from Mansfield to Sidney Schiff puts this view: 
The artist who denies his Time, who turns away from it even as much as the fraction 
of a hair is false. First, he must be free; that is, he must be controlled by none other 
than his deepest self, his truest self. And then he must accept Life, he must submit, 
give himself so utterly to Life that no personal quâ personal self remains.
51
 
The true inner self may be a refuge from the ravages of modernity and a source of artistic 
freedom but it may also register the collapse of signifying practices when the mind is put 
under pressure. With the twin notions of efficacious memory and memory effacement (which 
nevertheless does not invalidate the ineradicable nature of memory for Bergson or 
Mansfield) in view, I now turn to reading several of Mansfield’s stories from the perspective 
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 Reading 1: Amnesia and Aphasia in ‘The Garden Party’ 
Perhaps Mansfield’s most famous and most often anthologised story, ‘The Garden 
Party’ was begun on 9
 
October 1921 and completed five days later on her thirty-third 
birthday.
52
 It follows on from ‘A Married Man’s Story’ and ‘At the Bay’ and is apparently 
based on a re-inscription of a real event in Mansfield’s personal life, as Alpers explains: 
It is founded on events that actually occurred when Mrs Beauchamp gave a garden party 
at No. 75 Tinakori Road, Wellington, in 1907 – though it wasn’t Kathleen who went 
down with the party leftovers but her sister Vera.
53
 
Ian Gordon goes further in suggesting that in ‘The Garden Party’ Mansfield ‘is expressing a 
view of life on a basis of recorded memories’.
54
 But there is nothing clear-cut here about an 
apparent personal memory source because the story, in being derived from a ‘borrowed’ 
event belonging to her sister, is arguably already distorted as a memory for Mansfield.
55
 The 
‘corruption’ is all the more evident given the contradictory critical approach to narrative 
voice in the story. 
Clare Hanson and Andrew Gurr identify ‘The Garden Party’ as a ‘straightforwardly 
sequential narrative’ with Laura as its centre of consciousness.
56
 However, Perry Meisel 
argues that Mansfield’s stories do not have a ‘privileged center of consciousness’ either of 
character or of narrator. Rather, he suggests the focus is almost always on the individual’s 
‘unconscious’.
57
 Angela Smith has come closest to a Bergsonian position in arguing that the 
distinctive ‘flexible’ and ‘polyphonic’ narrative voice in the story is Mansfield’s unique 
mode of depicting Laura’s consciousness.
58
 While taking a Bakhtinian approach, Thomas 
Day has provided a reading of the ‘textures of voices’ and of ‘voicelessness’ in the story 
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which condition its ideological tensions and power relations.
59
 In a subsequent reading, 
Angela Smith returned to the story to discuss the way in which the narrative’s ‘polyphonic 
voice’ manoeuvres the reader into experiencing both the pleasure of the party and the ‘dark 
knowledge’ of the carter’s death. With these dual aspects held in tension, she suggests that 
Mansfield provides a pivotal ‘disruptive moment’ in the story which defies fictional 
conventions.
60
 Suggestive as these critical interpretations are, my view is that it is possible to 
be more overtly Bergsonian with regard to voice and voicelessness by bringing the idea of 
consciousness (perception and memory brought to bear on action), the unconscious (pure 
memory in abeyance) and forgetting (memory temporarily lost or suspended) into 
convergence around the character of Laura.
61
 
In reading ‘The Garden Party’ with Bergson, I argue that Mansfield draws on the 
psychological concepts of amnesia and aphasia not as a means of indicating a form of 
permanent forgetting but as a way of thinking through a surface or temporary forgetting 
which comes about because the apparatus of the mind is disordered. My reading is supported 
by Mansfield’s own appraisal of the story outlined in a letter to the writer William Gerhardi 
in which she explains what she had tried to achieve: 
The diversity of life and how we try to fit in everything, Death included. That is 
bewildering for a person of Laura’s age. She feels things ought to happen differently. 
First one and then another. But life isn’t like that. We haven’t the ordering of it. 
Laura says “But all these things must not happen at once” and Life answers “Why 
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not? How are they divided from each other.” And they do all happen, it is inevitable. 
And it seems to me that there is beauty in that inevitability.
62
 
The simultaneity of life’s happenings outlined here resembles a Bergsonian heterogeneous 
multiplicity applied to consciousness in which memories and perceptions (without being 
segregated) interpenetrate, both uniting and continuing.
63
 It is this impact on her 
consciousness, I suggest, which disturbs the remembering (for Bergson, the sensori-motor) 
functions. Laura receives a surfeit of multiple and competing perceptual and sensory stimuli 
during the day of the garden party and her memory apparatus is unable to deal with such 
heterogeneity all at once. In the face of various ‘shocks’ a temporary forgetting comes into 
play. Memories are not lost; they are merely temporarily mislaid. This form of forgetting 
might also be seen, therefore, as an incipient re-remembering in that Laura is likely to be 
able to recall what she has forgotten in the future. 
I identify three key phases of forgetting in the story in terms of amnesia and aphasia: 
- Phase One: Laura’s amnesia as the result of her over-stimulated perceptual apparatus 
and sensori-motor overload in the face of new, shocking and multiple events. Laura 
oscillates between entering and withdrawing from an adult world of conventional 
time, memory and discourse and is at the threshold of deriving her own meaning 
from unforeseen life events; 
- Phase Two: Laura’s forgetting of the death of the carter; her recalling the death; her 
being reminded to remember his death; and her later encounter with the man who is 
dead and therefore in an absolute state of forgetting; 
- Phase Three: Laura’s aphasia, following the profound (and marvellous) shock of 
viewing the dead carter and in being unable to utter the words which express either 
what life (or death) might mean. 
PHASE ONE 
A garden party might reasonably be thought to be a memorable occasion for an 
adolescent girl; and at the beginning of the story there is a sense of the features which will 
enable the day to being apparently happily memorious: the perfect weather (‘And after all 
the weather was ideal’)
 64
; the garden in bloom; a marquee being put up in the garden; a band 
expected; the arrival of flowers and food to a house which is ‘alive with soft, quick steps and 
                                                 
62
 CLKM, 5, 11
 
March 1922, p. 101. 
63
 See Guerlac, p. 119. 
64
 The text of the ‘The Garden Party’ used here is published in CWKM2, pp. 401-14 (p. 401). Further 
references to the story are given in brackets in the text. 
150 
 
running voices’ (p. 404). The narrative establishes a sense of abundance, of fructifying 
plenty, of the bustle of preparation and of anticipation, and particularly of Laura’s movement 
through the open and intimate spaces of her known world: ‘Away she skimmed, over the 
lawn, up the path, up the steps, across the veranda, and into the porch’ (p. 403). Yet the 
reader is also subtly led to believe that while the party is probably an annual one, there is a 
hint of something different: ‘this year’ Mrs Sheridan is ‘determined’ to leave the party 
arrangements to the children. The idea that there might be something to forget during the 
course of the day is prefigured in ironic tones from the outset by Mrs Sheridan’s first 
utterance in the story: ‘“Forget I am your mother. Treat me as an honoured guest”’ (p. 401). 
It is against the powerful force of Mrs Sheridan’s unforgettable voice, and the requirement to 
‘honour’ that maternal voice, that Laura must struggle – and fail – to find her own. 
Into this scene comes Laura who despite, or perhaps because of, her ‘artistic’ 
temperament is plunged into confusion in her encounter with the workmen putting up the 
marquee. In attempting to make ‘small talk’ with them, it is as though Laura hasn’t the 
memory experience of the right speech codes to draw on which would enable her to act 
appropriately in her unexpected encounter with a different social group. Hanson and Gurr 
argue that Laura has an affinity with the workmen (and later with the dead carter and her 
brother) which suggests that her world is beginning to extend beyond the narrowly feminine 
confines of family and garden.
65
 But any affinity, I would suggest, is superficial. That Laura 
is socially inexperienced is suggested by her blushing in front of the workmen, her attempt to 
mimic her mother’s voice, and her stammering: ‘“Oh – er – have you come – is it about the 
marquee?”’ (p. 402).
66
 Furthermore, Laura’s stammering ‘like a little girl’ (p. 402) suggests 
she is in an aphasic and liminal condition between that of regressive child, curious 
adolescent and incipient adult in which her memory states are in collision. Laura stammers 
again when she cannot complete her own internal thought: ‘The friendliness of it, the – the –’ 
(p. 403). This second stammering instance implies that Laura doesn’t yet have an efficacious 
habit memory of the words and tone of voice with which to convey feeling offended by the 
injustice of class distinctions. Her vocal vulnerability is also indicated by her somatic 
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response to the party: she can but ‘gasp’, rather than eloquently express, her love of parties 
(p. 403). 
While stammering is the first instantiation of Laura’s aphasia, the first occurrence of 
her amnesia is, if thinking in Bergsonian terms, when a mild shock inhibits her sensori-motor 
reactions: one of the workmen picks and smells a piece of lavender which surprises Laura 
and, distracted by the unexpectedness of the workman’s sensitivity, she temporarily forgets 
the slightly vexing inconvenience that the karaka trees in the garden will be obscured during 
the party by the marquee: ‘When Laura saw the gesture she forgot all about the karakas in 
her wonder at him caring for things like that’ (p. 403). Out of Laura’s forgetting emerges her 
proto-conscience as she strains towards taking right action in the world. While there is no 
moral dimension to Bergson’s idea in the text that memory is required for action, I think 
Mansfield promotes the idea that forgetting distracts not just from acting in the world, but 
from acting well. 
PHASE TWO 
That there is a proleptic hint of something untoward about to happen in Laura’s 
world is established with small textual clues: the day is perfect except for the fact that the 
blue sky is ‘veiled with a haze of light gold’ (p. 401), the word ‘veiled’ hinting at 
obfuscation, concealment and perhaps Laura’s cloistered social life. While things in the 
house and garden are being moved and are sounding, even clamouring, with a sense of being 
alive, objects are also being re-arranged, such as the furniture, which hints at spatial 
displacement (p. 404). To add to the subtle sense of foreboding, the song the Sheridan girls 
rehearse before the party contains rather mournful lyrics: 
This Life is Wee-ary, 
Hope comes to Die. 
A Dream – a Wa-kening. (p. 405) 
Here Mansfield sounds a note of temporal change through decay but also through the use of 
the ambivalent word, ‘a Wa-kening’, which in its accentuated syllables could imply 
becoming ‘awake’ to circumstances but might also signal ‘a wake’, as in ‘keening’ for the 
dead. Changefulness for Bergson is the very basis of life; ‘awakening’ conjugates the two 
ideas that we are compelled to awaken from the dream of permanence into the knowledge of 
our mutability which is the leitmotif of the story. The fact of continual change is expressed 
by the interruptions, before the party, to the Sheridan world: the men putting up the marquee, 
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the telephone ringing, the delivery of the lilies, the confusion over the fifteen types of 
sandwiches that the cook has made, and Godber’s delivering the cream puffs (p. 405). 
Yet as these changes occur, the narrative also introduces the reassuring and cohesive 
dimension of memory: Mrs Sheridan remembers ‘vividly’ ordering cream-cheese and lemon-
curd sandwiches, while for Laura cream puffs evoke familiarity (‘“Don’t they carry one back 
to all one’s parties?”’(p. 406). These small stabilising adjustments come just before the 
undermining shadow falls over the party preparations. It is signalled by the impeded 
movements of the hired working staff: ‘the back door was blocked by cook, Sadie, Godber’s 
man and Hans’ (p. 407). The schism between the upper middle class and working class is 
encapsulated in this phrase, the back door being the point of entry and exit for the servants. 
Laura’s shocked reaction to the death of the carter, Scott, who has been killed as his horse 
shied at a traction-engine, is her single exclamatory ‘“Dead!”’ (p. 407) Is Laura surprised at 
the sudden cutting short of life? Or is she afraid? Or is this the end of Laura’s naivety about 
the way in which her social world functions as she alone expects the party, consequently, to 
be postponed? What the narrative seems to be telling the reader is that a single word can 
convey all of these meanings as well as indicate that Laura is unable to say anything more in 
her aphasic state. 
Laura’s suggestion to cancel the party is regarded as ‘extravagant’ and ‘absurd’ by her 
mother and sisters, thereby establishing their ethical difference and distance from her. 
Laura’s ethical gesture is based on momentarily recalling that working men are not just 
‘extraordinarily nice’ but caring in a way that she finds lacking in men of her own class (p. 
403). At the same time, the fact that Laura is ‘breathless’ and ‘half-choking’ as she imparts 
the news of the real tragedy to her mother (which follows so quickly on the heels of the 
‘drama’ of party-making) suggests that strong emotion can lead to forgetting how to speak 
and what to say. Thereafter in the conversation with her mother Laura makes repeated but 
thwarted attempts to make her own voice heard. 
Far from letting herself be ‘forgotten’, Mrs Sheridan reclaims the party-arranging and in 
the midst of the crisis also orchestrates the recuperation of Laura’s adolescent bourgeois 
identity by deploying the social status symbols of a hat and a hand-mirror. In placing on 
Laura her own new black hat, Mrs Sheridan attempts to recall Laura to her proper place of 
femininity, charm, domesticity and upper-middle-class customs. In this way Mrs Sheridan 
seems to be trying to substitute Laura’s recently forged personal memories with those of 
hegemonic family and class-based memories. That is, a black-hatted Laura is required to 
remember and act differently in the world from a hat-less Laura following the death of the 
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carter. In Bergsonian terms, Laura will remember being in mourning under the shocking sign 
of the black hat.
67
 While Laura cannot initially bring herself to look at herself in Mrs 
Sheridan’s hand-mirror and she is therefore only partially recuperated to her mother’s 
version of the world (or only semi-resistant) at this point, shortly after, when inadvertently 
seeing herself in the mirror in her own room, Laura is reclaimed by the social co-ordinates of 
her class identity. 
A psychoanalytic reading of this scene is possible as well: Laura is returned to the 
Lacanian mirror stage and there (mis)recognises herself after having been encouraged by her 
mother, her primary care-giver, to admire herself: ‘My child! […], the hat is yours. It’s made 
for you. It’s much too young for me. I have never seen you look such a picture’ (p. 409). Mrs 
Sheridan’s comments fit with two aspects of Lacan’s thinking: that the ego is seduced by 
others’ expectations, wishes and dreams into thinking itself as an authentic ‘me’; and that the 
state to which Laura is recalled precedes the Imaginary in the form of the Symbolic register 
of Sheridan language and party sociability. With a few well-chosen words, Mrs Sheridan 
emphasises Laura’s youth (the hat is ‘much too young’ for Mrs Sheridan), her beauty and the 
importance of Laura looking at herself. In finally doing so, Laura is surprised by the 
aesthetic effect: ‘Never had she imagined she could look like that’ (p. 409). In my reading, 
however, it is at this juncture that the principal struggle between remembering and forgetting 
is played out in Laura’s mind. In remembering the plight of the carter’s family, briefly, 
conscience prevails: ‘Just for a moment she had another glimpse of that poor woman and 
those little children, and the body being carried into the house’ (p. 409). But this projected 
image, this imaginary ‘picture’ seems to Laura ‘blurred’ and ‘unreal’, perhaps because it is 
not a memory of something she has actually experienced as such; the memory is a recalling 
of what she has heard has happened to the carter and she has extrapolated a memory-image 
from that. 
Laura’s strategy at this point is to determine, with her inner voice of emerging social 
conscience, to postpone remembering until after the party: ‘I’ll remember it again after the 
party’s over, she decided’ (p. 409). But life again intervenes and, having forgotten the 
tragedy, Laura momentarily remembers it at the sight of her brother arriving home to change 
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for the party: ‘At the sight of him Laura remembered the accident again’ (p. 409). Her 
attempt to assuage her soul-searching in seeking Laurie’s opinion on the subject of 
cancelling the party is undermined, however, when Laurie reinforces his mother’s view of 
Laura’s external appearance: ‘“My word, Laura! You do look stunning,” said Laurie. “What 
an absolutely topping hat!”’ (p. 410). Being once again recalled to the Sheridan world, Laura 
forgets about the carter. This time of forgetting is condensed into a few brief sentences, 
several of which also mark the time of the party having taken place: 
And the perfect afternoon slowly ripened, slowly faded, slowly its petals closed. 
‘Never a more delightful garden party….’ ‘The greatest success….’ ‘Quite the 
most….’ (p. 410) 
The reader, it seems, is never quite invited to the party, almost as though it occurs off-stage 
as in a drama; and the reader would be forgiven for forgetting the party qua party. The story 
is preoccupied rather more with anticipating and, to a lesser extent, recollecting the day. 
Laura’s condition of forgetting is only brought to an end by her father who, de trop, reopens 
the subject of the accident. Laura is thus recalled a third time to the recent past by her father 
(having been earlier in the narrative recalled to present Sheridan realities both by her mother 
and her brother). 
Şebnem Kaya argues that in instructing Laura to take some left-over party food to 
the carter’s widow, Mrs Sheridan makes a crucial mistake in dealing with her daughter. Mrs 
Sheridan has gone to some lengths to erase the accident from Laura’s mind in the hat scene, 
but now reinforces it, suggests Kaya, rather than letting the event fade, ‘just when Laura 
started to enjoy forgetfulness after a painful transition period of obfuscation’.
68
 There are two 
points to be made in response to Kaya’s comments here: first, Mr Sheridan has already 
triggered the memory of the inconvenient (for Laura, awful) event in mentioning it after the 
party; and, second, the narrative time of the story has shifted to its post-party aftermath. The 
material remains of the party, that is, the leftovers, contrast with the mortal remains of the 
dead carter and there is an unexpected moment of further exposure to class difference for 
Laura. Laura, who initially cannot understand why she should be asked to deliver ‘scraps’ 
from the party, and who feels her difference from other family members, still acts in 
deference to her mother. Laura is consumed by the thought of the party’s reverberations to 
such an extent that she again forgets the death of the carter: ‘And it seemed to her that kisses, 
voices, tinkling spoons, laughter […] were somehow inside her. She had no room for 
anything else’ (p. 411). 
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In his reading of the story, Don W. Kleine makes a pertinent point when he suggests 
that while Laura says she will remember the dead workman after the party is over, she has 
learned too much to permanently forget the carter’s widow.
69
 In Bergsonian terms, Laura is 
in a state of temporary forgetting, absorbed as she is by the party – ‘“Yes, it was the most 
successful party”’ (p. 411) – until she is prompted to remember. Cherry Hankin argues that 
Laura ‘decides to forget’ the suffering inflicted by the carter’s death which suggests a 
cynical reading of her emerging sense of conscience.
70
 Hankin also observes that what Laura 
forgets is the different social standing of her family and that of the carter.
71
 But I challenge 
Hankin’s view about the forgetting of class distinctions. In ‘going down’ the hill from the 
grand house of the Sheridans to the shaded little cottage in the hollow, Laura is evoked 
descending not just to an ‘underworld’ of death and shadows but to the realms of a ‘lower’ 
class of which she is acutely aware due to her attire: ‘How her frock shone! And the big hat 
with the velvet streamer – if only it was another hat!’ (p. 411). The black hat which 
‘becomes’ her; that is, which defines and suits her, is reiterated for a fourth time (‘“What a 
becoming hat, child!”’, a party-goer has exclaimed, p. 410); and also functions as an absurd 
accoutrement to mourning.  
PHASE THREE 
There are, I suggest, two aphasic events which are brought into conjunction around 
Laura’s excursion to take the party leftovers to the dead carter’s family. The first precedes 
the viewing of the dead body. In a moment of seeming aphasia, Mrs Sheridan is unable to 
describe, forgets to describe, or withholds describing what Laura should not do once she 
arrives at the carter’s house: ‘“don’t on any account –”’ (p. 411). On any account, the reader 
is led to ask: what? The reader might try to fill in the gap with words such as ‘look at the 
dead body’, ‘touch the dead body’, ‘cry’, ‘stay too late’, ‘say something to offend’, or ‘forget 
what you see’. The first command seems most likely (and is therefore a prohibition which 
Laura ignores, or is inadvertently led to ignore by the widow’s unnamed sister) while the last 
might be an open invitation to Laura to forget. 
Much has been made of the episode in which Laura views the dead carter. Critics 
have speculated about whether this is an aestheticising or epiphanic moment, an awakening, 
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or a response associated with fantasy, dream state or fairy tale.
72
 What interests me, however, 
is the after-effect of Laura’s witnessing. Contrary to what might be expected, in viewing the 
corpse Laura finds the carter to be ‘wonderful’, ‘beautiful’, a ‘marvel’. This may be because 
he has been laid out in accordance with class custom and Laura has expected to see corporeal 
deformity, disfigurement or devastation. While the widow’s sister’s comment ‘“’e looks a 
picture”’ echoes that of Mrs Sheridan about Laura wearing the black hat, the sister’s further 
comment, ‘“There’s nothing to show”’ (p. 413), suggests that she may have had a hand in 
rendering him presentable.
73
 But Laura’s interiorised description of the carter may equally be 
an example of class-based hyperbole or inauthenticity because it is difficult to believe that he 
could look ‘wonderful’ or a ‘marvel’. The only words spoken by Laura at the dead man’s 
side are: ‘“Forgive my hat”’ (p. 413). Kleine reads this utterance as suggesting that what is 
meant is rather ‘forget my hat’ as Laura succumbs to the dream that death makes of life.
74
 In 
his reading of the story, Vincent O’Sullivan suggests that Laura’s encounter with the dead 
carter ‘is a genuine moment of fulfilment’.
75
 I take the opposite view that Laura’s disturbed, 
amnesiac mind results in her absurd statement about her hat which is compounded by her 
passing aphasia as she returns home and encounters her brother along the way. 
It is at this stage in the story that the second instance of aphasia occurs, when Laura 
encounters Laurie and he asks her whether her experience has been ‘awful’. At this crucial 
point in the text Laura is unable adequately either to recall or to speak about her attitude to 
life in the face of its complexity: 
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‘No’, sobbed Laura. ‘It was simply marvellous. But, Laurie –’ She stopped, she 
looked at her brother. ‘Isn’t life,’ she stammered, ‘isn’t life –’ But what life was she 
couldn’t explain. No matter. He quite understood. 
‘Isn’t it, darling?’ said Laurie. (p. 413) 
In his interpretation of this scene, Magalaner picks up on the implications of Mansfield’s 
letter to William Gerhardi. While Laura has largely viewed life in terms of comfortable 
generalisations before the fact of death enters her life she is unable to find a word that can 
take in all of life. For Magalaner, it doesn’t matter which word is used, whether ‘good’, 
‘bad’, ‘ugly’ or ‘beautiful’, ‘sad’ or ‘happy’: ‘What matters is that no one word suffices in a 
world that encompasses, though it may not always reconcile, all of them.’
76
 For Carole 
Froude Durix, Laura ‘has had a glimpse of the afterlife which has given her a concept of 
duration and time outside the timeless frivolities of society circles’.
77
 In her stammering to 
Laurie, Laura repeats the phrase “Isn’t life’ twice but Durix suggests she can only achieve 
‘phatic’ utterance, that is, (barely) keeping a line of communication open. Thomas Day 
claims that while the ‘floating’ narrator in the story maintains an ‘ironic’ distance, the 
narration could at any moment ‘degenerate into a mode of ventriloquism’, with the closing 
lines of the story representing Laura’s ‘inarticulate meditation on life’.
 78
 But I am most 
sympathetic to Saralyn Daly’s argument that Mansfield’s strategy at this point is to leave the 
reader ‘to intuit the unspeakable in Laura’s inarticulate response’.
79
 There are at least two 
possible outcomes as I see it: either Laurie then plays his part in echoing, empathically and 
emphatically, Laura’s aphasia; or Laura’s stammering stymies Laurie’s own confirmatory 
response. Either way, life, in this encounter, is figured as an ineffable mystery. 
Reading with Bergson, the explanation of Laura’s condition is that Laura’s sensori-
motor mechanisms have temporarily failed to find image-memories which enable her to 
respond to and recount in the present not just the encounter with the dead carter but the 
multiplicity of her confused and contradictory day. Laura’s amnesia and aphasia might 
suggest that she lacks historical self-understanding in the sense of not being able to benefit 
from memories from her past. Her forgetful yet awakening state might also suggest that she 
is struggling to resist becoming fully ‘conventional’. That is, for Laura it may be better to 
say nothing rather than to speak from a hegemonic class position, to be co-opted into 
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dominant social dialect norms and speech patterns, or to attempt to inculcate the mores of 
death and mourning rituals. 
Reading 2: Agraphia in ‘By Moonlight’ 
 I turn now to a story fragment, ‘By Moonlight’, not only because it contains the 
germ of the text of ‘The Garden Party’ and is, as such, an ‘ur’ text, but because I think it 
sheds light on another type of aphasia: Mansfield’s ‘agraphia’.
80
 As one of the aphasic 
disorders outlined by William James, agraphia is a term given to those who have ‘lost the 
power to write’ and who ‘cannot use the pen’.
81
 In a passage in which Mansfield breaks off 
the manuscript of ‘By Moonlight’, she provides a meta-commentary on the story: 
This isn’t bad, but at the same time it’s not good 
[…] 
I am stuck beyond words – and again it seems to me that what I am doing has no 
form! I ought to finish my book of stories first and then when it’s gone get down to 
my novel Karori. 
Why I should be so passionately determined to disguise this I don’t quite know. But 
here I lie pretending, as heaven knows how often I have done before, to write. 
Supposing I were to give up the pretence and really try? (pp. 400-1)
82
 
During the period in which the story fragment was written, Mansfield was staying in 
Switzerland, initially in Sierre and later in Montana; and she admits in a letter to Brett on 4
 
June 1921 that she is hurrying in case her illness catches up with her: ‘Im working against 
time’.
83
 There are several stories which Mansfield begins at this time, including ‘Such a 
Sweet Old Lady’, but which remain unfinished and are published posthumously in The 
Dove’s Nest and Other Stories. In late July she writes to Ottoline Morrell that while she has 
completed her commissioned stories for The Sphere, ‘It is always the next story which is 
going to contain everything, and that next story is always just out of reach.’
84
 The day after 
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she comments on her struggle to write, even though she is at her desk working every 
morning until lunchtime and from teatime until supper: 
Oh, Heavens – how difficult Art is. Its the perpetual work at technique which is so 
hard. Its not enough to know what you want to say – but to be able to say it – to be 
equipped to say it!
85
 
In August she records that she does not know how she will write her next story.
86
 At the 
same time, during August 1921, Mansfield has been working on ‘At the Bay’, as she tells 
Brett in several letters, and at the end of the same notebook for 30 August, she makes a list 
of twenty-five stories, most of which, in fact, she completed.
87
 But by November of that 
year, she is in despair again: 
Yes, for the last two weeks I have written scarcely anything. I have been idle; I have 
failed. Why? Many reasons. There has been a kind of confusion in my 
consciousness. It has seemed as though there was no time to write. […] I haven’t felt 
able to yield to the kind of contemplation that is necessary. […] Out of hand? Yes, 
that describes it – dissipated, vague, not positive, […] – wasting time.
88
 
Perhaps more than any other of Mansfield’s statements about her inability to write, this one 
points to the pressures of time, a failure of memory and an impoverished ability to submit to 
story-making. Mansfield’s comment that she feels ‘out of hand’ is suggestive of the loss of 
the power to write, even to ‘handle’ a pen, and of the shadow upon her, not of the past, but of 
what will remain ‘unwritten’ in the future. 
‘By Moonlight’ describes the accoutrements of beauty, upper-middle-class luxury 
and domesticity. There is affection and music, brightness and cheer. Yet there is also a sense 
of something vaguely sinister or uncanny inhabiting the text as well as a sense of the 
narrator’s distance: the ‘ghostly’ chatter from the kitchen sounds ‘far away’ and Mansfield’s 
narrator only gradually takes up Laura’s point of view. While the brother Laurie is in his 
‘dark-room’, Laura is hiding on a landing window-sill and is puzzling over her life: ‘What 
was she to do?’ (p. 399). The oscillating description between brightly lit rooms and dark 
passages, openness and secrecy, and exterior and interior spaces, such as cupboards which 
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are imposing, empty and strange, suggests a sense of Mansfield’s own ambivalence about 
her writing at this late stage in her life. 
In this story fragment, Laura is ‘waiting for someone’, as Mansfield, perhaps, waits 
for inspiration followed by periods of imaginative fluency. As the text dwindles to its lack of 
an ending, Laura ‘forgets’ her resolve not to disturb her brother; she can no longer be alone 
with her fearful, doubting thoughts and heads towards Laurie’s dark-room. Despite her 
anticipated pleasure at encountering her brother, the dark-room may be a covert textual clue 
for Mansfield’s own anticipation of being silenced; it may also represent the sense that a 
surfeit of memories obliterates the capacity of language to articulate them; and that a lack of 
memories (the mind becoming dark) can stultify creativity. In the last paragraph it is Laura 
who approaches an interior space of darkness but it is Laurie who is doing the ‘creative’ 
work in his ‘dark-room’ (p. 400). 
Although parts of ‘By Moonlight’ find their way into ‘The Garden Party’, what 
might be termed ‘the inarticulacy of incompletion’ of the story could be seen as a form of 
stammering. There happens to be an intriguing, and belated, connection to Bergson, writing, 
agraphia and stammering. In The Two Sources of Morality and Religion (translated into 
English in 1935), Bergson outlined the risks of carrying too far an immersion in ‘a unique 
emotion, an impulse, an impetus received from the very depths of things’ because too much 
novelty might result in a failure to communicate.
89
 This immersive ‘style’ was subsequently 
called by Gilles Deleuze the ‘stammering’ of language, and given as an instance of ‘Being 
like a foreigner in one’s own language’.
90
 The paradox in Mansfield’s case, however, is that 
her agraphia and her hesitation occurred during the most productive period of her writing 
life, and as her life was drawing to an end, towards oblivion and permanent forgetting. 
Reading 3: Oblivion 
There exists a rather strange story fragment, ‘It fell so softly, so gently’, the writing 
of which John Middleton Murry dates to 1921 and which is therefore coterminous with the 
writing of ‘The Garden Party’. The story was not published in Mansfield’s lifetime and 
consists of two brief paragraphs, but it is suggestive for my purposes because it invokes a 
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type of oblivion related to memory and forgetting.
91
 In this fragment the falling snow adopts 
the position of the narrator, advising the un-named ‘him’ of the story to forget: 
‘Forget! Forget! All is blotted out, all is hidden – long ago,’ said the snow. ‘Nothing 
can ever bring it back – nothing can ever torture you again. There is no trace left. All 
is as if it never had been.’ (p. 435) 
The ‘blotting out’ may invoke Mansfield’s agraphia, with the snow’s effacing return to 
whiteness or the blankness of the page. There may also be distant echoes of Joyce’s short 
story ‘The Dead’ in as much as it snows, obliteratingly, in both stories. In Mansfield’s story, 
footsteps are covered over, effectively blotted out, and an unidentified ‘she’ is lost and the 
‘he’ of the story gains his freedom. 
In this narrative fragment, the clock evidently frightens the snow, indicating that the 
clock is possibly expressing timely antagonism in choosing the very word at which to strike: 
At that moment, upon that word [i.e. free] a clock struck one loud single stroke. It 
was so loud, so mournful, so like a despairing groan that the feathery snowflakes 
seemed to shiver, to hesitate an instant, to fall again faster than ever as though 
something had frightened them – – – (p. 436). 
The antinomies between the clock and the snow might seem perfectly Bergsonian 
(representing clock time and the real time of duration), if they can be seen as being 
antipathetic. In these two enigmatic paragraphs, the reader does not know whether freedom 
is from time’s ravages, or from another human being. But if clock time wins out over the 
subtleties of temporal flow (snow), and consciousness and memory are confined to 
nothingness, Mansfield may have been signalling that she was not yet ready to encounter the 
release from temporality that might come with death’s oblivion. 
Reading 4: Amnesia and Aphasia in ‘The Daughters of the Late Colonel’ 
‘The Daughters of the Late Colonel’, as Alpers notes, was begun at the Villa Isola 
Bella in Menton in the South of France in late November 1920 and finished on 13 December 
that year. It was published in the London Mercury in May 1921 and included in Mansfield’s 
short story collection The Garden Party in 1922.
92
 It was one of the few stories that 
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Mansfield felt was successful.
93
 She makes a revealing comment in a letter to John 
Middleton Murry in November 1920 about the form of the story: ‘Its form is the form of The 
Prelude BUT written today – not then.’
94
 And in January 1921 Mansfield wrote to Richard 
Murry more explicitly about the method she had used: ‘Its the outcome of the Prelude 
method – it just unfolds and opens. But I hope its an advance on Prelude. In fact I know its 
that because the technique is stronger.’
95
 ‘Daughters’ has been approached in terms of time 
and narrative form in extremely insightful and probing ways by several critics.
96
 Angela 
Smith has observed that the numbered sections have a direct function in the story in that they 
represent the ‘structural rhythms of order and temporality’ which are counterpoised by ‘the 
durational wavering of the sisters’ consciousness’ which provides a Bergsonian 
interpretation of time in the story.
97
 Narrative structure can thus be seen to work against the 
temporal shifts in the characters’ consciousness in an overt dualism. Don W. Kleine, by 
contrast, suggests the story is ‘most hospitable’ to the phenomenological perspectives of time 
and space in narrative fiction advanced by Henri Poulet and Gaston Bachelard.
98
 The 
deployment of the narrative strategies of flashback, dream image and interior monologue 
creates the seeming impossibility of a narrative ‘“becoming”’.
99
 My reading, while alert to 
the temporal dimension of the story, concentrates primarily on amnesia at the thematic level 
and on aphasia at the narrative level. 
The daughters of the Colonel, Constantia (Con) and Josephine (Jug), look back at the 
longer past following their father’s recent death of the week before. It is their absent-
mindedness, such as their inability to make up their minds about simple domestic issues, and 
their forgetfulness, which characterise their mental state, rather than a sense of grief or 
mourning. Constantia’s mind is characterised as being vague, while Josephine’s 
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consciousness tends to fly off at tangents.
100
 One aspect of what I regard as their amnesiac 
condition is the abandonment of measured time, as in this instance: ‘Constantia was still 
gazing at the clock. She couldn’t make up her mind if it was fast or slow. It was one or the 
other, she felt almost certain of that. At any rate, it had been’ (p. 276). This mental dithering 
is combined with a tendency of both women to repeat their memories of stultifying 
sameness, without, that is, the accretion of new memories associated with Bergson’s theory 
of memory: ‘Constantia looked for a moment as though she might begin going over all the 
other times’ (X, p. 278). This stasis traps the daughters in their gendered obedience and self-
abnegation. Regarded in Bergsonian terms, a tendency to repeat suggests an adherence to a 
fixed idea of the past and of habit memory and may signal the daughters’ perplexity at being 
‘released’ into a present from a past in which the paterfamilias has presided over them; they 
have been left stranded without the memories required for action in the present which leads 
to a failure of futurity. Subject even in his absence to their father’s continuing tyranny, the 
daughters are prevented from living in the continuous time of their duration.
101
 
The daughters’ forgetting is ‘a kind of symbolic death’ depicted by the obscuring of 
the sun for Josephine, as Pamela Dunbar notes.
102
 When Constantia remembers lying in the 
light of a full moon secluded indoors, she had felt compelled to stretch herself out in 
sacrifice, as though ‘crucified’ (p. 282). Angela Smith suggests that these moments, in which 
Constantia stands before the Buddha and recalls her wonder, her longing, and her submission 
to the moon, express Bergson’s élan vital. When Constantia is ‘on the verge of acting freely 
and recovering possession of herself at the moment when she loses her awareness of clock 
time’ she ‘acknowledges the durational flow that she has always repressed’.
103
 According to 
Smith, Constantia is ‘on the edge of rebarbarising herself’ but it is ‘habitual self-denial’ 
which prevents this from happening (p. 119). I would add to this perceptive view that 
between the thieving sun, with its hints of the poetry of John Donne, and the crucifying 
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moon, the daughters’ natural world erodes. Just like their dead mother’s fading photograph, 
the daughters’ lives are bleached of colour and light. 
Where Smith finds positive renderings of Bergsonian duration in the story, I read 
these more negatively. For instance, Smith argues that Josephine’s musing about sending 
their father’s watch to their brother Benny in a corset-box is a transgressive image in which 
feminine duration comically subverts masculine temporality by means of a concealed aspect 
of women’s bodies (p. 118). I read the conversation about whether or not to despatch the 
watch as indicating, rather, that the daughters are on the margins of clock time which is the 
time of history, empire, chronology and ‘progress’, while their individual sense of durational 
time is occluded. They are therefore not only ‘outside’ time, but the rapid temporal shifts of 
the narrative back and forth between past and present suggest an anxiety about time with the 
‘stopped’ watch signifying the ‘winding down’ of time to what becomes the ‘now’ of their 
forgetting. 
The times when Constantia and Josephine do remember are signalled by colour for 
Smith, indicating that a change is about to happen and that the sisters ‘dare to bring memory 
into the durational present’ (p. 118, emphasis added). While I agree that there are textual 
hints about memory-led anticipation, such thoughts are abandoned. An example is at the 
beginning of scene XII in which Constantia and Josephine are prompted to imagine that they 
no longer have to silence the barrel-organ in the street outside in order to placate their father 
because he is no longer alive. The sound of the barrel-organ evokes an explicit memory that 
a week has passed since their father’s death. But that Josephine finds this knowledge 
disturbing (rather than liberating) is symbolised both by her strange, faint smile and the 
square of sunlight which is ‘pale red’ and then ‘almost golden’. The word ‘almost’ is telling, 
as is the preceding description of the mote of sun which ‘came and went and came’ (p. 280). 
Josephine’s insight is not only fleeting but elusive and ungraspable; and the daughters’ 
memories flicker back and forth between remembering and forgetting in amnesiac distortion. 
This scene leads up to the end of the story when the daughters’ memories and their lives are 
effectively brought to an abrupt end, foreclosing the possibility for the reader of imagining 
narrative continuity for the characters. 
 At the narrative level, the end of the story enacts what might be regarded as a 
stylistic amnesia, particularly in its use of punctuation. I quote in full the passage which 
presents Constantia’s attempts to say something meaningful ‘about the future and what….’ 
(p. 282) The missing words may be ‘comes next’ or ‘we are to do’, either of which would 
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anticipate a future. This trailing away of language is also a marker of aphasia in as much as 
the dialogue fails due to the sisters’ conjoint inability to remember what they want to say: 
‘Don’t you think perhaps –’ she began. 
But Josephine interrupted her. ‘I was wondering if now –’ she murmured. They 
stopped; they waited for each other. 
‘Go on, Con,’ said Josephine. 
‘No, no, Jug; after you,’ said Constantia. 
‘No, say what you were going to say. You began,’ said Josephine. 
‘I … I’d rather hear what you were going to say first,’ said Constantia. 




A pause. Then Constantia said faintly, ‘I can’t say what I was going to say, Jug, 
because I’ve forgotten what it was … that I was going to say.’ 
Josephine was silent for a moment. She stared at a big cloud where the sun had been. 
The she replied shortly, ‘I’ve forgotten too.’ (XII, p. 282) 
Aside from the comic absurdity of the exchange and the Beckett-like sense of the ruin of 
language as well as the Bergsonian sense of the rueing of language, there is pathos in this 
entropic running down, and out, of things to say. The two women are unable to remember 
the words to express themselves but they support each other in their inarticulacy and 
forgetfulness. The pauses, the silences, the hesitations and the interruptions, the tentative 
advances, retreats and the denials are realised, paradoxically of course, in language but in 
small negative words such as the repeated ‘no’, ‘don’t’ and ‘can’t’, while the dashes, ellipses 
and the exclamation marks denote that time (the sun going down on them) has run out for the 
daughters, and memory has been eroded. Not only do speech and memory run out, the 
sudden and decisive end of the story reminds the reader that writing has been discontinued; 
perhaps the most potent image for this being the extraordinary description of the note left 
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 William Gerhardi, as Vincent O’Sullivan notes, wrote in positive terms to Mansfield 
about the story, saying ‘I think it is, and in particular the last long paragraph towards the end, 
of quite amazing beauty’; while about the story as a whole, he wrote: ‘I don’t remember ever 
reading anything so intolerably real – stifling – since “The Three Sisters”.’
105
 While Gerhardi 
celebrates the quality of the writing as well as the way in which the scene is deftly handled in 
delivering a lack of consolation to the reader, he accentuates the story’s oppressiveness. 
Mansfield claimed she also saw beauty in the daughters’ lives. Yet any beauty seems 
tempered by the sense of their moribund existence. Mansfield was clear about the deliberate 
conclusion to the story, one of tentative hopes dashed, of time in decline, of the future 
denied: 
All was meant, of course, to lead up to that last paragraph, when my two flowerless 
ones turned with that timid gesture, to the sun. ‘Perhaps now.’ And after that, it 
seemed to me, they died as truly as Father was dead.
106
 
Mansfield’s comment may also allude to Thomas Hardy’s apparently favourable reaction to 
the story, having read it in the London Mercury, and which he conveyed either in a note 
given personally to John Middleton Murry at Hardy’s home, Max Gate, or in a letter from 
Hardy’s wife, now lost.
107
 Mansfield regarded Hardy’s reaction as evidence of his having 
mis-read the story, as she explained to Dorothy Brett in a letter of 11
 
November 1921: ‘Even 
dear old Hardy told me to write more about those sisters. As if there was any more to say!’
108
 
Mansfield had finished with the daughters, perhaps even to the extent of wanting to forget 
them. Certainly the aphasia (Con’s inability to speak) and amnesia (she has forgotten what 
she was going to say) at the end of the story do seem to take the reader beyond Bergson’s 
notion of recoverable forgetting. Mansfield, I suggest, supervenes on Bergson’s theory of 
memory in this story both in de-mobilising the sisters’ processes of remembering and in 
demoting their memories to the realms of the forgettable. 
 In the light of writing ‘Daughters’, Mansfield’s understanding about the mind 
seemed to change. In a letter to Richard Murry a month after having written the story, she 
speculated about ‘a whole mind – with absolutely nothing left out’.
109
 The context for her 
comments is that she had expressed regret for the way in which prose was being written by 
her contemporaries who, she feared, were ‘still cutting up sections rather than tackling the 
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whole of a mind’.
110
 Her concerns may also prefigure ‘A Married Man’s Story’ which she 
worked on in August of 1921, which represents a mind that cannot stop remembering (‘with 
[…] nothing left out’), but that remembers horribly and unreliably. 
Reading 5: Hyper-Reminiscence in Je ne parle pas français and ‘A Married 
Man’s Story’ 
In this last reading, I offer a brief analysis of the much earlier Je ne parle pas 
français and the later ‘A Married Man’s Story’ using a type of unforgetting which I 
speculatively term ‘hyper-reminiscence’. I therefore supplement Bergson’s ideas in Matter 
and Memory which, according to Gunter, are focused on an ‘all-preserving human 
reminiscence’.
111
 The inability to forget also invokes Freud and I will not overlook a possible 
Freudian interpretation. In both stories, the past seems a burden for the characters which is 
more characteristically Freudian. The idea of ‘hyper-reminiscence’ is also an inversion of 
Ricoeur’s idea of ‘happy memory’, in that the memories involved are dismal and degrading. 
Hyper-reminiscence in my characterisation has a ‘pathological’ element to it. While, 
as noted, Bergson has little to say about the inadvertent (or indeed, the culpable) distortions 
or manipulations of memory, in Matter and Memory he does allow for memories which may 
become detached in cases where there is a ‘violent emotion’. In such cases, the individual 
may be cut off from his or her history.
112
 This type of ‘detached’ memory seems to share 
elements of Freud’s idea of the repression of memory-traces. Bergson also asserts that 
memories we believe to have been abolished may resurface and we may ‘live over again […] 
forgotten scenes of childhood’.
113
 In Bergson’s schema, however, such memories are not 
distorted. If for Bergson any memory is pristine and persistent, it is also new each time it is 
remembered, in as much as it is accompanied by all previous memories. Thus a memory of 
childhood remembered a month ago is the same memory yet different from that memory 
remembered a week ago in that other memories have, in the meantime, accumulated. 
Je ne parle pas français was written in Bandol in France in January and early 
February 1918. It was dated 1919, but was published in early 1920 by John Middleton 
Murry’s Heron Press.
114
 In this story the cynical first-person male narrator’s hyper-
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reminiscence involves distortion and a sense of cynical yet wounded memory. While Raoul 
Duquette asserts that he rejects his past, he is clearly disturbed by it, and, in particular, by the 
memory of a childhood sexual trauma. The story, as Kate Fullbrook has observed, concerns 
‘the pressure of the past on the present’ and is ‘deeply concerned with regret’.
115
 Another 
way of looking at Duquette’s first-person account is that he falsifies his past by recalling his 
earlier memories, which may be ‘false’ memories. When Duquette wavers between retelling 
apparent truths and apparent falsehoods, this ambivalence produces a heightened sense of the 
fallibility and distancing of the narrator.
116
 As a writer Duquette’s autobiographical past is 
also subject to a present fictionalising process; what Cherry Hankin calls his ‘narcissistic 
confession’.
117
 Given the irony with which he approaches his own fictional writings, the 
authenticity of his memories as a first-person narrator of his own life must be put in doubt. 
All the signs of an unresolved Freudian psycho-drama are in place in this story. 
There is Duquette’s obsessive repetition in returning to the café where he has apparently 
humiliated others: ‘I enjoyed one of these moments the first time I ever came in here. That’s 
why I keep coming back, I suppose.’
118
 The repetitious behaviour, however, lacks the 
‘working through’ undertaken in psychoanalysis and places the reader in the uncomfortable 
position of ‘listening’ to Duquette’s confessions. Duquette’s distorted narcissism is 
exemplified in his inability to really see himself for who he is when he looks in a mirror (p. 
114). Psychoanalysis is invoked in his boastful claim about his ‘subconscious’ mind: ‘I am 
going to write about things that have never been touched before. I am going to make a name 
for myself as a writer about the submerged world’ (p. 117). Yet these Freudian elements 
collide with more Bergsonian ones, for example, when Duquette reveals that he is aware that 
he can never recapture an experience exactly: ‘you never do recover the same thing that you 
lose’ (p. 115) evokes Bergson’s idea that the past, while not lost, cannot be repeated. That 
said, Duquette is unable to see the potential for using his past memory for action in the 
present. He regards the past in terms of loss, an attitude which points to an underlying 
abjection. 
Falling between ‘The Daughters of the Late Colonel’ and ‘The Garden Party’, the 
unfinished ‘A Married Man’s Story’ was written in late August 1921 and was published 
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posthumously and incomplete in The Dove’s Nest and Other Stories.
119
 Several critics have 
approached the story from a Freudian perspective: Hankin focuses on childhood trauma, 
regarding the married man’s ‘second self’ as a metaphor for the unconscious or for 
repression, and his childhood as fantasy; while Alex Calder treats the story entirely as a case 
history.
120
 More recently, Bruce Harding has provided a provocative interpretation of the text 
as a ‘psychological fable about a mentally ill male in the grip of a form of mania and who is 
dangerously dissociated from other people: radically alienated and emotionally sterile to a 
horrifying degree’.
121
 Pamela Dunbar, taking a reader-response approach, suggests that the 
reader is witness to the married man’s steadfast ‘determination to uncover his past’, 
compared to being confronted by Duquette’s ‘repressions’ in Je ne parle pas français.
122
 
Clare Hanson and Andrew Gurr have, I think rightly, distinguished the attitudes 
towards the past held by Raoul Duquette and the nameless narrator of ‘A Married Man’s 
Story’ in suggesting that the latter story’s first-person narrator ‘accepts fully that the past 
influences the present, is indeed part of the present’, with the use of the present tense placing 
the reader in ‘close relationship’ with the narrator at the start of each scene.
123
 Hanson and 
Gurr claim that what is most shocking about the story is the narrator’s way of directly 
addressing the reader: ‘We are not used to being addressed so summarily and directly in 
fiction: we are unused, as it were, to the text’s need of us.’
124
 The story, I agree, brings up an 
issue of textual intimacy between the narrator and the reader; as another of Mansfield’s rare 
male first-person narratives, it may also be the case that Mansfield was ill at ease in probing 
into the recesses of a disturbed male consciousness. 
The married man’s comment, ‘While I am here, I am there’, reverses Bergson’s idea 
that memory joins the present: the narrator’s pathologised self is located in the traumatic 
events of an abusive childhood while the multiple recurring memories of these events suffuse 
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and distort his actions in the present.
125
 Mansfield reworks Bergson’s idea that the past is 
potentially available and pushes it to the extremes of hyper-reminiscence: what if too much 
of the past presses relentlessly onto the present and prevents a man from living? What if the 
man’s present is taken up with deflecting his wounded memories from his family? What if 
the past is so active that it has the potential power to insinuate itself into his married life, 
perturbing and perverting it, and corrupting his child’s future? 
Hanson and Gurr observe that colour is used to evoke the married man’s childhood 
and his father’s chemist’s shop, the scene of some of his childhood trauma, recalling 
Mansfield’s symbolic use of colour also in ‘Daughters’ discussed above. Windows, posters 
and his father’s bald head take on the reflections from the coloured glass bottles evoking the 
‘feverish vividness of a dream-image’.
126
 While the lurid and bright colours of scarlet and 
yellow, red and gold suggest ‘perverse sexual relationships’ for Hanson and Gurr, the glass 
jars may also symbolise the married man’s memories which are ‘unstoppable’; they are so 
much a ‘living part’ of him (p. 387). The first-person narrator, however, denies that he 
remembers everything. The ‘dark stretches, the blanks, are much bigger than the bright 
glimpses’ (p. 386). The idea of ‘blanks’ once more suggests the blank page on which the 
married man is attempting to record his traumatic life-story. His memories are a site both of 
textual inscription (his own narrated story) and of contradiction (those of the unreliable 
narrator). In this formulation, memory is a text of repressions, a site of warped possibilities. 
 The ‘married man’ is at his writing desk at the beginning of narrating his story; he is 
in a reverie evoked by the ‘wavering reflections of the lamps’ (p. 380). His wife is a 
shadowy figure. While he is not minded to wonder what she might be thinking, the reader 
may be moved to do so because the vacuum of actually transcribed thoughts draws in all the 
more forcefully the reader’s anticipations of what she must be thinking, or feeling. This lack 
of empathy adds to the sense of this being a story about failed consolation: the father, the 
mother, the woman seeking a ‘pick-up’, the married man and his wife, even the married 
man’s writing. The narrator provides strong sensory and often emphatic descriptions of his 
hyper-memories narrated in the present tense: of sounds (‘the whole earth is […] sounding 
with a soft quick patter’; ‘How loudly those tied-up boats knock against one another!’); 
sights and smells (‘peering into moist smelling summer-houses’; ‘How strong the sea 
smells!’); touch (‘brushing through deserted gardens’; ‘you know how soft and almost 
crumbling the wood of a summer-house is in the rain’); and movement (‘running from 
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shelter to shelter, dodging someone, swerving by someone else’) (p. 380). But they serve 
only to give a manic hypostasising aspect to his troubled story of psychological damage. 
The married man’s self-diagnosis is of having been a child suckled by wolves, a 
pathologically distorted Freudian memory. His past dominates: ‘Who am I, in fact, as I sit 
here at this table, but my own past? If I deny that, I am nothing.’ (p. 387) But this story is 
itself one of retractions and admitted ‘falseness’ (p. 384). The married man’s ambivalence is 
represented by his longing to subject his writing to ‘the plain truth, as only a liar can tell it’ 
(p. 384). The narrator may be suggesting that all art is artifice and lies; or that his memories 
are false; or that his truths are warped by painful experience into falsehoods, and that 
memory is distorted in the hands of one who remembers unfaithfully. In the light of the 
narrator’s confessed unreliability, the narrative itself poses the question of whether the story 
itself still has the reader’s involved attention. Unreliable memory becomes a litmus test of 
the married man’s fictionalising tendency: memory distortion as the re-definitive basis of 
narrative: 
It is just as close, as strange, as puzzling, and in spite of all the countless times I 
have recalled the circumstances, I know no more now than I did then whether I 
dreamed them or whether they really occurred. (p. 388) 
A Freudian phantasmatic aspect undermines the narrative. Finally the narrator explains that 
he ‘saw it all, but not as I had seen before…. Everything lived, but everything’ (p. 390), and 
while the married man’s memories survive, they are closer to Freud’s notion of repression 
than to Bergson’s belief in efficacious memory. 
The inconclusive end to the un-concluded story is illuminating: ‘I did not 
consciously turn away from the world of human beings […] but I from that night did beyond 
words consciously turn towards my silent brothers….’ (p. 390). There are several points to 
note about the final words of the unfinished story. First, this is an ending, of sorts, as the 
narrator has recounted his troubling memories. Secondly, he turns from humankind to the 
wolves (with its echoes of Freud’s ‘wolf man’ perhaps) and to a wildness that takes him 
‘beyond words’, and out of the arena of language which separates humans from other 
species. Thirdly, in that he is ‘beyond words’ may be Mansfield’s comment on her own 
stance as a writer of this particular story: that she is herself beyond writing anything further. 
It may be that the story cannot continue, the final words inscribing a necessary hesitation in 
which imagination cannot fill the aporia. And yet, the typographic lack of closure might also 





 In this chapter I have explored the complexities of forgetting. I have aligned 
Mansfield’s approach to forgetting with that of Bergson, through a discussion of aphasia and 
amnesia, suggesting that forgetting need not be a complete annihilation of memory, but a 
temporary or reversible state, using a reading of ‘The Garden Party’ as evidence. I have also 
provided a contrasting reading of ‘The Daughters of the Late Colonel’ suggesting that in this 
story, Mansfield confronts the idea of the fragility of memory over its persistence, 
demonstrating that some memories cannot be effectively recalled. The daughters put their 
father out of mind; he is uncannily recalled, but ultimately the daughters’ memories are 
permanently erased, buried like their father. I have then provided a further Freudian-inflected 
reading of two of Mansfield’s stories in which my idea of ‘hyper-reminiscence’ is evinced 
particularly in first-person male narrators, suggesting a gendered dimension to distorted 
recollection. 
In this chapter I have also suggested that not only do the stories discussed evince the 
Bergsonian idea of the survival of the past and of the mind’s potential for recalling 
memories, they put pressure on this idea. The cumulative effect of my readings (Laura’s 
hesitation about speaking, the step into the dark-room, the effaced note and the silenced 
sisters, even the negatives in the title of ‘Je ne parle pas …’, and the married man’s being 
‘beyond words’) seems to suggest a deep scepticism of language and perhaps even an 
unconscious anxiety or fear of the effacement of memory on the part of Mansfield which 
brings her into contemporaneous alignment with Bergson. The concern with blackness (the 
black hat) and the blankness (the whiteness of snow) of the empty page may echo Bergson’s 
view that language is inadequate while simultaneously demonstrating that it is the best tool 
available to the creative artist. 
Bergson’s view of memory has in the course of time been challenged by 
poststructuralist accounts which present language, narrative and storytelling as a means of 
securing memory by textualising it. Arguably, a poststructuralist account of memory would 
start from a Husserlian rather than a Bergsonian base, and from that position maintain that all 
‘retentions’ will disappear unless they are secured through some act of memorialisation. This 
view is in stark contrast to Bergson’s theory that we need to strategically ‘forget’ and ‘select’ 
from an intact and accumulating ‘pure memory’.
127
 However, a type of ‘retention’ does come 
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into play for Bergson when thinking about time and memory: while the temporality of time 
consists in the passing of one moment to another, crucially, the latter moment always retains 
the former.
128
 In my final chapter, I explore the ways in which Bergson extends the idea of 
memory retention from inside the human mind to the whole of the cosmos and does so by 
invoking the idea of an all-embracing, pervasive cosmic mind. In re-examining epiphany 
from a Bergsonian perspective, I read Mansfield’s story ‘Bliss’ in terms of the opening of 
consciousness and memory to an insistently creative cosmic spirit. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
however, is that Bergson did not pave the way for neuroscientific theories of, for instance, the 
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Mansfield, Mysticism and Cosmic Memory: The Bergsonian Epiphany in 
‘Bliss’ 
The splendid rhythm of Life is absent. […] Silence hung motionless over the church, 
the shadow of her great wings darkened everything. […] The High Altar shone 
mystical – vision-like. – Katherine Mansfield
1
 




In this chapter I develop the idea that by ‘memory’, Bergson means both 
consciousness and spirit. In his Huxley Lecture, ‘Life and Consciousness’, delivered at the 
University of Birmingham on 24 May 1911, Bergson explicitly states that consciousness 
‘means, before everything else, memory’.
3
 And in Matter and Memory he asserts that 
‘[w]hen we pass from pure perception to memory, we definitely abandon matter for spirit’.
4
 
In the same passage, Bergson also postulates that ‘[n]o doubt also the material universe itself 
[…] is a kind of consciousness’.
5
 With these three statements in view, I argue that Bergson 
turns in his later works to thinking about memory as a form of cosmic or universal 
consciousness or spirit. The notion of memory-as-spirit or cosmic memory is, in my view, 
not simply reducible to a post-Cartesian split between the immanent consciousness of the 
subject and the transcendence of the external world. Neither is it a purely ontological 
antithesis between immanence, understood as that which is within being, and transcendence, 
understood as that which is above or beyond being, including the Christian ‘God’.
6
 Rather, I 
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 The Edinburgh Dictionary of Continental Philosophy, ed. by John Protevi (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2005), pp. 303-4. I concede that in the later works of Creative Evolution and 




contend that immanence and transcendence are coterminously held in relation to a 
continuous creative consciousness, memory or spirit regarded as a form of mystical ‘ultimate 
reality’. This ‘spirit’ is to do with Bergson’s concept of élan vital or ‘vital impulse’ which he 
outlines in Creative Evolution, a work in which he also extends consciousness to the cosmos 
at large. 
Why, though, invoke the mystical? I do so, because mystical discourse was 
prominent in the period in which Bergson and Mansfield were being read in Britain; because 
the mystical provided Bergson with a set of concepts which took him further in the 
development of his philosophical thinking; because these concepts can be transposed to a 
literary setting, providing a particularly rich apparatus for reading Mansfield’s writing; and 
because mysticism is related to the search for ultimate reality which is also a philosophical 
quest. On this latter point, Leszek Kolakowski observes that Bergson’s metaphysics develops 
a distinctive ‘cosmology’ which shares elements of Western mystical discourse: ‘the Whole 
is of the same nature as myself. The time-generating life of the consciousness is the model 
for the universe’.
7
 And that Bergson himself explains mysticism as a ‘manifestation of the 
primordial divine energy’ provides the élan vital with mystical underpinnings. Just as 
Bergson speculates about this aspect of philosophical process – a mystical metaphysics, we 




This chapter is grounded in the idea that mysticism and literary epiphany share the 
property of revelation or that which is ‘disclosed’. I propose a Bergsonian approach to 
epiphany which is based on reinterpreting the ‘moment’ as time-filled and continuous, such 
that epiphany opens out from the memory of the individual mind to the memory of the 
cosmos when certain conditions are met. The Bergsonian epiphany differs in intensity from 
the ordinary experiences of everyday life. In analysing Mansfield’s story ‘Bliss’ I suggest the 
protagonist experiences an epiphanic state of mystical rapture. This transcendent feeling of 
‘bliss’ is compromised, however, when the revelations in the story provide knowledge of the 
carnal, earth-bound body which undermine the sense of mystical oneness with cosmic spirit. 
In the course of the chapter I also suggest that it is time to revalorise the ‘extraordinary’ over 
the ‘ordinary’ in the context of recent work in modernist studies on the ‘everyday’. I begin 
by establishing the importance of mysticism to the period, to Bergson’s developing 
philosophy and to Mansfield’s experimental literary technique; I then re-evaluate the 
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modernist moment and literary epiphany before turning to the Bergsonian epiphany which 
lends itself especially well to my reading of individual and cosmic memory in ‘Bliss’. 
Mysticism 
In historical terms, the development of Western mysticism, and with it a monism 
which recognises the search for a single unknown being or higher power, can be seen as a 
response to a late nineteenth-century scientific culture in which an overt materialism 
prevailed. It may be that materialism so pressured the modern psyche that diverse but related 
practices such as mysticism, spiritualism, theosophical thought, occultism and magic forced 
materialism into more open contemporary engagement and scrutiny. While these movements 
all have antecedents in the nineteenth century, they arguably acquire even more purchase on 
culture, belief and the mind in the twentieth century, especially during and after the First 
World War.
9
 In the literary context, Virginia Woolf’s article on ‘Modern Fiction’ captures 
the idea that modernist writers especially looked to the ‘spiritual’ in the aftermath of the 
‘materialism’ of the Edwardian novelists.
10
 Pericles Lewis argues that it was modernist 
writers who experimented with form in an attempt to make narrative structure ‘more capable 
of describing transcendent experiences’.
11
 In re-evaluating the notion that the population at 
this time was somehow lacking religious belief, Lewis outlines his idea of the ‘secular 
sacred’ which finds its expression in modernist literary experimentation.
12
 While Mansfield 
does not figure in his discussion, he finds in Virginia Woolf’s experimentation with multiple 
and ‘intertwining’ streams of consciousness a means to produce a ‘re-enchantment of the 
world’ and a ‘new form of spirituality independent of the Christian God’ which was 
appropriate for modern times.
13
 This association between changes in literary form and 
patterns of spiritual feeling in society is of course entirely compatible with theories of 
modernist fiction which see inner focalisation, psychologisation (and its expression as 
‘spirit’), as refuges from the material world. 
In discussing H.D.’s ‘writing on the wall’, May Sinclair’s ‘ecstasies’, Mary Butt’s 
‘mystic intuition’ and Virginia Woolf’s childhood ‘moments of being’ in terms of mystical 
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experiences, Heather Ingman points to women writers’ particular observance of a spiritual 
dimension in their writing, but not necessarily one which eschewed a Christian God.
14
 The 
link between transcendence and modernist women authors’ innovations in literary practice, 
however, suggests that the binaries of ‘materialism’ and ‘spirit’ were hierarchised along 
gendered lines. In my view, of all the British women literary modernists, it was May Sinclair 
who engaged most fully with Christian mysticism on philosophical and literary levels. 
Sinclair devoted a chapter to explicating ‘The New Mysticism’ in her philosophical work, A 
Defence of Idealism, asserting that the mystical quest for ‘Unity’ or ‘Ultimate Reality’ is a 
metaphysical one.
15
 She also brings Bergson into her discussion, commenting that he sees, 
like the mystic, that ‘the process of Becoming is a spiritual process of ascension’.
16
 In her 
later work, The New Idealism, Sinclair acknowledges that there are forms of consciousness 
beyond the human and forms of space-time systems which are derived from the ‘ultimate 
consciousness which is God’. 
17
 
In Sinclair’s novel, Mary Olivier: A Life, the protagonist experiences intimations of 
the divine which help define her sense of self.
18
 In the novel, these instances of ‘secret 
happiness’ that are ‘like God’ are described as being similar to a mystical revelation: 
She could never tell when it was coming, nor what it would come from. It had 
something to do with the trees standing up in the golden white light. It had come 
before with a certain sharp white light flooding the fields, flooding the room.
19
 
The final words of the novel, ‘If it never came again I should remember’, indicate that what 
secures mystical knowledge for Mary is memory.
20
 It should be noted that Katherine 
Mansfield, however, criticised Sinclair’s novel in a review for the Athenaeum for its ‘vast 
barn of impressions’ and rejected Sinclair’s psychological approach of rendering multiple 
sensory stimuli.
21
 While Mansfield herself claimed to have ‘a terribly sensitive mind which 
receives every impression’, she also professed that it was the duty of the writer to ‘single out, 
[…] bring into the light, […] put up higher’.
22
 Writing therefore elevated the ordinary to a 
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spiritually transcendent and extraordinary state. Mansfield also complained that Sinclair’s 
‘surface impressions’ prevented the reader from exploring the ‘mystery of life’, implying any 
‘higher’ truth unknowable except by divine revelation.
23
 
According to Alex Owen, a renewed interest in mysticism occurred at the fin de 
siècle as ‘many looked to a re-formulated spirituality as a vital precursor of the coming 
age’.
24
 Seeking solace in spiritual truths was part of the complex constellation of being 
modern. In the pre-war period, mysticism gained ground as writers such as Friedrich von 
Hugelin in The Mystical Element of Religion (1908) and Rufus Jones in Studies in Mystical 
Religion (1909) provided accounts of mysticism’s principal tenets, while Caroline Stephen, 
Virginia Woolf’s aunt, published several books on Quaker mysticism, including Light 
Arising: Thoughts on the Central Radiance (1908) and The Vision of Faith (1911). Evelyn 
Underhill, a pacifist and Christian convert, theological editor for the Spectator and a 
reviewer for Time and Tide, became an influential commentator on mysticism in the second 
decade of the twentieth century with her book, Mysticism (1911). Underhill defined 
mysticism as ‘the expression of the innate tendency of the human spirit towards complete 
harmony with the transcendental order’.
25
 In this formulation, rather than seeking the divine 
within, the human spirit looks to a unity with a higher being or divine spirit via mystic 
revelation. By the outbreak of the First World War, the new mysticism or ‘mystical revival’ 
was in evidence and fully established by its end, and linked at that time to philosophical 
idealism and European vitalism. 
In his Gifford Lectures given at the University of Edinburgh in 1901 and 1902, 
William James defined religious feeling explicitly in relation to the transcendent or divine as 
‘the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they 
apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine’.
26
 In his 
later lectures, James related personal religious experience directly to particular mystical 
states of consciousness.
27
 In doing so, he identified four ‘marks’ associated with the 
mystical: ineffability (referring to direct experience); noetic quality (a state of insight 
inaccessible to the intellect); transiency (in which insights fade quickly and may not be 
recoverable in memory); and passivity (where the will is in a submissive state and associated 
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by James with automatic writing and mediumistic trances).
28
 These four signifying aspects of 
the mystical state correlate with some of Bergson’s ideas, especially those of direct 
apprehension and of intuition as opposed to intellect, although James differs from Bergson in 
his description of memory and ephemerality. Where James’s distinctive approach to the 
mystical is, I think, taken up by Bergson in his later writing is in the sense of intensity 
combined with abandonment to a momentous or exceptional experience.
29
 James based his 
explanations on accounts taken from writers such as Charles Kingsley, John Addington 
Symonds and Henri-Frédéric Amiel, whose recollections of mystical experiences are 
couched in terms of trance, spiritual possession and access to the divine, the last being 
described as ‘cosmogonic reveries, when one reaches to the stars […]. Moments divine, 
ecstatic hours’.
30
 What seems clear is that the mystical state is one of heightened 
consciousness often accompanied by a sense of ecstasy. Mystical states are also of a higher 
order than ordinary consciousness; when passing from one to the other, James suggests it is 
‘as from a less into a more, as from a smallness into a vastness’, a quantitative definition that 
Bergson would have eschewed for one more qualitative or intensive.
31
 
In his own Gifford Lectures of 1916-18, Samuel Alexander mentioned some of the 
criticisms that had been levelled at James’s presentation of religious states, such as his 
failure to consider the ‘calm’ and un-exalted religious feelings of the ‘ordinary’ man in 
favour of the excited, disturbed and even ‘pathological’ varieties of religious feeling.
32
 Yet 
Alexander’s own definition of religious sentiment as ‘the feeling of our going out towards 
something not ourselves and greater and higher than ourselves, with which we are in 
communion’ seems also to take on a mystical and transcendent dimension.
33
 Alexander adds 
that it is the mind and body caught up in the forward movement of time and reality in its 
‘nisus towards a new quality’ that characterises religious feeling.
34
 The notion of ‘nisus’, of 
effort or impulse, might also evoke Bergson’s concept of the élan vital were it not for the 
intimation of goal-striving teleology that the term implies. 
The idea of the mystical or elevated state was also outlined by Richard Maurice 
Bucke, a Canadian psychiatrist, who in 1901 had made a study of ‘cosmic consciousness’ 
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which he described as ‘a higher form of consciousness than that possessed by the ordinary 
man’.
35
 The cosmic mind in Bucke’s view was an exceptional one that rose above that of the 
‘simple’ consciousness shared by both animals and humans as well as that of ‘self’ 
consciousness in which only a human is aware of ‘his own mental states as objects of 
consciousness’.
36
 The cosmic mind was also accompanied by a sense of enlightenment that 
allows access to ‘a new plane of existence’, and feelings of ‘elevation, elation and 
joyousness’, as well as a sense of already having eternal life; a kind of predestined 
immortality.
37
 Cosmic consciousness, a term Bucke had adopted from Edward Carpenter 
who had been influenced by the Eastern term ‘universal consciousness’ when travelling in 




Bergson and Mysticism 
In his later thinking, Bergson extends his theory of consciousness and memory 
which also leads to an account of the mystical. From describing ‘memory’ as the primary 
instance of individual consciousness with its own sense of the past, he moves to a position in 
which memory also includes the unforeseen continual unfolding of the future, an idea which 
is made explicit in Creative Evolution when he comments that we are ‘pressed against the 
future and cutting into it unceasingly’.
39
 ‘Cosmic’ memory, in the form it takes in Creative 
Evolution, is the whole of the past brought into the present and the impending future. In 
tending towards the future, cosmic memory is a form of ‘pan-consciousness’ that takes in all 
life forms and is all-pervasive, as G. William Barnard explains: 
The consciousness that Bergson claims is connected to the energy of life is not 
simply human consciousness […] Nor is it just the consciousness that seems to be 
present in different degrees within all organisms […] Instead, Bergson suggests that 
the level of consciousness which is connected to the élan vital is an ‘enormous field’ 
of creative awareness that is expressed in and through all organisms, to a greater or 
lesser degree, depending upon the level of development of their respective nervous 
systems. In the more rudimentary organisms, this creative cosmic consciousness is 
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squeezed tightly ‘in a kind of vise’; but in more advanced creatures, especially in 
human beings, it is expressed increasingly freely and completely.
40
 
In attributing duration, consciousness and memory to the ‘whole of the universe’ in Creative 
Evolution, which opens up another dimension of reality, Bergson is clearly invoking a 
mystical realm.
41
 The mystical aspect to Bergson’s thought also relates to a philosophical 
strain of vitalism. The idea of the dynamic movement associated with ‘becoming’ and the 
emphasis on the élan vital as a creative life force, spirit or impetus outlined in Creative 
Evolution, share something with ‘vitalist’ philosophy, even though critics have debated the 
nuances of Bergson’s position.
42
 According to Barnard, in Creative Evolution Bergson 




Bergson’s closest investigation of mysticism is in his last substantial work, The Two 
Sources of Morality and Religion. In identifying both the ancient origins of morality and 
religion and their modern-day expression, he sets up a new dualism between the ‘closed’ and 
the ‘open’ soul. The beliefs and practices which pertain to the ‘closed soul’ are associated 
with ‘static’ religion, automatism, obligation and ‘morbid’ states, whereas the ‘mystic’ or 
‘open’ soul is associated with ‘dynamic’ religion, creative emotion, love and mystical states. 
As with the dualism between matter and memory, the two aspects of the dualism between the 
closed and open soul have a specific role to play: Bergson suggests that for religion to be 
‘dynamic’ it requires its opposite, static religion, for its ‘expression and diffusion’.
44
 In 
historical terms, the open soul arises out of the past formations of the closed variety. This 
interpretation allows Bergson to suggest that the mystic soul is a unique product of the 
‘evolutionary dynamism’ of the élan vital first articulated in Creative Evolution.
45
 Bergson’s 
‘mysticism’, then, brings together the cosmic life force of the élan vital, which is pervasive 
and inclusive of all forms of life, with the more rare condition of the individual mystic soul. 
For a few, the soul, driven by the cosmic life force, may be lifted to ‘another plane’ and, via 
a creative effort, may make contact with the ‘divine’, which is ‘of God’.
46
 Thus the 
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transcendent experience may be one of apprehending or merging with a universal life force 
or cosmic spirit or with a supra (Christian) being. 
Mansfield and Mysticism 
Caroline Maclean maintains that Katherine Mansfield’s encounter with mysticism 
began as early as her camping trip to the Urewera district in the northern part of North 
Island, New Zealand in 1907. Observing that ‘Mansfield was certainly interested in the 
Maori mysticism she encountered during her trip’, she points to Mansfield’s notebook entries 
as evidence.
47
 My view, however, is that The Urewera Notebook rather reflects a young 
writer training herself to record her vivid sensory impressions and is as much steeped in 
European culture as Maori spirituality. The Notebook just as frequently evokes pagan images 




Mansfield may have been initially quite dubious about mysticism. An early 1912 
review in Rhythm of an anthology of poems, The Triumph of Pan (1910) by Victor Neuburg, 
who wrote on occult and theosophical subjects, suggests a degree of ambivalence. While 
Mansfield praises Neuburg for having ‘something of the poet’s vision’ and for ‘delighting in 
simplicity and sensuality which is born of passionate admiration’, she describes mysticism as 
‘perverted sensuality’ and a practice that ‘leads to the annihilation of any true artistic 
effort’.
49
 Neuburg was an associate of Aleister Crowley, who had been a member of the 
occult society the Hermetic Order of the Golden Dawn (as had Bergson’s sister, Mina 
Bergson
50
) until he founded his own occult order in 1907. The poems had emerged out of the 
occult rituals of sex and magic that Neuburg and Crowley had practised in the Algerian 
desert; Mansfield’s response is quite possibly a result of her distaste for Neuburg’s lifestyle 
and his poetry rather than for ‘mysticism’ as such. The Neuburg review, like that of May 
Sinclair, underlines the importance to Mansfield of sensitive and selective artistry coupled 
with appropriate ‘vision’. 
                                                 
47
 Caroline Maclean, The Vogue for Russia (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015), p. 87. 
Maclean also comments that John Middleton Murry took an interest in ‘mystical aesthetics’ 
especially at the time he was involved with the journal Rhythm (p. 87). 
48
 In her edition of Mansfield’s Urewera notebook, Anna Plumridge notes that Mansfield thought 
Maori culture important, but had a tendency to romanticise it. But she also exhibited ‘empathy and 
respect’ for the Maori people she encountered. See Katherine Mansfield, The Urewera Notebook, 
ed. by Anna Plumridge (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015), p. 11; p. 13.  
49
 Katherine Mansfield, review of The Triumph of Pan by Victor Neuburg, CWKM3, pp. 430-1 
(p.431). First published in Rhythm, 2.6 (July, 1912), 70. 
50
 See Owen, p. 3. Mina Bergson was married to Samuel Liddell MacGregor Mathers, one of the 
founding members of the Order. 
183 
 
An early period of personal crisis does, however, suggest a mystical awareness 
linked to her writing practice. Following the death of her brother, Mansfield described a 
feeling of mystic closeness to him. In Murry’s view, albeit based on his recollections in the 
1930s, Leslie’s death occurred when Mansfield was also seeking in her writing an ‘inward 
clarity’. Murry comments that writing the first draft of Prelude was part of the ‘purification 
of her memory of New Zealand’ as well as the ‘purging of all resentment from her soul’ and 
the ‘outward and visible sign of […] inward and spiritual grace’.
51
 After her death, the 
journalist and writer Thomas Moult gave considerable credence to Mansfield as a ‘saint’ in 
two short commentaries for the Bookman: ‘To her friends she has bequeathed a treasure most 
noble: […] an exalted sense that they have been privileged to sojourn awhile in the presence 
of one who was among the saintliest of women.’
52
 As a Georgian poet, Moult brings a 
prevalent religious discourse to the life, and death, of one of the literary ‘moderns’. This 
discursive construction of a spiritual Mansfield was still in circulation in the 1930s, as 
evidenced in a discussion of Mansfield by André Maurois who referred to her ‘pure and 
feminine mysticism’.
53
 The idea of a ‘mystical’ Mansfield was also captured in the 1950s by 
Katherine Anne Porter who comments: 
As her health failed, her fears grew, her religious impulse wasted itself in an anxious 
straining toward some unknown infinite source of strength, of energy-renewing 
power, from which she might […] find some fulfillment [sic] of true being beyond 
her flawed mortal nature.
54
 
But Porter stops short of claiming that Mansfield was a mystic, possibly as a reaction to John 
Middleton Murry’s cult of saintliness of Mansfield after her death: ‘Katherine Mansfield has 
been called a mystic, and perhaps she was, but in the severe hierarchy of mysticism her rank 
cannot be very high.’
55
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In a brief review of Mansfield’s so-called journal, assembled by Middleton Murry 
from diverse writings and published in 1927, Moult further refers to the spiritual quest in 
Mansfield’s writing: 
One of the great values of the ‘Journal’ is that of its revelation of her attitude to 
writing. Almost an obsession with her was her desire to go on refining and purifying 
her expression of material existence, until it became a wholly spiritual expression.
56
 
Moult’s angle is that while the life of the spirit is neither attainable nor desired by most 
individuals, Mansfield desired it with ‘an intensity’ and ‘a hunger’.
57
 Why it should be that it 
has tended to be fellow writers who evince a spiritual dimension to Mansfield’s writing is 
perhaps a comment on a writer’s need for a ‘muse’ or sacred source of inspiration. The 
novelist Sally Vickers has also recently identified a ‘quasi-mystical strain’ in Mansfield’s 
writing which she attributes to Mansfield’s literary technique of bringing her characters’ 
consciousnesses into contact in ‘webs of inter-consciousness effects’.
58
 
That what Maclean calls ‘aesthetic mysticism’ can be detected in Mansfield’s early 
work is confirmed by Vickers, who argues that Mansfield’s interest in the theosophy of 
Gurdjieff and P. D. Ouspensky derived from ‘a lifelong preoccupation with the generative 
interplay between states of consciousness’ and was far from sudden.
59
 While I think Vickers 
is right, it was clear that Mansfield was thinking more determinedly about mystical and 
religious states during the early 1920s, as her reading at the time shows. As she told Violet 
Schiff in January 1922, a book which resonated with her was an esoteric treatise by ‘M. B. 
Oxon’: ‘What saved me finally was reading a book called Cosmic Anatomy, and reflecting 
on it.’
60
 Why did this disorganised account of mystical thinking published in 1921, with its 
scattered references to astrology, cosmology, the supernatural, dreams, thought-transference, 
eastern scriptures, Sanskrit, Egyptian mythology and eurhythmic dancing, captivate 
Mansfield? 
There were aspects to Cosmic Anatomy which would have appealed to Mansfield. It 
promised to address the post-war ‘discontent’ described by Wallace as the ‘present sorrows’ 
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 It purported to be on the side of ‘Feeling and Emotion’ rather than ‘Reason 
and Intellect’, and to offer a ‘more expanded outlook’ on life as well as provide a new means 
of expression.
62
 It referred to the ‘appalling wave of untruth which has swamped us’ at a 
time when Mansfield was thinking about truth as a value above all others.
63
 That the book 
clearly preoccupied Mansfield for a while is evident from a notebook entry she made while 
she and Murry were at the Chalet des Sapins in Switzerland in 1922: 
I have read a good deal of Cosmic Anatomy – understood it far better. Yes, such a 
book does fascinate me. Why does Jack hate it so? To get even a glimpse of the 
relation of things, to follow that relation & find it remains true through the ages 




Vincent O’Sullivan suggests Wallace’s reassurances about the unity underlying things might 
have been of comfort to Mansfield given her own increasing sense of a schism within 
herself; furthermore, Wallace’s insistence that time was not merely mechanical (probably an 
allusion to Bergson’s thought) might also have registered with her.
65
 Jeffrey Meyers, 
however, maintains that Mansfield’s reading of Cosmic Anatomy and her ‘enthusiastic 
acceptance of its doctrines’ more likely indicate that Mansfield’s mind ‘had moved far into 
the realm of the mystical’ and that mysticism, while providing some consolation, also 
hastened her death.
66
 The mystical dimension of Mansfield’s work and life thus still 
generates controversy among critics. Most significant for me is that reading Cosmic Anatomy 





1922, recording in her notebook on the latter day: ‘Read Cosmic Anatomy. I managed to 
work a little. Broke through. This is a great relief.’
67
 At this time, Mansfield also recorded in 
her notebooks her vivid dreams and memories of New Zealand; and it could be the case that 
her sense of a wider ‘cosmic’ spirit provided the context for reconnecting with the spirit of 
her childhood past. 
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Mansfield’s connections to contemporary mysticism extended to Middleton Murry’s 
friend W. J. Millar Dunning, who was an adherent of the mystical thinking that was growing 
in popularity. In a letter to Murry in September 1922 Mansfield comments, ‘There seems to 
me little doubt that the wave of mysticism prophesied by Dunning is upon us.’
68
 While she 
also referred to mysticism as ‘dark matters’, at this point in 1922, Mansfield had been 
meeting with A. R. Orage, her old friend and sometimes foe from her early association with 
the New Age, and Orage was a strong advocate of Ouspensky’s mystical esotericism. In a 
direct and confirmed association with Mansfield, Ouspensky gave a series of lectures in 
London in 1922 which Mansfield attended and which contributed to her decision to join the 
Gurdjieff Institute. 
Mansfield told Murry, writing from Paris in October 1922, that the mystical ideas 
she was hearing about were confirming her own: ‘I don’t feel influenced by Youspensky or 
Dunning. I merely feel Ive heard ideas like my ideas but bigger ones, far more definite 
ones.’
69
 It is perhaps not surprising that Mansfield found solace in the mystical when she felt 
that medicine and science had failed her. Writing from the Prieuré later in the month, having 
abandoned Manoukhine’s irradiation treatment in Paris
70
 to join the Gurdjieff Institute for 
the Harmonious Development of Man, while Murry moved next door to Dunning, Mansfield 
affirmed that Gurdjieff might be her saviour: 
Haven’t I been saying, all along, that the fault lies in trying to cure the body and pay 
no heed whatever to the sick psyche. Gurdjieff claims to do just what I have always 
dreamed might be done.
71
 
Many Mansfield critics have written about her decision to enter the Institute, some of it 
sceptical, some of it sympathetic, largely depending on whether Gurdjieff is regarded as a 
charlatan or not.
72
 According to Sophia Wellbeloved, the Institute’s aim was to turn 
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‘mechanical man’ into a ‘real’ man, ‘possessed of will, identity and consciousness’.
73
 
Mansfield had already heard of Gurdjieff’s teachings via Ouspensky.
74
 At this advanced 
stage in her illness, the Institute probably provided a peaceful environment in which to die, 
but Mansfield approached it in hope of both spiritual and physical renewal. 
Mystical Analogies between Bergson and Katherine Mansfield 
In a 1912 article on ‘Bergson and the Mystics’, Evelyn Underhill both discusses 
Bergson’s philosophy from a mystical point of view and presents mysticism in Bergsonian 
language, asserting that the mystical is opposed to the mechanistic.
75
 To Bergson’s 
categories of the artist-philosopher, the genius and the practical man, Underhill adds the 
mystic who sees the world ‘in a larger way than that of humanity in general’ and has access 
to higher cosmic reality.
76
 That artistic perception and mystic contemplation share in an 
alteration and intensification of consciousness provides a clear link between contemporary 
writers such as Mansfield and a form of mystically derived creativity which might also offer 
a purview of a different level of consciousness, a world mind or cosmic mind. 
Bergson’s reference to a cosmic or ‘supra-consciousness’ in Creative Evolution is 
related to what he describes as the ‘need of creation’.
77
 In Two Sources, mysticism is also 
bound up with writing and creative emotion which may have relevance to Mansfield, as well 
as to many other contemporary writers, of course, in the early twentieth century. Bergson 
suggests that the mystic may have access to an elusive form of creativity which is 
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incommunicable. He suggests, somewhat mysteriously, that this creativity would ‘not be 
writing’; and, as such, this non-writing would require an entirely new set of concepts.
78
 It is 
not clear whether Bergson is referring here to a form of unwritten and unvoiced 
communication such as telepathy or whether he believes there are no adequate expressive 
means for conveying mystic revelation. The analogue with Mansfield, as well as with 
Virginia Woolf, is Bergson’s assertion that individuals can have access to an original, natural 
state of mind beneath the surface of his or her habits using a process of introspection, a 
‘moment of vision’.
79
 In mystic discourse there are echoes of Bergson’s intuition such as the 
observation from Caroline Spurgeon, in a book of 1913, that ‘we can know a thing spiritually 
only by becoming it. We must be the thing itself’ that recalls Katherine Mansfield’s literary 
technique of immersing herself in her characters in order to ‘become’ them.
80
 
In the light of analogies between Bergson and Mansfield, I now provide a counter-
argument to the prevailing view of the modernist short story and the ‘moment’ to suggest 
that it is durational or time-filled rather than fixed. In doing so I expand understanding of 
Mansfield’s use of epiphany in her fiction, which has often been couched in terms of gleams, 
instants and ‘glimpses’.
81
 In delineating epiphany as an apprehension of the mystical and 
transcendent, I suggest it produces not fleeting but rather abiding memories. What I call the 
‘Bergsonian’ epiphany is made especially clear in Mansfield’s story ‘Bliss’. There are three 
aspects of Bergson’s philosophy which I align with mysticism in my reading of ‘Bliss’: the 
extension of memory to cosmic consciousness via the élan vital; the mystic’s vision as an 
intuition of that cosmic consciousness; and the idea of creative inspiration leading to an 
apprehension of cosmic or ‘higher’ reality. 
The Moment 
An important aspect of the critical lineage of literary epiphany turns on the idea of 
the passing ‘moment’. The moment can be situated in the context of nineteenth-century 
literary aestheticism, especially that of Baudelaire in France, the Pre-Raphaelites and 
Algernon Charles Swinburne in mid-century Britain and, in the later part of the century, with 
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Walter Pater, Oscar Wilde and Aubrey Beardsley. Baudelaire described the moment as 
ephemeral and as a sign of the modernity of life in the nineteenth-century French urban 
metropolis. In his view, the duty of the artist was to ‘distil the eternal from the transitory’ 
and arrest the moment before it faded forever.
82
 This role for art was significant because it 
ushered in the idea that some modes of artistic practice could freeze time. Photography was a 
new visual technology which provided the very means of fixing the moment, whereas 
cinematography created an illusion of continuity through moving but juxtaposed individual 
frames. Fictional techniques used during the period of late nineteenth-century aestheticism, 
particularly that of literary impressionism, drew on symbols as a means of capturing a 
momentary image or sensation, whereas short fiction in particular had previously tended to 
narrativise the moment via plot and scene.
83
 
In his well-known Conclusion to his Studies in the History of the Renaissance, 
Walter Pater also regarded the moment as fleeting, intense and psychological: a ‘single sharp 
impression’ which was ‘unstable, flickering’ and ‘gone while we try to apprehend it’.
84
 
Pater’s ‘moment’ was also a ‘relic’ of time that has passed which allowed for the possibility 
of retaining the momentary in memory.
85
 But in the later essay ‘The School of Giorgione’, 
Pater described moments as being replete with life but only for the time in which they are 
held in suspension; they are ‘exquisite pauses in time, in which, arrested thus, we seem to be 
spectators of all the fullness of existence, and which are like some consummate extract or 
quintessence of life’.
86
 Pater seemed, therefore, to offer to capture the ephemeral moment, 
momentarily. In doing so, the moment still barely existed. Artistic ardour to experience 
further intense moments merely seemed to motivate the arduous pursuit of the evanescent.
87
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The transitory but exquisite ‘moment’ in the modernist literary mode has typically 
been associated with a heightened awareness or revelation arising out of a banal episode or 
occurrence, particularly in the work of James Joyce. But in a recognisable ‘turn’ associated 
with the new modernist studies, critics have recently focused on the unexceptional moment 
in relation to the ‘everyday’. Among modernist critics Liesl Olson has argued that ordinary 
experience is the dominant subject of literary modernism, implying that the ‘ordinary’ is 
always associated with the exteriorities of living in the world in order to challenge what she 
refers to as literary modernism’s previous interest in ‘an aesthetic of self-conscious 
interiority’.
88
 Olson therefore commits herself to examining the ‘moments’ which are not 
heightened, as such, in literary modernism. The ordinary, in Olson’s categorisation, is an 
‘affective experience of the world characterized by inattention or absentmindedness’, 
pertaining to moments which are likely to be mundane, anti-revelatory or forgettable.
89
 
Also as part of an identifiable ‘turn’ to the everyday, Bryony Randall has recently 
examined the way in which modernist authors represent ‘dailiness’, referring to both daily 
time and everyday life.
90
 In shifting focus from the ephemerality of the present as well as the 
exceptional moment that might be the means with which to encapsulate the everyday, 
Randall concentrates her analysis on present ‘ongoing daily time’.
91
 While this welcome 
approach to the continuities of time in the work of Dorothy Richardson, Gertrude Stein, H.D. 
and Virginia Woolf resonates with my own interests, the suggestive attention given to the 
‘temporality of dailiness’ nonetheless valorises the ordinary. Greater insight is to be gained 
in approaching Katherine Mansfield, I contend, by re-evaluating the moment as continuous 
and time-filled but also as exceptional and opening out to the mystical, as understood 
especially through Bergson’s philosophical insights. 
Mansfield refers to the ‘moment’ in several of her book reviews for the Athenaeum, 
thereby giving the term a literary framework. In a review of 1919 she comments that there 
are ‘signs of the writer’s “literary” longing to register the moment, the glimpse, the scene’.
92
 
And in discussing Vita Sackville-West’s novel Heritage a month later, she defines the 
moment clearly in terms of a spiritual crisis: 
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[H]ow are we to appreciate the importance of one ‘spiritual event’ rather than 
another? What is to prevent each being unrelated – complete in itself – if the gradual 
unfolding in growing, gaining light is not to be followed by one blazing moment?
93
 
What is interesting in this passage is not only the way in which Mansfield gives a spiritual 
significance to the moment, indicating that it is something which is rare and exalted rather 
than ordinary or mundane, but also the fact that it includes the idea of a continuous 
movement towards the crisis suggesting that the moment is not isolated, fixed or fragmented. 
Understanding of the moment can be pushed further if it is approached as being 
psychological, as a form of consciousness, which is where Bergson is so productive for 
reading Mansfield. As Sydney Janet Kaplan has noted, Mansfield looked for a way to 
represent ‘the pressures of the “moment,” the sudden breakthroughs into deeper levels of 
consciousness’.
94
 It is this emphasis on the shifts in and layers of consciousness that gives 
Mansfield’s thinking about the ‘moment’ its Bergsonian overtones, encapsulated in a 
notebook entry for 30 August1922 following a conversation with A. R. Orage: ‘Let me take 
the case of K.M. […] through it all, there have been moments, instants, gleams, when she 
has felt the possibility of something quite other.’
95
 The strange disembodiment which is also 
suggested by referring to herself in the third person, suggests Mansfield thought the moment 
could be of an extraordinary kind leading to some form of access to a higher spiritual reality. 
The idea of the transcendent moment is echoed in Virginia Woolf’s ‘moments of being’, 
associated with memories of her early childhood. Such moments are similarly exceptional 
and characterised by an ecstatic ‘revelation of some order; […] a token of some real thing 
behind appearances’.
96
 Such revelatory moments are offset by moments of ‘non-being’ or 
what Woolf calls the ‘cotton wool of daily life’, behind which is hidden a pattern connecting 
all human beings.
 97
 For Julie Kane these ‘moments of being’ are ‘mystical experiences’ 
which ‘constituted true “reality” for Woolf’.
98
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But Woolf also attached importance to the idea of ‘separate moments of being’ in 
her memoir that implies a segmentation of time which Bergson would have rejected.
99
 In To 
the Lighthouse, this impulse is represented particularly by the separate desires of James, Mrs 
Ramsay and Lily Briscoe to ‘crystallize and transfix the moment’, but they do so in vain.
100
 
It is apparent that Woolf could not entirely make up her mind: 
Now is life very solid or very shifting? I am haunted by the two contradictions. This 
has gone on for ever; will last for ever; goes down to the bottom of the world – this 




While Woolf veers between fixity and fleetingness, Harvena Richter suggests that in her 
essay ‘The Moment: Summer’s Night’ Woolf conceptualised the moment not as a single 
‘atom’ of experience but as a compound one bringing together visual and sensory 
impressions, bodily affects and awareness of time and change.
102
 In this reading, Woolf’s 
moment is, as Woolf herself described it, a dense ‘“knot of consciousness”’, a complex 
clustering of momentary experience.
103
 Richter is sympathetic to Bergson, noting that 
Woolf’s ‘moment of being’ with its ‘diversity in unity’ is similar to that of Bergsonian 
duration, while Woolf’s characters experience time ‘in the all-inclusive now’.
104
 If Woolf’s 
‘moment’ is open to diverse interpretations, my view is that for Woolf and for Mansfield the 
notion of something spiritual and lasting was attached to the moment which aligns with 
Bergson. 
For Bergson there are no moments as such, because there are no ‘instants’: ‘[T]here 
is for us nothing that is instantaneous,’ he observes in Matter and Memory.
105
 There are no 
‘instants’ because there is ‘already some work of our memory, and consequently of our 
consciousness, which prolongs into each other’.
106
 In his lecture, ‘Life and Consciousness’, 
Bergson states that an instant: ‘is the purely theoretical limit which separates the past from 
the future’. It is never perceived. Rather, what is actually perceived is ‘a certain span of 
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duration composed of two parts – our immediate past and our imminent future’.
107
 Past, 
present and future form a duration which is an ‘indivisible continuity’; it arises out of life’s 
impetus to preserve the past and to anticipate the future.
108
 A Bergsonian ‘moment’ might, 
then, be understood as being one of perceptual consciousness imbued with duration and 
memory. It is movement which cannot be disaggregated.
109
 It continually changes without, it 
seems, fading: ‘A moving continuity is given to us, in which everything changes and yet 
remains’.
110
 Such a moment might best be characterised in terms of its memorability (‘it 
remains’) and its duration (it is continuous), and not spatially, whereby a moment in time is 
‘arrested’. 
This way of thinking anew about the transitory offers a different way of 
understanding epiphany which has long been seen as one of the defining features of 
Modernist short stories, and usually as a means of distilling and fixing a moment of 
emotional intensity, transformation, revelation or knowledge, especially useful in a short 
narrative to convey dramatic effect.
111
 I argue that the epiphany, based on a Bergsonian 
understanding of the moment, allows for a cosmic dimension and that the epiphanies in 
‘Bliss’ both facilitate and interrupt the expansion towards the cosmos of Bertha’s ‘mystical’ 
consciousness. 
Epiphany 
Epiphany in biblical thought refers to the manifestation of Christ to the Gentiles as 
represented by the Magi (Matthew 2, 1-12) and the festival celebrating this on 6 January. Its 
longer historical derivation is from the Greek epipháneia (to ‘reveal’ or ‘show forth’) and 
refers to a moment of sudden and great revelation. The definition of epiphany offered by M. 
H. Abrams in the 1980s, however, has been lastingly influential for literary criticism. For 
Abrams epiphany is ‘a manifestation’ or ‘showing forth’ used in modern poetry and fiction 
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to apply to ‘the sudden flare into revelation of an ordinary object or scene’.
112
 At the end of 
that decade, Susan Lohafer and Jo Ellyn Clarey defined epiphany as ‘a fleeting moment of 
mythic perception when the mystery of life breaks through our mundane perception of 
reality’.
113
 Taking these two definitions together, the modern view of epiphany is of a sudden 
revelation of significance arising out of the ordinary which then fades. But I want to reclaim 
a more spiritually inflected understanding of epiphany which allows for the extraordinary, 
the mystical and the transcendent as well as the durational; an approach which challenges the 
commonly held view, expressed by Mary Rohrberger, that the epiphany is ‘a point of frozen 
energy resonating just beyond understanding’.
114
 
The specifically mystical impetus to literary epiphany can be traced back at least to 
Arthur Symons who in his 1899 work, The Symbolist Movement in Literature, regarded 
symbols as the ‘sign of an unseen reality’. Symons borrowed his definition from Thomas 
Carlyle’s Sartor Resartus in which Carlyle suggested the epiphany is ‘some embodiment and 
revelation of the Infinite’ which is made to ‘blend itself with the Finite, to stand visible, and 
as it were, attainable there’.
115
 Symons champions modern writers who attempt to 
‘spiritualise literature’, who rebel against a ‘materialistic tradition’, and reject ‘the old 
bondage of exteriority’ attributed to nineteenth-century realist narrative technique.
116
 Writing 
is regarded by Symons as revelation; he sees the artist as a mystic and symbolical literature 
as being intertwined with ‘the doctrine of Mysticism’.
117
 Katherine Mansfield, who was well 
read in both Impressionism and Symbolism, shares some of Symons’s Symbolism and 
mystical aims for literature. 
Why critics of modernist literature in particular have been preoccupied with the 
epiphany is largely due to James Joyce having used the term, supposedly in a secular way, to 
indicate an unexpected revelation of a passing but significant moment in Stephen Hero, the 
early draft of A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man. The often-quoted passage reads: 
By an epiphany he meant a sudden spiritual manifestation, whether in the vulgarity 
of speech or of gesture or in a memorable phase of the mind itself. He believed that 
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it was for the man of letters to record these epiphanies with extreme care, seeing that 
they themselves are the most delicate and evanescent of moments.
118
 
As Abrams points out, however, the secularisation of theological concepts had already taken 
place in Romantic literature; Joyce had merely substituted ‘epiphany’ for what earlier 
authors had been referring to as the ‘moment’.
 119
 But even Joyce’s ‘secular’ epiphanies in 
Stephen Hero are motivated by a spiritual impetus, as Stephen comments: ‘“I wish to bring 
to the world the spiritual renewal which the poet brings to it …”.’
120
 Stephen himself 
possesses a sensitive soul and a ‘temperament ever trembling towards ecstasy’.
121
 He 
attributes ‘soul’ to objects which suggests that it is the epiphanee who engages the object of 
attention rather than there being anything inherently or potentially sublime in the object 
itself. The epiphany is ephemeral for Joyce, therefore, because the epiphanee’s 
consciousness moves on from the object; it is the ‘phase of the mind’ which is distinctive, 
rather than the object qua object. 
For Proust, by comparison, the epiphany is something remembered, and is either 
triggered by an object or deliberately recalled. These two important types of epiphany are 
closely related to memory: the one recalling a past moment, the other of immortalising a 
present moment for all time. But neither is given a spiritual dimension. In Virginia Woolf’s 
case, however, I have identified at least five types of spiritual epiphany in To the Lighthouse: 
Mrs Ramsay’s ‘reading epiphany’ (the sonnet); Lily’s ‘appropriated epiphany’ (of ‘making 
of the moment something permanent’ (p. 218), borrowed from Mrs Ramsay); Lily’s 
‘recalled’ epiphany (of the leaf pattern on the tablecloth); and Lily’s final ‘aesthetic’ or 
‘painterly’ epiphany. There is also James’s epiphany: ‘For nothing was simply one thing’ (p. 
251). Woolf valorises both the ‘great revelation’ and the ‘little daily miracles’ (p. 218), 
suggesting that epiphany is always significant and spiritual. 
In the critical literature, while Morris Beja maintains that epiphany need not involve 
a mystical experience or conversion, more recently, Sharon Kim has shifted focus from the 
‘suddenness’ associated with epiphany to the ‘manifestation’; she considers epiphany as ‘the 
mutual visibility of both the revealed and the perceiver’ which, because it is rare, attracts the 
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 By contrast, Liesl Olson counters the idea that any (modernist) 
epiphany can produce a prolonged spiritual experience, arguing that a return to ordinary 
experience is inevitable after an epiphany, and that it is only in the ‘fold of everyday life’ 
that ‘real change can actually manifest itself’.
123
 My argument runs against that of Olson, 
relying on an opposite trajectory for epiphany: that it is not merely a moment of 
transcendence but a transcendent experience of cosmic memory; and it draws on Bergson to 
do so. 
The most extensive treatment of epiphany in Mansfield’s work has been a full-
length, unpublished study by Sarah Sandley, although mysticism is not directly under 
consideration in this work.
124
 Sandley argues that Mansfield used a unique epiphanic mode 
for her moments of illumination, the ‘glimpse’ (p. 100). According to Sandley, this mode 
was Mansfield’s way of representing subjective life or interiority associated with literary 
modernism’s aesthetic impulse more generally (p. 305). In Sandley’s view, Mansfield’s story 
‘The Escape’ is the exemplary ‘glimpse’ story which explores ‘an alternate state of 
consciousness’ rather than an expansion of consciousness as such (p. 94). Sandley identifies 
sixteen stories and two fragments (from the Alpers edition of Mansfield’s stories) that 
contain one or more of her multiple ‘glimpse’ criteria: 
[H]eightened awareness, a blurring of the senses, a removal from everyday states of 
consciousness, a physical sensation of being raised above the situation or scene, a 
change of feeling to either extreme excitement or extreme calm, a feeling of intense 
joy, of harmony, sudden belonging or ‘rightness’, and a non-discursive expansion of 
awareness. (p. 103) 
In particular, Sandley concentrates on Mansfield’s use of certain technical narrative devices 
such as the shifting use of Free Indirect Thought and her use of multiple poetic effects which 
contribute to a sense of ‘climax’ (p. 103). Within Sandley’s comprehensive and compelling 
typology of Mansfield’s use of the ‘glimpse’ is the ‘Remembered Glimpse’, exemplified in 
stories such as Prelude, ‘A Dill Pickle’ and ‘The Stranger’, in which a character recalls a 
glimpse. Valuable for my thinking is the idea that intensely realised glimpses are ‘the only 
time when characters experience a deeply apprehended “now” that is not related to clock 
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time’ (p. 264). Sandley also emphasises that the glimpse has a memorial function: ‘Those 
characters who have experienced Glimpses carry the memory with them to compensate for 
their mundane, disappointing day to day life’ (p. 304). This view predates the current 
predilection for finding depth of meaning in the ‘ordinary’; it also validates the Bergsonian 
idea that it is memory that ensures continuity and meaningfulness for individuals in the 
modern world. Coming close to a Bergsonian view, in approaching the moment as time-
filled and without restraining it, Julia van Gunsteren argues that instants may emerge from 
duration in a way in which time is hypostatised even while ‘the moment itself has its own 
duration’. The instant then ‘returns to the flow of fleeting time’.
125
 But it is not clear whether 
this ‘instant’ is continuously in the flow of real time or is given a distinct substance. If the 
instant is an unceasing deviation, it could perhaps be understood in terms of Bergson’s idea 
of the different rhythms of time and of consciousness; in this way, the Bergsonian moment is 
a multiplicity which expands and contracts with consciousness.
126
 What I would like to add 
to Sandley’s and Gunsteren’s approaches is the idea that the continuous ‘now’ of epiphany 
opens on to the plane of cosmic memory; that is, of ‘all’ memory. 
More recently Josiane Paccaud-Huguet has discussed Mansfield’s epiphanic 
moments from a Lacanian perspective which offers a very different angle to that of my 
Bergsonian approach. What is particularly suggestive in her analysis is her description of 
epiphany as ‘secular mysticism’ which allows for the possibility of transcendence without 
framing it in Christian terms.
127
 Paccaud-Huguet identifies three distinctive modes of 
epiphany – the ‘arboreal’, the ‘blank’ and the ‘dark’ – which are, in turn, related to the forces 
of desire, betrayal through language, and danger and erasure, all of which suggest ‘negative’ 
forms of non-spiritual epiphany.
128
 Where I concur with Paccaud-Huguet’s argument is in 
her identification of ‘anti-epiphanies’ and in her assessment that Mansfield’s characters are 
overwhelmed by their experiences of epiphany, especially in their experience of ‘plenitude’, 




                                                 
125
 Van Gunsteren, p. 61. 
126
 ‘In reality there is no one rhythm of duration; it is possible to imagine many different rhythms 
which, slower or faster, measure the degree of tension or relaxation of different kinds of 
consciousness’. M&M, p. 275. 
127
 Josiane Paccaud-Huguet ‘A Trickle of Voice: Katherine Mansfield and the Modernist Moment of 
Being’, in Celebrating Katherine Mansfield: A Centenary Volume of Essays, ed. by Gerri Kimber 
and Janet Wilson (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pp. 131-43 (p. 132). 
128
 Ibid., p. 136. 
129
 See the chapter on ‘Pleasure’ in Andrew Bennett and Nicholas Royle [1995], An Introduction to 
Literature, Criticism and Theory, 4th edn (Harlow: Pearson Education, 2009), pp. 289-98. 
198 
 
The Bergsonian Epiphany 
In Henri Bergson and British Modernism, Mary Ann Gillies explores the idea of a 
Bergsonian epiphany in relation to James Joyce’s work. She puts the case for the way in 
which Joyce uses memory to provide a narrative structure for his novels that relies on 
epiphanies.
130
 The argument hinges on the idea that Stephen’s subjective awareness of time 
is similar to Bergson’s immersion in duration.
131
 What Gillies terms a ‘memory-derived’ 
epiphany (likened to what Morris Beja identifies as ‘retrospective’ epiphany
132
) is Bergson’s 
‘recollection of the past moment [which] illuminates both the previous experience from 
which it comes and the present experience that prompted the recollection in the first 
place’.
133
 Joyce, she contends, uses just such a two-way process in a ‘memory (epiphany)’. 
Gillies provides close readings of ‘A Little Cloud’, ‘A Painful Case’ and ‘The Dead’ from 
Dubliners in terms of a ‘Bergsonian-like involuntary memory’. In ‘The Dead’, the principal 
epiphany is described in terms of a ‘memory-based central moment’ which, in a Bergsonian 
manner, ‘shows how memory impinges on present life and is, in turn, altered by this 
relationship’.
134
 Dustin Anderson has pushed this reading further in suggesting that the 
Joycean epiphany resembles Bergson’s memory cone: ‘The initial recollection (or first 
memory-image) interacts with both the aggregate representation of pure memory and with 
perception to create the epiphany (moment of consciousness).’
135
 While these are, I think 
valid, interpretations, they position epiphany in relation to the memory dyad outlined in 
Matter and Memory. My model of epiphany builds on Bergson’s early texts but further 
derives from Bergson’s thinking about cosmic memory in the later texts of Creative 
Evolution and Two Sources. 
In reclaiming the idea of literary epiphany as a textual form of mystical revelation 
which provides access to cosmic duration, consciousness and memory, I provide a typology 
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of epiphany which relates to the move Bergson makes in Creative Evolution in extending 
memory from the human mind to the cosmos.
136
 I frame literary epiphany as a mystical 
apprehension of cosmic consciousness or an all-creative ‘supra-consciousness’. Bringing 
together Bergson’s thinking from Creative Evolution and Two Sources, as well as that of 
William James on the mystical experience, Richard Bucke on cosmic consciousness and 
Evelyn Underhill on the mystical experience outlined above, the Bergsonian epiphany is 
characterised by the following features: 
 
1. Revelation or disclosure. 
2. Intensity of feeling: elation, ecstasy, love, mystic rapture, bliss. 
3. Apprehension of transcendent reality and the ‘divine’, accompanied by a sense 
of brightness or luminosity. 
4. Individual consciousness expanded into cosmic memory. 
5. The ‘moment’ as durational. 
Something akin to this idea of epiphany as a shining, mystical revelation opening out 
to cosmic memory and potentially to the ‘divine’ is alluded to by Mansfield in a notebook 
entry for January 1920, in which she comments directly on the nature of the epiphanic 
‘glimpse’: 
And yet one has these ‘glimpses’, before which all that one ever has written (what 
has one written) all (yes, all) that one ever has read, pales…. The waves, as I drove 
home this afternoon – and the high foam, how it was suspended in the air before it 
fell…. What is it that happens in that moment of suspension? It is timeless. In that 
moment (what do I mean?) the whole life of the soul is contained. One is flung up – 
out of life – one is ‘held’ – and then, down, bright, broken, glittering on to the rocks, 
tossed back – part of the ebb and flow. […] [W]hile I watched the spray I was 
conscious for life of the white sky with a web of torn grey over it [.]
137
 
This record of something momentous having occurred encapsulates the Bergsonian 
epiphany: there is the heightened awareness of the ‘white sky’; and there is light, both 
‘bright’ and ‘white’. There is the continuity of movement of the waves while Mansfield’s 
consciousness forms ‘part of the ebb and flow’ of the forces of nature; and there is 
immersion in the cosmos (‘for life’). Something is revealed of reality beyond life (‘One is 
flung up – out of life’). There is mystery (‘what do I mean?’); and there is an intuition of 
cosmic memory (‘the whole life of the soul is contained’). Consciousness is durational (‘I 
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was conscious for life’); while time is unbounded (‘It is timeless’). A paragraph later in the 
same notebook Mansfield discusses Dickens’s ‘immersion’ in his writing, which she couches 
in terms of an elevated feeling of bliss: ‘There are moments when Dickens is possessed by 
this power of writing – he is carried away – that is bliss.’
138
 Being ‘carried away’ towards a 
state of cosmic consciousness and writing as a form of bliss or creative emotion are the ideas 
to which I now turn. 
‘Bliss’ 
Bliss generally refers to a state of gladness, enjoyment or delight as well as the 
beatitude of heaven. But the story, ‘Bliss’, was a product of mixed feelings for Mansfield. It 
was written in Bandol in the South of France during the second half of February 1918, when 
Mansfield was experiencing a crisis in her health as well as contemplating the relationship 
between ‘corruption’ and ‘love’; and it followed one of her most cynical stories, Je ne parle 
pas français. Mansfield wrote to Murry in late February 1918 about being taken over by 
writing: 
Ive just finished this new story Bliss and am sending it to you. But though my God! I 
have enjoyed writing it […]. One extraordinary thing has happened to me since I 
came over here! Once I start them they haunt me, pursue me and plague me until 
they are finished and as good as I can do.
139
 
The passage suggests Mansfield wrote the story possessed by her own creative ‘bliss’; and 
that it ‘plagued’ her may be a covert reference to her health, or to her relationship with 
Murry, which was known to be under strain at that time. ‘Bliss’, then, is a potentially 
ambivalent title for the story. 
My reading focuses on an ambivalent process of transfiguration and of apprehension 
of cosmic consciousness rather than on a moment of transfixion. It is signalled by Bertha’s 
state of ‘waiting for something … divine to happen …’.
140
 That the ‘divine’ can be read 
ironically, as pleasure which becomes degraded, as well as in mystical terms brings the 
mundane and the everyday and the celestial and the cosmic together. Bertha’s anticipation of 
the ‘divine’, I argue, further prefigures two disturbing epiphanic ‘revelations’ in the story: 
her apparent self-revelation to Pearl in her mystic rapture gazing at the pear tree; and her 
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delayed revelation that her husband and Pearl have deceived her and ‘blinded’ her conscious 
awareness. 
The story opens with the words: ‘Although Bertha Young was thirty she still had 
moments like this when she wanted to run instead of walk, to take dancing steps on and off 
the pavement’ (p. 14). There is a Bergsonian dimension to this opening description of 
Bertha’s bliss in that there is a sense of the past continuing into the present which is caught 
up in the feeling. The inclusion of elements of Free Indirect Discourse, normal Indirect 
Discourse as well as Direct Discourse, often shifting fairly freely between these narrative 
modes, also indicates ambivalence and places the reader in a position of uncertainty from the 
outset about who is narrating the story. When Bertha’s exalted state is indirectly narrated, the 
implication is that she is not fully aware of her own consciousness: 
What can you do if you are thirty and, turning the corner of your own street, you are 
overcome, suddenly, by a feeling of bliss – absolute bliss! – as though you’d 
suddenly swallowed a bright piece of that late afternoon sun and it burned in your 
bosom, sending out a little shower of sparks into every particle, into every finger and 
toe?… (pp. 141-2) 
Such a state of blissful abandonment, as Evelyn Underhill observes, is also typical of the 
mystic who ‘must be “oned with bliss”’ in their communion with transcendent reality.
141
 
This ambivalent narrative mode is encoded by the opposing emotions in the story 
which are both tentatively valorised and subtly undermined. Bertha is in a ‘bright glowing 
place’ but is ‘fearful’; her radiance and the ‘fire in her bosom’ contrast with the cold mirror, 
Harry’s coolness, and Pearl Fulton’s silver and white attire. There is the solidity (and 
artificiality) of objects such as the pyramid of fruit, but an ‘airy’ atmosphere; there is light 
and shadow; Bertha appears to be in the full flow of bodily feeling whereas Pearl is 
represented as being ethereal; there is Bertha’s joie de vivre and Harry’s ‘zest for life’ 
countered by Bertha’s tiredness and the ‘dragging’ cats. These polarities are encapsulated by 
the proleptic irony that Bertha is waiting for something (superb or spiritual) that ‘must 
happen … infallibly’ (p. 142) for it suggests any ‘absence of error’ will later be tested, even 
negated. There is an ironic reference perhaps, also, to divine Infallibility – that ‘inability to 
err in teaching revealed truth’ – as Bertha is finally able to perceive the truth (or read the 
falsehood) with respect to Pearl’s and Harry’s amatory relations.
142 
The story’s ambivalence 
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is further captured in the image of the pear tree which lacks buds or petals, but is in bloom; it 
is tall and slender but ripe and full. In Bertha’s heightened state, which induces a 
(mis)reading of her situation, the tree is perfect. Also ambivalent is Bertha’s exaggerated 
sense of being ‘too happy – too happy!’ (p. 145). The iteration of such phrases throughout 
the story seems to call such feelings into question rather than reinforce their power and 
persuasiveness and, by extension, raises a further question about the perfection, the 
infallibility, of Bertha’s life.
143
 
In the story, the phrase ‘Nothing is one thing’ (which is echoed across time by 
Woolf in To the Lighthouse) might be seen both in terms of a Bergsonian multiplicity and of 
Mansfield’s sense, as discussed in relation to ‘The Garden Party’, of the ‘diversity of life’ 
and ‘how we try to fit in everything’.
144
 Two of the same, or two different things experienced 
simultaneously, extend to earthly, bodily lust (‘bliss/om’) and an apprehension of mystic, 
cosmic ‘bliss’. That is, on the one hand there is the effect of Pearl Fulton on Bertha: ‘What 
was there in the touch of that cool arm that could fan – fan – start blazing – blazing – the fire 
of bliss that Bertha did not know what to do with?’ (p. 147). On the other hand there is 
Bertha’s apparent (and as it turns out, ironically construed) mystical intuition in relation to 
Pearl: 
What she simply couldn’t make out – what was miraculous – was how she should 
have guessed Miss Fulton’s mood so exactly and so instantly. For she never doubted 
for a moment that she was right, and yet what had she to go on. Less than nothing. 
(pp. 148-9) 
In this passage the Bergsonian idea of the ‘many’ (or heterogeneity) collides neither with the 
‘one’ (unity), nor with a negation (nothing), but with a subtraction: ‘Less than nothing’. The 
ironic undertones undermine Bertha’s ability to ‘commune’ with Pearl which relies on 
Bertha’s sense of her rare and seemingly mystical ability to divine what others are feeling: 
‘“I believe this does happen very, very rarely between women”’ (p. 149). This ‘inspoken’ 
thought, or Free Indirect Discourse, gives us Bertha’s interior point of view, which is 
overlaid with foreboding for the reader who has already been alerted to the idea that Bertha 
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is not entirely in control of herself, and that another narrator – a supraconsciousness – is 
covertly manipulating the narrative. 
There are, I suggest, two revelations in the story: one of ‘mystic revelation’ or 
‘cosmic epiphany’, the other of ‘untimely’ revelation’ or inverted epiphany. The first 
revelation is in the encounter with Pearl Fulton when Pearl and Bertha look at the pear tree 
together. Bertha, having seemingly intuited that there is some mystic communion with Pearl, 
has waited for a ‘sign’ from Pearl; this comes when Pearl asks about the garden. As Bertha 
pulls the curtains apart and opens the windows (actions which can be construed as 
unconscious preparation for the epiphany as well as unconscious sexual self-display), there is 
Bertha’s annunciatory exclamation: ‘“There!” she breathed’ (p. 149). Bertha’s breath is the 
spirit (‘breath’ deriving from Latin spiritus meaning ‘spirit, breath’) working in her. The pear 
tree in the garden, in full bloom, is Bertha’s spiritual and sensual ‘revelation’ to Pearl Fulton 
in that the tree can be regarded, not only as a phallic symbol, but as a symbol of a 
Bergsonian ‘cosmic epiphany’: ‘[I]t seemed, like the flame of a candle, to stretch up, to 
point, to quiver in the bright air, to grow taller and taller as they gazed – almost to touch the 
rim of the round, silver moon’ (p. 149).
145
 Here is Bertha’s ‘disclosure’ to Pearl; the intense 
joint gaze (accompanied by the heat of a flame); a reaching up towards the light with its 
intimation of transcendence; the quivering of consciousness; and the sense of durational 
continuity in the ‘moment’ of the tree-as-candle stretching and growing, all fulfilling the 
terms of the Bergsonian epiphany. The moon symbolises potentially both a female sexual 
state (in the words ‘rim’ and ‘round’) as well as the shining emblem of Bertha’s projected 
mystical love onto the ‘silvery’, tall and transcendent Pearl.
146
 
The aura that surrounds the two women is also reminiscent of a mystical experience, 
the two women, ‘caught in that circle of unearthly light […] creatures of another world […] 
wondering what they were to do in this one with all this blissful treasure that burned in their 
bosoms and dropped, in silver flowers, from their hair and hands?’ (p. 149). At this point 
there is also an apparent synthesis of opposing states: the mystic communion between the 
two women evinced by the sight of the pear tree (certainly an ‘arboreal’ epiphany in 
Paccaud-Huguet’s schema) brings the otherworldly and the earthly into a unified state of 
‘bliss’. Not only do the immanent and transcendent aspects of consciousness and reality 
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merge, but the moment is given over to cosmic memory encapsulated by the questing and 
questioning phrase on which my interpretation of the story turns: ‘For ever – for a moment?’ 
(p. 149). The idea of an endless continuity of time, ‘forever’, pushes a Bergsonian reading 
beyond his own limits towards everlastingness; Mansfield, I suggest, is implying in this 
phrase that the ‘forever’ is found within the moment and depicts the possibility of enduring 
consciousness and memory. 
This cosmic experience is simultaneously compromised, however. For in the story 
Bertha’s seemingly perfected state of mystical communion with Pearl is brought into doubt: 
the text establishes that the mystical state may merely be Bertha’s psychological projection 
or a fantasy, a dream state or a reverie, even a self-induced hysterical state.
147
 This raises the 
idea that mystic revelation may itself be in some sense untrue. The supra-narrator’s repeated 
questioning signals this ambiguity: ‘did Miss Fulton murmur: “Yes. Just that.” Or did Bertha 
dream it?’ (p. 149). The possibility of error or uncertainty breaks the reader’s spell at this 
point, although at this stage in the narrative Bertha’s own ecstasy is not undermined. It is the 
reader who has questions: to what does Pearl Fulton’s indistinctly yet emphatically spoken 
pronoun ‘that’ refer: the experience of bliss; of sexual desire; of a state of arousal in 
response to the ‘quivering’ pear tree; of Pearl’s own desire for Bertha’s ‘exquisite’ feeling? 
Or, perhaps, the experience of the shining light which I am associating with Bergsonian 
epiphanic transcendence and the apprehension of the ‘unearthly’? This last supposition is 
especially suggestive given that the apparent spell between the women is broken only when 
an electric light is switched on. The story continues in the glare of artificial illumination 
which only emphasises the artifice of Bertha’s and Harry’s modernity evinced by their 
fashionable suburban lives and the banality and affectation exhibited by their metropolitan 
dinner-party guests. 
That Bertha understands that she has shared something mystical and other-worldly 
with Pearl allows her to anticipate the world of earthly pleasures: and the possibility, for the 
first time, of desiring her husband. That this carnality would take place in a ‘dark room’ 
contrasts with the luminescence associated with Pearl. This light / dark dyad not only raises 
light to the principal term over darkness (and Pearl over Harry), it also implies desire which 
is not necessarily fully or only sexual on both sides of the binary. That is, Bertha’s initiation 
with Pearl may be into a form of mystical love which in turn initiates the first feelings of 
heterosexual desire towards Harry. But Bertha imagines the sexual dimension to the latter 
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relationship to be ‘blind’ and frightening, also emphasising her ambivalence towards 
heterosexuality (p. 150). Read in Bergsonian terms, there is a hesitant interplay between 
‘matter’ and ‘memory’: the ‘matter’ of flesh (carnal union with Harry) takes place once the 
‘memory’ has found its outlet (in mystical union with Pearl). The phrase (which may be 
Bertha’s or the supra-narrator’s) ‘Was this what that feeling of bliss had been leading up to?’ 
(p. 151) suggests that Bertha experiences some carnal ardour. And yet the narrative quickly 
checks this notion, too: ‘But then, then – ’; the iterated adverb ‘then’ alluding to a possible 
continuing deferral of Bertha’s bliss/om. 
The second revelation, or what I am calling ‘inverted epiphany’, occurs when Bertha 
witnesses a revelatory scene of intimacy between Pearl and Harry in the hall at the end of the 
dinner party as they seem to affirm (from Bertha’s point of view) a future (sexual) 
assignation. The anticipated tryst is presumably within an already established relationship 
which may itself result in a distortion of time for Bertha whose faith in the reliability of the 
past as well as that of her future may be put in doubt by Harry’s unfaithfulness. The 
‘untimely’ revelation or ‘inverted epiphany’ is of an unhappy truth which results in bathos. 
At this stage in the narrative, Pearl Fulton is still associated with the moon (‘her moonbeam 
fingers’, p. 151), and in symbolising changeability allows the story to turn on Bertha’s 
revelation that she has been mis-reading her own story; the disclosure, in which ‘bliss’ 
changes to ‘blight’, happens without foreknowledge.
148
 The Bergsonian sense of the future 
that is unforeseeable is played out at the end of the story: 
‘Oh, what is going to happen now?’ she cried. 
But the pear tree was as lovely as ever and as full of flower and as still. (p. 
152) 
It is the pear tree that seems to be able to continue unchanged, the word ‘still’ signifying 
both ‘going on’ (temporally) and remaining in its place (spatially). And the tree is ‘still’ 
itself, capable of change and continuity in its growth cycle. These two types of epiphany, the 
‘mystical’ and the ‘inverted’, might be regarded as a means of shedding further light on 
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Bergson’s own dualism between matter and spirit via the recalibrating of Bertha’s mystical 
rapture with profane sexuality, spiritual enlightenment with earth-bound realities. 
Sally Vickers has suggested that Bertha and Pearl Fulton looking together at the pear 
tree is a ‘transforming moment’ which brings communion with both her friend and husband. 
Where I differ from Vickers is in her claim that evoking this ‘epiphanic conjoined state’ as 
perfect leaves the reader as unprepared as Bertha for the later episode in the hall. According 
to Vickers, this ‘re-visioning of the former vision only quickens the sense of life’s 
mysterious ineffability’ shared both by Bertha and the reader.
149
 But in my reading the signs 
are already there for the reader but not yet for Bertha. In another analysis, which also runs 
counter to my own, Paul March Russell argues that the story’s ending invokes a ‘true bliss’ 
associated with the pain of non-spiritual revelation: 
[T]the story undercuts romantic conceptions, including the identification of epiphany 
with spiritual transcendence. […] [T]he narrative structure of ‘Bliss’ is anti-




In my view, Bertha has her exalted mystical feeling attended by light, but she is also ‘blind’; 
her ‘blindness’, nonetheless, is the very symbol of her mystic state. The mystic believes in 
truth beyond understanding; the etymology of the mystical indicates that the mystic must 
keep her mouth (‘close lips or eyes’) shut for there is secrecy or mystery attached to the word 
itself.
151
 It is significant, then, that in the first epiphany Bertha is in a mystic state of having 
her eyes closed (she sees the pear tree ‘on her eyelids’). In the second epiphany, rather than 
hearing the assignation being made with Harry, Bertha appears to see the affirmation on 
Miss Fulton’s eyelids. In the one case she may be a naïve reader of her world, in the second, 
she ‘lip-reads’ on the eyes the revealed truth. 
 The critical literature on ‘Bliss’ is extensive, much of which advances various 
interpretations of the story, often via the symbolism of the pear tree, in relation to Bertha’s 
sexuality.
152
 Bertha’s ‘bliss’ has also been discussed in terms of hysteria, although critics 
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have not made a link between Bertha’s ecstasy and mysticism. Patricia Moran has 
commented persuasively on Bertha’s hysteria, suggesting that Mansfield intended Bertha to 
be ‘recognizably hysterical’.
153
 Bertha displays the classic symptoms of globus hystericus, 
including mood swings, uncontrollable laughter and a choking sensation which Moran 
associates with ‘bliss’. But Moran claims the story is not so much ‘about’ hysteria, as such, 
as about Bertha’s attempt to repress her ‘abnormal’ sexual desire, with the text becoming 
‘the hysteric’s stream of (un)consciousness’.
154
 Earlier critics such as Sylvia Berkman and 
Saralyn R. Daly have also taken the view that Bertha is hysterical, with Daly maintaining 
that Bertha’s ‘high excitement’, demonstrated by the description ‘She began to laugh.[…] 
I’m getting hysterical’, derives from her knowledge before the story begins that her husband 
is having an affair.
155
 This reading denies the possibility of dramatic disclosure which I find 
in the story and points rather to self-denial. Daly further relates the ‘hysterical tone’ of 
Bertha’s interior monologue to her status as a ‘treacherously fallible narrator’.
156
 In this 
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reading Bertha is either selfless (she knows but does not reveal that she knows) or nihilistic 
(she rejects knowledge and accepts nothing). 
The link between hysteria and the mystical state in particular was made by Evelyn 
Underhill, who observed that hysteria had long been interpreted as perverted mysticism. In 
this, early twentieth-century, view hysteria is seen as a disease which causes the 
disintegration of consciousness, with the hysteric exhibiting tendencies towards 
‘automatism’ as well as ‘ecstasy’.
157
 The subtle difference between the mystic and the 
hysteric, however, is that while the consciousness of each is dominated by one fixed and 
intense idea, in the hysteric that idea becomes obsessional whereas in the mystic the idea is 
uplifting: it is a ‘perception of the transcendent reality and presence of God’.
158
 This 
difference seems to turn on rationality; and the reader may ask: is Bertha rational or 
irrational? Is she a mystic and / or a hysteric? The story surely allows multiple readings. 
Bertha has a ‘habit’ of repeating herself, such as falling in love with strange women (p. 144), 
a symptom perhaps of an obsessional personality. She also perceives a higher level of reality 
in the objects and things around her; symbols such as fruit arranged in a pattern in a bowl, 
the fructifying pear tree, the transcendent moon and Pearl’s luminosity announce Bertha’s 
mystical and hysterical state. I would suggest that both Bertha’s epiphanic perception and 
her ‘hysterical’ consciousness foster the conditions for a mystical feeling towards Pearl and 
cosmic memory: a double means of entry into ‘another world’. 
Bertha’s ecstatic / hysterical state aligns with the mystic’s psychological disposition, 
according to Underhill, to display ‘nervous organization of the artistic type’.
159
 In this view, 
artistic contemplation, creativity and inspiration relate to divine influence. The artist longs to 
express himself or herself, trying ‘to give us in colour, sound or words a hint of his ecstasy, 
his glimpse of truth’.
160
 In ‘Bliss’, Bertha’s ‘artistry’ seems redolent of a hyper-aesthetic 
state as she struggles with self-definition, description of the world and a confused 
understanding of the beautiful or sublime. The idea of writing as inspiration in ‘Bliss’ is set 
against the superficial ‘modern’ works satirised in Eddie Warren’s enthusiasm for inane-
sounding ‘new’ poems such as ‘Table d’Hôte’ with its ludicrous lines about tomato soup. 
But what Bertha’s feeling of bliss might also allude to is an authorial comment on the 
ecstasy (and agony) of writing. While Bertha finds it difficult to express herself in speech 
(which recalls Laura’s stammering in ‘The Garden Party’), it may be that ‘bliss’ is 
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nonetheless indicative of a divinely inspired, creative life; ‘Bliss’ can also be seen, then, as a 
story ‘about’ writing as revelation and inspiration; as the very breath of words.
161
 
Who, though, narrates the story? Saralyn Daly argues that Bertha is the narrator but 
is a ‘treacherously fallible’ one.
162
 Patricia Moran also finds ambiguity in the story, 
suggesting that the text is ‘Focalized through Bertha and yet not her voice’, and that ‘“Bliss” 
speaks the unspeakable story of a woman who has no story.’
163
 While Moran argues that 
there is no omniscient narrator, she does not suggest ‘who’ it is that ‘speaks’; the text seems 
to speak itself. Mansfield herself admitted to Middleton Murry that the story exceeds 
Bertha’s own consciousness: 
What I meant […] was, Bertha, not being an artist, was yet artist manqué enough to 
realise that those words and expressions were not & couldn’t be hers – They were, as 
it were quoted by her, borrowed […] … Yet she’d none of her own … But this I 
agree is not permissible – I cant grant all that in my dear reader.
164
 
As well as being a citational character in the way Mansfield describes, it could be argued that 
Bertha is possessed by Katherine Mansfield’s own creative spirit in an almost occult way. 
While Mansfield makes her supra-narrator withdraw from view, s/he becomes 
‘ghostly’ and, as I have noted, at times covertly operates in the text by providing the reader 
with information ahead of Bertha. T. O. Beachcroft notes that stories by Mansfield, as well 
as those by Joyce, Lawrence and the now largely forgotten A. E. Coppard, are not strongly 
action centred and ‘put across by a self-important narrator’. Rather, their distinguishing 
feature is that ‘The stories are not so much narrated as revealed’.
165
 If in ‘Bliss’ Bertha is 
never given full access to memory and consciousness her limited (or false) consciousness is, 
ironically, revealed via epiphany. The two types of epiphany I have described in the story 
represent Bertha’s transition from one of expectation leading to the revelation of the mystical 
state to one of dismay at the revelation of the betrayal of earthly desire. While the latter state 
of knowledge may signal a Christian fall from grace for Bertha, the reader has already been 
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While Bergson’s mystical-inspired epiphany has been primarily helpful for reading 
‘Bliss’, it could also be so for reading other stories by Mansfield in which an intimation of 
cosmic memory can be discerned, namely, Prelude and ‘The Escape, both of which feature 
prominently in the story a tree which has symbolic mystical properties. In ‘The Escape’ the 
story brings in the five aspects of the Bergsonian epiphany: a disclosure or unexpected 
revelation; an unexpected intensity, for the protagonist is a ‘hollow man’ in T. S. Eliot’s 
sense; an apprehension of the divine accompanied by luminosity; an extension of memory 
consciousness to the ‘beyond’ of the cosmos; and a sense of durational continuity. The 
mystical revelation happens to the male character whose transcendent vision is triggered 
both by a tree with its silver stem and copper leaves as well as by something white and 
opaque with pillars which is ‘beyond’ the tree. The epiphany turns on a double exposure to 
the silence and the voice of a woman singing, emanating either from within the tree 
(immanence) or the unknown ‘beyond’ (transcendence), with the repetition of the word 
‘beyond’ highlighting the story’s mystical dimension (p. 221). Some of Mansfield’s stories 
which include children also lend themselves to a reading in terms of ‘mystical epiphany’. 
‘The Doll’s House’, for instance, culminates in little Else’s revelation that she has ‘seen’ the 
little lamp; and in ‘The Voyage’, the boat’s passage through mist to the early light of dawn 
charts the growing understanding of the inevitability of death of the motherless child Fenella 
as she is passed from her grieving father to the old Father Time figure of her grandfather. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have placed a renewed emphasis on Bergson’s mystical philosophy 
in the context of the modernist period and I have argued that Bergson attributed 
consciousness and memory not only to the individual but to the universe or cosmos as a 
whole and which not only historicises Bergson, but contributes to twenty-first-century re-
evaluations of early twentieth-century religious belief. I have then argued that Mansfield 
represents cosmic memory in some of her stories by deploying the technique of what I have 
described as the Bergsonian epiphany. I have claimed that in ‘Bliss’, however, Mansfield 
forestalls the durational possibilities of epiphany for Bertha by allowing her to oscillate 
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between immediate time-based and earthly desires and spiritual yearnings towards a 
potentially more  timeless memory. 
In providing a new and distinctive reading of ‘Bliss’, a well-worked text in 
Mansfield studies, I have brought together Bergson’s articulation of  cosmic memory with a 
reinvigorated approach to epiphany conceptualised in terms of the extraordinary as a means 
of countering a recent tendency in modernist studies to over valorise the ordinary and 
mundane. My approach has rested on the idea that the ‘moment’ is neither foreclosed by 
being captured nor everlasting, but is time-filled. As the moment passes, in Bergson’s 
schema, it is also retained. But one question remains unresolved: when, if at all, does the 
temporal consciousness of the individual cease? Is duration endless for the individual or is it 
curtailed by death or death’s brief ‘thereafter’?  
Other than in ‘The Voyage’, a death features or is recounted in several of 
Mansfield’s stories, notably ‘The Child-Who-Was Tired’, ‘The Woman at the Store’, 
‘Millie’, ‘Old Tar’, ‘The Stranger’, ‘The Daughters of the Late Colonel’, ‘Widowed’, ‘At the 
Bay’, ‘The Garden Party’, ‘Six Years After’, ‘Weak Heart’, ‘The Fly’ and ‘The Canary’. 
There is also a symbolic death of the heart or of hope in stories such as ‘Miss Brill’ and ‘The 
Life of Ma Parker’, ‘Marriage à la Mode’ and ‘A Cup of Tea’. By way of a final Conclusion, 
I turn to the potential inconclusiveness of death by examining Mansfield’s and Bergson’s 
attitude to the afterlife; and in offering a reading of Mansfield’s last completed story, ‘The 
Canary’, I reprise the four key concepts of Bergson’s thought that have enabled the readings 




Life after Death 
She is a bird. 
[…] 
‘A moment – a moment … I die’. 




Throughout this thesis I have aimed to show that an understanding of a range of 
Katherine Mansfield’s stories can be enriched by using some of Bergson’s key philosophical 
ideas to interpret them. By way of a conclusion, I explore Bergson’s and Mansfield’s 
attitudes to life after death in answering the question of whether what I have referred to as 
the ‘insistence’ of memory extends up to and beyond bodily death. I show that both Bergson 
and Mansfield expressed ambivalence about immortality, and in a reading of her last 
completed story, ‘The Canary’, I bring Bergson’s thought to bear on this ‘final’ Mansfield 
text. ‘The Canary’, I argue, addresses the ‘matter’ of bodily death and intimations of the 
immortality of the ‘spirit’ through remembering. In my reading, I identify four specific types 
of binary terms which recapitulate the topics of my four chapters: generative memory, 
temporality, forgetting and cosmic memory. 
Historians and literary critics have attested that in the early twentieth century 
spiritualism – the belief that the spirits of the dead exist in another realm and can be 
contacted by the living – was pitted against scientific rationality. As Jenny Hazelgrove 
explains, ‘Spiritualism emerges as the pathological outcome of science’s triumphant but 
traumatic shedding of religion.’
2
 Growing interest in spiritualist practices prevalent in late 
Victorian culture associated with the occult and magic, with paranormal phenomena, and 
with mediums and parapsychology continued to inform the emerging cultures of modernity, 
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especially technological cultures, of the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century.
3
 
That spiritualism had a mainstream following in the immediate post-war and interwar years 
was largely due to the devastating psychological impact of the First World War.
 
Grieving 
relatives attended séances to try to make contact with the war dead and soldiers turned to the 
supernatural to make sense of the incoherencies of life in the trenches. But spiritualism also 
had a wider cultural impact on some writers such as Arthur Conan Doyle who, while they 
might not have found a means to resolve the question of whether the dead return or remain 
among the living, found in spiritualist discourse an echo of the way art transmogrifies the 
world. Modernists, in particular, also found an exemplum for their formal and thematic 
experimentalism, such as the ‘displacements of authorial voice’ and ‘subversions of spatial 
and temporal conventions’, as Helen Sword has demonstrated.
4
 
Bergson’s investigation of psychic phenomena such as séances, clairvoyance and 
telepathy, as well as the life of the spirit after the death of the body, provided him with the 
framework for his lifelong work on the interaction of memory and material life.
5
 In his 1914 
lecture about the First World War, he berated Germany for having deployed ‘the 
mechanization of spirit instead of the spiritualization of matter’.
6
 And in ‘Life and 
Consciousness’ he speculated that if the activity of our minds exceeded that of our brains and 
if memories were independent of the brain, as he had theorised in Matter and Memory, then 
the ‘personality’ might be preserved, even enhanced, after bodily disintegration, with 
consciousness ‘preparing itself for a more efficient action, for an intenser life’.
7
 A year later, 
in his lecture on ‘The Soul and the Body’, Bergson hypothesised, a little more cautiously, 
that it might be possible to establish ‘survival for a time’ after death.
8
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More than twenty years later, in Two Sources, Bergson returned to the same problem 
but this time he took a more mystical view, arguing that if our soul survives physical death, 
the afterlife might be accessed via something similar to mystic intuition accompanied by 
feelings of joy: ‘Joy indeed would be that simplicity of life diffused throughout the world by 
an ever-spreading mystic intuition; joy, too, that which would automatically follow a vision 
of the life beyond.’
9
 Bergson demonstrates his willingness to use the methods of science to 
produce knowledge about a possible spiritual life after death by going on to say that such an 
experience could only be confirmed by scientific experiment. The unanswered question, 
however, was whether either mystics, with their special faculties of apprehending the 
mystical realm, or mere ordinary human beings, even, could reach the highest plane of 
‘everlasting life’. In Two Sources Bergson concluded that there was insufficient information 
about the ‘conditions of the afterlife’ to be able to judge, especially when it came to whether 
the afterlife had duration ‘for a time or for all eternity’.
10
 And in the second of his two 
introductions to The Creative Mind, he observed that there could only be a ‘degree’ of 
‘added life’ after physical death. He eventually came to the conclusion that only religious 
faith could account for an afterlife of ‘endless duration’.
11
 What is noteworthy, then, is the 
way in which Bergson seemed to defer to the discourses of science and religion over 
metaphysics when it came to the contested question of the immortality of the soul.  
Like Bergson, Katherine Mansfield was also sceptical about the possibility of life 
after death. In 1919 she had confided in Ottoline Morell: ‘weve only one life and I cannot 
believe in immortality. I wish I could’.
12
 Rather, she seemed to aspire to a renewed life in 
life, a condition she worked hard to achieve at the Gurdjieff Institute, confiding in her friend 
Olgivanna: ‘more than ever I feel that I can build up a life within me which death will not 
destroy’.
13
 The chance of eternal life was not ruled out by Gurdjieff and his followers, 
however; they thought that through sacrifice and suffering the life of the mind might become 
immortal.
14
 Despite her doubts, it seems clear that in her by then advanced stage of 
tuberculosis Mansfield had especially good reason to contemplate the life of the soul and the 
potential for immortality, as I show in turning to ‘The Canary’, which she finished on 7
 
July 
1922, only six months before her death. 
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‘The Canary’ is unusual among Mansfield’s stories in being presented as a spoken 
monologue where the speaker is alone and yet seems to address an unidentified listener, 
‘you’ (p. 513). Whereas in ‘Bliss’ there is ambiguity about who is speaking, in ‘The Canary’ 
it is unclear just who is the addressee of the story. Clare Hanson and Andrew Gurr suggest 
that in as much as it is the reader who is made to overhear the story, the reader is invited to 
‘complete the circle of its creation’.
16
 Mansfield may also have been partially addressing 
herself as the canary: she referred to her lungs as ‘wings’ and had at that time also written 
what was to be her last poem in which the speaker of the poem is likened to a ‘wounded 
bird’.
17
 The landlady’s soliloquy may therefore be an act of recalling the dead to life via 
remembrance, but also in song. 
Vincent O’Sullivan, one of the few critics to have written about ‘The Canary’, 
maintains that the story is a lament for the death of the canary which intimates that ‘more 
than mere decease might be drawn from it’.
18
 Mansfield herself wrote in spiritually uplifting 
terms to her cousin Elizabeth in February 1922 about the enchanting song of the canaries that 
she could hear from her hotel window in Paris, but also commented on the difficulty of 
aesthetically rendering the birds’ sonorous sound: ‘How can one possibly express in words 
the beauty of their quick little song rising, as it were, out of the very stones …’
19
 This 
sentiment points to that which goes beyond words: to transcendence (‘rising’), deriving from 
the spirit immanent in things (‘the very stones’), as well as an aural ‘resurrection’, with 
sound holding memory within it which might continue after the death of the physical body.
20
 
The idea of going beyond speech is countered by Anne Besnault-Levita, who refers to the 
‘dramaturgy of voice’ in the story and suggests that it is speech rather than song that 
functions as a ‘form of memorialization’ which temporarily offsets the speaker’s loss. 
Without an interlocutor or audience for speech, the reader is required to take on an 
‘impossible mourning’.
21
 This ‘monologic’ story is redefined by Besnault-Levita at the end 
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of her analysis as an example of ‘dialogism in absentia’, a form of polyphony in which 
different utterances seem to be self-generated in a ‘dramaturgy of the solitary self’.
22
 
‘Voice’, then, signifies not only borrowed speech, but the de-authorising of narrative voice; a 




The function of sound or song in ‘The Canary’ is the basis of the first opposition in 
my reading and recalls my first chapter on Bergson’s differentiation between habit and pure 
memory. The landlady is subject to the routines of looking after her boarders and of listening 
to her washerwoman every Monday. She brings her sewing onto the veranda in the 
afternoons, the canary repetitively hopping ‘from one perch to the other’ and launching into 
song: ‘it was always the same, every afternoon’ (p. 512). These habits are interspersed with 
recollections from pure memory of specific occasions when the bird has consoled her with 
its singing: 
… It surprises even me now to remember how he and I shared each other’s lives. 
The moment I came down in the morning and took the cloth off his cage he greeted 
me with a drowsy little note. I knew it meant ‘Missus! Missus!’ (p. 512) 
While the bird may sing, it is of course a captive and the text may also resonate extra-
textually with Mansfield’s fears for her creativity, when a month before her death she wrote 
that she was ‘tired’ of her ‘little stories like birds bred in cages’ and hadn’t ‘written a word’ 
for several months.
24
 The tension between the productive recollection of the sonorous bird in 
the story and the restrictions on creative freedom also recalls Bergson’s idea that it is rare 
that we are truly ‘free’, even though it is the artist and the mystic who are most likely to defy 
convention and make that leap to freedom. 
The second opposition that I identify in the story, recalling my second chapter, is 
between spatialised time and the ‘real’ time of duration. The landlady’s day consists of both 
the measured time of attending to her lodgers and the fluid time of recollecting the 
‘exquisite’ song of her canary. Just as memory for Bergson, going all the way back to Time 
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(Autumn, 2008), 2-10 (p. 3; p. 5). Besnault-Levita also provides a phenomenological reading of 
voice as a ‘sonorous phenomenon’ in several of Mansfield’s stories in her chapter, ‘“– Ah, what is 
it? – that I heard”: Voice and Affect in Katherine Mansfield’s Short Fictions’, in Katherine 
Mansfield and Literary Modernism, ed. by Janet Wilson, Gerri Kimber and Susan Reid, pp. 89-100 
(p. 90). In this article Besnault-Levita argues that ‘The Canary’ is a ‘tragedy’ of ‘the inaudible’ (p. 
97). 
22
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and Free Will, is represented by the chimes of the clock which supply an image for ensuring 
that ‘distinct terms’ have ‘melted into one another […] to make a kind of musical phrase’
25
 
and is later described in Matter and Memory as being the continuity of the past in the 
present, memory is prolonged for the landlady through the canary’s repeating song. The 
canary seems to bring the different rhythms of time together through its singing which is 
singular: ‘It was not like the singing of other canaries’ (p. 511) and entire: ‘it really seemed 
to me he sang whole songs’ (p. 511). 
Memory and forgetting (in Bergson’s sense that forgetting is remembering in 
abeyance) were the subject of my third chapter and is the third opposition I identify in ‘The 
Canary’. The immediacy of the landlady’s spoken word, and the canary’s iterated song, are 
countered by the pauses (or ‘hesitation’ in Bergson’s schema) denoted by the ellipses in the 
text which indicate that the landlady’s memories are being recalled. The pause or hesitation 
necessarily precedes the drawing down of memories from their latent state when required in 
the present. The different use of tenses in the story brings the remembered memories into 
conjunction with the speaker’s perceptual consciousness of her immediate surroundings, as 
well as with the temporal horizon of her future: 
… You see that big nail to the right of the front door? I can scarcely look at it even 
now and yet I could not bear to take it out. I should like to think it was there always 
even after my time […] I feel he is not quite forgotten. (p. 511; emphases added) 
The landlady is able to ‘forget’ the evening star when it is no longer needed to assist her in 
living; and she speaks ‘without being morbid, or giving way to – to memories’ (p. 514). The 
story is not, then, a nostalgic retreat into the past or a succumbing to the pressures of the 
past; rather, it is a commemoration in the present of the unforgettable life of a living creature 
and a celebration of the very act of remembering via necessary forgetting. 
The fourth opposition that I identify is between immanence and transcendence, and 
the individual and the cosmic aspects of memory which map onto the subject of my fourth 
chapter. The memory of the sweetness of the bird’s singing, which is absorbed by the soul 
‘like one’s breathing’ (p. 514) (the immanent), is in tension with a mysterious aurality (the 
transcendent): ‘Ah, what is it? – that I heard.’ (p. 514) This collocation may function both as 
a form of mystic sensitivity to a Bergsonian ‘supra-consciousness’, as a sensitive receptivity 
to a higher being, who may or may not be God, or as a form of sorrow ‘deep down’ in the 
self. The landlady may even be approaching in her soliloquy a quasi-mystic apprehension of 
                                                 
25
 T&FW, p. 127. 
218 
 
the ‘fringe of the real’, or she may be incanting a prayer. A ‘note’ of potential resurrection 
may be sounded in the canary’s song: the landlady’s memory is partly auditory; she hears 
again the song of the canary. Song is not a trigger for memory but a form of memory itself: 
the aural heard as a refrain. 
The possibilities of resurrection and redemption clearly preoccupied Mansfield at 
this time. ‘The Canary’, as Pamela Dunbar argues, was ‘Mansfield’s own literary epitaph’.
26
 
Having completed the story and just before she entered the Gurdjieff Institute, Mansfield 
experienced a crisis in her own being which she couched in terms of death and rebirth. As 
she explained to Murry: ‘I have to die to so much; […] the only thing to do is to get the 
dying over – to court it, almost […] and then all hands to the business of being reborn 
again.’
27
 Once she had entered the Prieuré in Fontainebleau, she found a form of redemption 
there which negated her writing: ‘“What were all my teas and dinners and people, my 
writing –, yes, my writing, too – in comparison with the real life that I find here?”.’
28
 
Removed from the realm of writing she questioned her own truthfulness and fidelity to life 
and envisaged a form of artistic resurrection for herself following her spiritual rehabilitation 
through Gurdjieff’s teachings. In ‘Talks with Katherine Mansfield’, A. R. Orage reports that 
at that time Mansfield understood herself as a writer seeking a true ‘creative principle’, an 
insight which is akin to Bergson’s élan vital and which in Two Sources he reconceptualises 
as ‘creative emotion’.
29
 Mansfield hoped to reach beneath the veneer of insincerity which she 
found in her writing to see ‘what remains’: by this she meant what would survive in its 
emotional truthfulness rather than in any material sense.
30
 In her conversations with Orage, 
she is said to have doubted that she had yet found the technique with which to harness pure 
creative emotion. 
Mansfield’s own ‘beyond’ is of course unknown. Did her spirit live on? Ida Baker 
believed so, recording in her memoir many years later that Mansfield was in touch with her 
from beyond the grave: ‘I saw her face radiant with light as she smiled and passed through 
the room, telling me that all was well.’
31
 And it is well known that John Middleton Murry 
recalled having a mystical vision of Mansfield after her death and that he sanctified her 
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posthumously in the pages of the Adelphi.
32
 While a story like ‘The Canary’ may hint at the 
limited possibilities of extension beyond death accompanied by spiritual belief as in 
Bergson’s view, in doing so, it also transcends the normal limits of artistic vision. The 
specific nature and extent of Mansfield’s focus on insistent memories, temporal recollections 
and epiphanies which intimate a ‘beyond’ and tentatively stretch the membrane separating us 
from eternity take us, I believe, further than most other authors. 
  
                                                 
32
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